India and the European Union share many values and principles, such as inclusiveness, democracy, and multilateralism. With 1.4 billion people, India is the largest democracy in the world and considers itself as a leader among the Global South. India and the EU share common visions of a rules-based global order and are aligned on their commitment to an open, free, secure, stable, peaceful, and accessible cyberspace, enabling economic growth and innovation. In light of India’s rapid digitization and connectivity, the EU-India Strategic Partnership & Roadmap to 2025 includes commitments to cooperate on new and emerging technologies, norms and regulatory frameworks, and international standards.

China has the largest amount of users in the world, a significant digital economy growth potential, and its national Internet giants Alibaba, Didi, Tencent and Baidu are increasingly able to rival the biggest Western competitors in terms of market value and influence on the global tech landscape. China’s cyber diplomacy puts special attention towards equal participation, the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes, and support for multilateral institutions to shape normative views on the governance of cyberspace. However, China’s propagation of the cyber-sovereignty approach to international cybersecurity policy and an absolutist reading of sovereignty in cyberspace provide a legal cloak for state practices that often run counter to the core European values of a global, open, and free Internet.

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country with a population of 211 million people. Nigeria also has the continent’s largest economy, with a total GDP of $440 billion. Nigeria only emerged as Africa’s largest economy in 2014, overtaking South Africa after a GDP rebasing exercise which accounted for the contribution of emerging sectors of the economy, such as the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector. Nigeria’s economy had hitherto been petroleum dominated. In Q4 2021, the ICT sector of the economy contributed 15% to GDP, compared to 5% for the oil and gas sector. The percentage of people who use the Internet in Nigeria is 28%, largely through mobile networks. 91% of the population is covered by a mobile network (i.e. 74% by at least a 3G network and 41% by at least a 4G network). Huawei and ZTE have been responsible for constructing major parts of Nigeria’s broadband network (4G, LTE and 5G). Mobile phone subscription coverage is 99% of the population. Active mobile broadband subscription is 42% of the population, while fixed broadband connection is negligible, under 1%. Nigeria has 6 international submarine cables bringing at least 40TB capacity to its shores. There are 7 Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) in Nigeria with 71 peering networks. NigComSat-1, a communications satellite, made possible by cooperation between Nigeria and China, was launched in May 2007. Nigeria has plans to purchase 2 more communications satellites by 2025. Nigeria banned cryptocurrencies in 2021, but floated perhaps Africa’s largest digital currency the e-naira the same year. Despite the cryptocurrency ban, it is still in use in the country although hosted in foreign accounts.
The European Union is a significant partner in Nigeria’s cyberspace. For example, through its EU-Nigeria Digital Economy Package (Global Gateway Initiative), the EU plans a 820 million Euros investment to support Nigeria’s digitalisation strategy through digital infrastructure investments, digitalisation of public services, digital entrepreneurship, digital skills, and digital governance. However, the EU faces strong competition from China, whose investment in Nigeria’s telecommunications sectors is estimated to be $US 16 billion. China also helped manufacture and launch Nigeria’s Communications Satellite and has an equity stake in the parent satellite communications company. Huawei has been an important partner of the Nigerian government in building smart cities and e-government applications in an effort to improve government public services. Nigeria’s cyberspace is governed by several agencies including the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) and the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA).

As a member of the 2015 UNGGE group, India accepts that international law and specifically the UN Charter applies in its entirety in the cyber domain. India has noted the need to develop common understandings as to how international law should be interpreted, especially on the issues of what constitutes force and/or an armed attack in cyberspace and what the threshold of cyber-attacks should be to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
In statements at the UN General Assembly, India has also specifically called for further elaboration on peacetime rules of international law, the law concerning the right of self-defence and international humanitarian law. 
Apart from these calls for clarification and elaboration, however, India’s stance on specific aspects of international law and their interpretation remains unclear. This seems consistent with India’s recent reorientation of its foreign policy; since 2019, India’s wider approach has been marked by a shift from traditional non-alignment to issue-based ‘multi-alignment’ that reflects national priorities and interests.

In theory, China accepts that the principles enshrined within the UN Charter, including sovereign equality, prohibition on the use of force, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, non-intervention in the affairs of other states and fulfilment of international obligations in good faith, apply in cyberspace. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese position is generally characterized by a reluctance to crystallise the precise ways in which existing customary and international treaty law might govern the cyber domain; the exact application of specific aspects of international law, such as laws on self-defence, state responsibility, and international humanitarian law, is claimed to remain unclear in the absence of international consensus. 
Chinese delegations have also repeatedly cautioned against the “indiscriminate application of the law of armed conflicts”, arguing that the undue emphasis on jus ad bellum undermines stability in cyberspace by presupposing and thus effectively legitimising cyber conflict, consequently turning cyberspace into a “new battlefield”. 
China regards proposals on regional exchanges of views and development of common understanding on the application of international law with particular scepticism, stating that states must work on reaching “universally-accepted consensus” on the application of international law, rather than engage in “self-explanations at regional levels or among a small group of countries”. The Chinese have also consistently favoured the adoption of new international legal instruments tailored to the attributes of cyberspace (lex specialis).

Nigeria’s stance on international law in cyberspace is primarily shaped by its traditional concern over the growing proliferation of global cybercrime. Nigerian diplomats have emphasised the need for a proper legal framework that reflects the ideals and current trends within the African region. Nigeria has neither signed nor ratified the African Union (UN) Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection. Less has been said, however, about the application of international law in cyberspace more generally. However, On 6 July 2022, Nigeria acceded to the Council of Europe Convention on cybercrime. The Convention entered into force in Nigeria on 1 November 2022.

India has assumed a stance of strategic ambiguity on the proliferation of norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, positioning itself as a ‘bridge builder’ between the two camps that have emerged during multilateral cyber norm negotiations. 
Its insistence on an enhanced role for intergovernmental institutions (such as the ITU) and its oscillating allegiance to the two polarised factions largely reflect the country’s long-standing focus on Westphalian sovereignty and the consequent belief in the primacy of the state as an actor in international affairs. This brings India to a certain degree of alignment with sovereignty-focused countries like China and Russia in the context of norm-building debates. 
At the second substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), India argued that voluntary norms do not necessarily increase the predictability of state behaviour within the ICT environment, but was not openly against the adoption of new voluntary norms; for instance, the country proposed the adoption of a new norm on refraining from weaponisation and offensive uses of ICTs along with countries like Iran, Cuba, and Nigeria.

China’s International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation highlights that the country is committed to the maintenance of peace and stability in cyberspace through international cooperation on norms of responsible state behaviour. In 2018, Chinese support for the Russia-sponsored UNGA Resolution A/RES/73/27 was instrumental in establishing the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) as an alternative forum to the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE), whose fifth iteration in 2017 had failed to reach consensus. 
The country is in favour of formulating new norms of responsible state behaviour in light of recent ICT developments; during the latest OEWG discussions, China put forward specific proposals on formulating new rules on data security, in accordance with its own Global Initiative on Data Security. 
China has repeatedly expressed a preference for non-voluntary, binding legal norms, arguing that the best option is to formulate “new international legal instruments consummate with the characteristics of cyberspace, with a view to maintaining peace in cyberspace, instead of using legal instruments as a tool to pursue accountability and punishment unilaterally.”

Nigeria has been an active participant in the OEWG, contributing to the 2021 consensus report. Nigeria’s position acknowledges the applicability of existing international laws in cyberspace and supports the call for the operationalisation of the 11 Norms of responsible behaviour in cyberspace to address its current challenges. Nigeria also upheld the conclusions of the final report of the GGE: that the precedence set by the 2021 OEWG should be a baseline for international cooperation because of the inclusive nature of stakeholder participation.

In matters related to cyber resilience, India has proven to be an active proponent of bilateralism. It has initiated cyber dialogues with actors like the US, the UK, Russia, Malaysia, the EU, and ASEAN, all of which include capacity-building elements. Internationally, the country has also been especially vocal on the need to establish cooperative mechanisms for developing and implementing bilateral, regional, and global confidence-building measures (CBMs). 
In the context of multilateral fora, India has many a time reiterated that the issue of supply chain protection enjoys particular significance for them, especially in relation to ‘trust and trusted sources’ when it comes to preferring suppliers of ICT products and systems. It has also noted that capacity building actually goes beyond what is being dealt with under international security and is inherently tied to discussions on international legal instruments on cyberspace, where all states are equal and have the capacity to discuss legitimate matters under the auspices of the UN.

The Chinese International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation places a large emphasis on the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and engagement with partner countries through predictability-increasing practical measures to prevent unintended conflicts, respond to information operations, and ensure supply chain security in network equipment and industrial control systems. 
Another key pillar of China’s cyber strategy is providing capacity-building assistance to developing countries. The Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2017, and 'the Digital Silk Road' seek to internationalise Chinese technology made by state-owned or affiliated companies, including Huawei and ZTE, and therefore export Chinese technical standards abroad. Chinese outreach in this domain is most active in Africa, South America, and Central and Southeast Asia through projects such as the China-ASEAN Information Harbour and the China-Arabia Digital Silk Road Ningxia Hub. In addition to infrastructure investment, capacity building also focuses on enhancing information-sharing capacities, cyber defence personnel training, and crisis management.

In the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Cybersecurity Index 2020 which measures commitment to cybersecurity amongst its members , Nigeria ranked 47^th in the world, and 4^th within the African region. In 2021, Nigeria published the updated National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy, which lays out detailed cybersecurity obligations for different private sector and public sector actors in critical national information infrastructure (CNII) protection and resilience within a context of multiple stakeholders. The National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy, together with the Cybercrime Act, are the major policy instruments governing cybersecurity in the country.
The Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC) at Oxford University, in 2018, reviewed the maturity of cybersecurity capacity in Nigeria at the behest of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), using the Cybersecurity Maturity Model (CMM). Nigeria’s CMM report indicated a maturity stage of either start-up or formative stage (maturity stages 1 and 2 out of 5 stages) for the majority of factors, suggesting opportunities for investment. The United Kingdom has pledged some of this necessary investment, with Nigeria set to benefit from a £22 million investment package which aims to support resilience in Africa and the Indo-Pacific region.

Under the auspices of the OEWG, India has highlighted the need for “real-time cooperation between government agencies” in combatting cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyber threats more widely. To date, however, India has not signed any international cybercrime agreement. It voted in favour of a Russia-sponsored UNGA Resolution calling for the establishment of a separate cybercrime treaty. 
Despite having brought its legal framework largely in alignment with the Budapest Convention, India remains a non-party because the document was drafted without the country’s participation, thus rending the treaty discriminatory. Another big objection has been raised on the basis of section 32.b, which gives intelligence agencies trans-border access to data for the purposes of criminal investigations with lawful and voluntary consent - a concern shared by Russia. 
It has also been argued that the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) regime under Budapest is not effective, as it does not commit states to a firm promise of cooperation; from the perspective of the Indians, it would be preferable to replace this regime with a UN-driven process.

The Chinese Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation notes that the country “supports the UN Security Council to play an important part in international cooperation against cyber terrorism” and “supports and contributes to UN effort on fighting cyber crimes”. China is not a party to or observer of the Budapest Convention; instead, it has consistently backed Russian bids in the UN to establish a new cybercrime treaty, with these efforts culminating in Resolution A/74/247 that created an Ad Hoc Committee for that purpose. 
China has also signed the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright Treaty) in 1985 as well as the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and is a member of Interpol. 
In addition, China has pursued regional avenues of cooperative engagement; within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, for instance, the country agreed to participate in efforts to fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, and international cybercrime. 
It also supports joint cybersecurity exercises under the auspices of the Organisation.

The Nigerian 2020-2030 National Digital Strategy, which is in line with the African Union Digital Transformation Strategy 2020-2030, emphasises the significance of adopting ‘collaborating approaches’ to fighting cybercrime; it specifically notes that ‘cybersecurity is not a local issue and it requires collaboration with relevant institutions around the globe’. In 2019, the country voted in favour of UNGA resolution 74/247, which established an Ad Hoc Committee to draw up an international convention on cybercrime. The Nigerian position paper prior to the launch of the first substantive session noted the ‘urgent need to define and sanction criminal conduct in cyberspace, improve synergy in trans-national policing capabilities, improve procedural tools and reform/enhance international cooperation, whilst respecting human rights’. In its capacity as a member of ECOWAS, Nigeria has participated in several socialisation-based capacity-building initiatives, including the OCWAR-C project, the GLACY+ workshops and the African Forum on Cybercrime (organised by the African Union).