As a member of the 2015 UNGGE group, India accepts that international law and specifically the UN Charter applies in its entirety in the cyber domain. India has noted
the need to develop common understandings as to how international law should be interpreted, especially on the issues of what constitutes force and/or an armed attack in cyberspace and what the threshold of cyber-attacks should be to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter.
In statements at the UN General Assembly, India has also specifically called for
further elaboration on peacetime rules of international law, the law concerning the right of self-defence and international humanitarian law.
Apart from these calls for clarification and elaboration, however, India’s stance on specific aspects of international law and their interpretation remains unclear. This seems consistent with India’s recent reorientation of its foreign policy
; since 2019, India’s wider approach has been marked by a shift from traditional non-alignment to issue-based ‘multi-alignment’ that reflects national priorities and interests.
In theory, China accepts
that the principles enshrined within the UN Charter, including sovereign equality, prohibition on the use of force, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, non-intervention in the affairs of other states and fulfilment of international obligations in good faith, apply in cyberspace.
Nevertheless, the Chinese position is generally characterized by a reluctance
to crystallise the precise ways in which existing customary and international treaty law might govern the cyber domain; the exact application of specific aspects of international law, such as laws on self-defence, state responsibility, and international humanitarian law, is claimed to remain unclear in the absence of international consensus.
Chinese delegations have also repeatedly cautioned against the “indiscriminate application of the law of armed conflicts”
, arguing that the undue emphasis on jus ad bellum
undermines stability in cyberspace by presupposing and thus effectively legitimising cyber conflict, consequently turning cyberspace into a “new battlefield”.
China regards proposals on regional exchanges of views and development of common understanding on the application of international law with particular scepticism, stating
that states must work on reaching “universally-accepted consensus” on the application of international law, rather than engage in “self-explanations at regional levels or among a small group of countries”. The Chinese have also consistently favoured
the adoption of new international legal instruments tailored to the attributes of cyberspace (lex specialis