Internet penetration in Montenegro stands at 83%, while analysis indicates that internet usage increased by 10,000 users (+2%) from 2021 to 2022. [x] As an EU candidate country, Montenegro has strived to align itself with the EU’s cyber priorities and recent strategic documents like the 2018-2021 Cybersecurity Strategy and its 2013-2017 predecessor represent a firm indication of this ambition. In the past five years, however, the Montenegrin government and media outlets have increasingly seen themselves sitting at the bullseye of numerous malicious cyberattacks, suggesting “synchronised action” on the part of several state and non-state actors. [x] A 2022 digital maturity assessment commissioned by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and conducted by e-Governance Academy found Montenegro to have only a “basic” level of digital maturity in seven dimensions, including “financing digitalisation, level of digital skill, and access to services”. The same assessment found that the “right conditions” had been generated for the purposes of digitalisation, but implementation fell short. These conditions included “political will and support, the legal framework, digital infrastructure and interoperability, digital identity/signature and security”. Montenegrin policymakers now perceive an increased need to transform their stated strategic goals into concrete action.

Brazil is the world’s eighth largest economy in terms of GDP, and by far South America’s most populous and powerful state. While the country has suffered economic and political crises since 2014, it has made significant advances in domestic digitization and played a pivotal, albeit ambiguous role in international negotiations on cyberspace. Brazil has the world’s fifth largest internet user base, after China, India, the United States and Indonesia, and is a leading country in South America when it comes to ICTs usage. The share of Brazilians using the internet has increased from less than 3% of the population in 2000 to more than 68% in 2019. As such, Brazil remains a critical partner for the EU’s efforts to build a secure, stable and rights-based cyberspace.

Thanks to its regulatory powers, robust digital economy, and active foreign and security policy, the European Union is one of the key players in cyberspace. The EU strongly promotes the position that international law, and in particular the United Nations (UN) Charter, applies in cyberspace. As a complement to binding international law, the EU endorses the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour that have been articulated by the UN Group of Governmental Experts. It also encourages the development and implementation of regional confidence building measures, both in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and other regions. On a bilateral level, the EU has established cyber dialogues with strategic partners to reinforce the exchange of good practices, lessons learnt and further the idea of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

Recalling its EU candidate status, the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UN Group of Governmental exports (UNGGE) saw Montenegro aligning itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] Montenegro has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29.

In accordance with the output produced by the 2013, 2015, and 2021 consensual reports of the United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UNGGE), Brazil believes that international law enjoys general applicability in cyberspace. For Brazil, this also includes international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Nevertheless, Brazilian delegations have expressed concern that unqualified transfers of international humanitarian law and an unlimited right of self-defence could legitimise cyberspace as a military domain, while also challenging the protective value of sovereignty and cementing a Western-biased status quo.

Under the auspices of the UN, the EU and its Member States have consistently reaffirmed that a universal cyber security framework can only be grounded in existing international law, including the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law. 
Addressing issues as to how existing international law and international humanitarian law, including the principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality and distinction, apply to the use ICTs by States is necessary to increase accountability and transparency. International humanitarian law is fully applicable in cyberspace and this should not be misunderstood as legitimising the use of force between states in the cyber domain. The EU has typically opposed calls for the need to adapt existing international law as a means to develop a new legal instrument for cyber issues.

At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, Montenegro aligned itself with the EU’s position that the “previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus” form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x].

Brazilian diplomats portray Brazil’s role in the often polarised debates on norms of responsible state behaviour as that of a broker or strategic bridge-builder between the different camps rather than a mere ‘swing state’ and highlight that balancing between both camps serves to maintain an independent foreign policy. Brazil sought to focus its chairmanship of UN GGE’s third and fourth iterations on three issues: the role of civilians in cyber conflict, the right to respond, and attribution. Since the 2013 Snowden revelations, the country has been a stark champion of data protection, showcasing exceptional norm entrepreneurship
in relation to cyber-surveillance norms. Brazil has also expressed support for the proposal of adopting a legally binding instrument in the medium to long-term to prevent the militarisation of cyberspace.

Since 2014, the EU’s ambition has been to act as an ‘honest broker’ on multilateral discussions surrounding issues of cyber governance and norms of responsible state behaviour, aiming to ensure the support and partnership of proactive players in the context of the global debate. The EU has long promoted the need for voluntary, non-binding norms. It believes that norms crystallised under the UN GGE process should generally not be revisited and that progress should be made on matters relating to their implementation. 
Within the OEWG, the EU advanced a suggestion to develop a global repository of existing practice within the United Nations, which would enable UN member states to showcase how they are implementing the voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour, confidence building and other measures.

The new Cybersecurity Strategy 2022-2026 aims to improve effective mechanism for responding to cyber incidents and response to cybercrime. The new strategy recognises the establishment of a new body Cyber Security Agency which will be umbrella institution when it comes to cyber security. The CIRT team will be transferred to the new Agency. The 2018-2021 Cybersecurity Strategy explicitly establishes a “reliance” on European and Euro-Atlantic conceptualisations of cybersecurity and resilience. The Strategy points to the EU’s 2016 NIS Directive as the primary source of inspiration, notably in its requirements for the adoption of a national cybersecurity strategy, the definition of relevant authorities, and the creation of a Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT). Indeed, since 2012, the Montenegrin CIRT represents “a central point for coordinating prevention and protection against computer security incidents on the Internet and other IT security risk for the area of Montenegro”. The Strategy also features a dedicated section on cyber defence, highlighting the country’s alignment with NATO targets (E 6202 N). In expanding cyber defence capabilities, the document notes that “special attention will be paid to harmonisation with regard to the standardisation of concepts, methods, policies, and procedures in line with the accepted European and international standards”. It also pledges the country to a set of goals: (1) definition and protection of critical information infrastructure; (2) strengthening the resilience of information systems to incidents; and (3) performing analysis of threats to IT infrastructure. Montenegro completed a bilateral ICT cooperation agreement with Thailand in 2013, while it is also a member of the CAMP initiative, the platform where members “prepare themselves with collective actions to keep cyberspace safe” through training, joint exercises, and dialogues.

Brazil’s 2020 National Cybersecurity Strategy (E-Ciber) outlines ten strategic actions to be undertaken in relation to cyber resilience, which include the extension of international cooperation and the enhancement of protection for critical infrastructure. The Strategy pledges Brazil to encourage international cooperation in cybersecurity, participate in joint cyber resilience events and exercises, and expand cybersecurity cooperation agreements. On the level of discourse, Brazil remains committed to international cyber cooperation in resilience, staying true to its traditional stance in favour of multilateral solutions.

The EU places great importance on cyber resilience and capacity building. Internally, the Union has built a robust legal acquis in relation to the resilience of critical infrastructures, the cornerstone of which rests upon the 2016 Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive and the 2013 and 2019 Cybersecurity Acts. This legal meshwork seeks to integrate cybersecurity into all elements of the supply chain and introduce soft law mechanisms like the EU cybersecurity certification scheme. In doing so, it harmonises national cybersecurity capabilities, cross-border collaboration and the supervision of critical sectors across the EU. 
In the coming months, the Commission intends to add upon the existing cyber-acquis by introducing an array of new initiatives, such as the updated NIS Directive (the so-called NIS2), a proposal on a Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive, and a plan to launch a network of Security Operations Centres across the Union. The aim is to create a Union-wide ‘cybersecurity shield’ that will facilitate the detection of cyberattacks and provide an impetus for proactive action. 
This internal buildup of capabilities is supplemented by the development of a specialised ‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’ that allows the Union and its Member States to address cyber incidents through various joint policies, from cooperation and stabilisation measures to restrictive measures and attribution.

Montenegro is a party to the Council of Europe-sponsored Budapest Convention, ratifying it in 2010. In February 2013, Montenegro signed the regional Declaration on Strategic Priorities against Cybercrime, which “identified strategic priorities” that largely reflect the spirit and content of the Budapest provisions. [x] The 2018-2021 Strategy lists several developments that have contributed towards strengthening the capabilities of law enforcement authorities in dealing with cybercrime: these include the establishment of a dedicated High-Tech Crime Group within the Ministry of Interior, while the National Security Agency is making “significant efforts aimed at creating normative and operational mechanisms for fighting against cybercrime and espionage”. [x]

Many thanks to Ms Ana Minevski for her valuable comments.

Brazil originally refrained from signing the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and had expressed scepticism in response to invitations to accede. The argument advanced was that the treaty is Western-biased and lacking in inclusivity, given that Brazil was not part of the original drafting process. During voting for UNGA Resolution A/74/401, the Russian-sponsored proposal for a new binding Cybercrime Convention, Brazil abstained; during meetings with the BRICS leaders, however, Brazil had endorsed Russian pleas for a new cybercrime instrument to replace the Budapest regime. Upon invitation by the Council of Europe, Brazil finally initiated the process of accession to the Convention in December 2019 and is now an observer country.

The EU has been an early champion of the Budapest Convention signed under the auspices of the Council of Europe, given the overlapping membership of the two organisations. Much of the EU’s cyber diplomatic efforts have focused on promoting the Convention as the main instrument of choice for fighting cybercrime on a global level. EU member states have consistently opposed Russian bids for replacing this regime with another legal framework. 
The Union is represented in the recently constituted Ad Hoc Committee established by UNGA resolution 74/247 by its Member States and is currently focused on ensuring that the process is inclusive, transparent, consistent with the progress of the UNGGE and OEWG processes, and committed to legal consistency.