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Thanks to its regulatory powers, robust digital economy, and active foreign and security policy, the European Union is one of the key players in cyberspace. The EU strongly promotes the position that international law, and in particular the United Nations (UN) Charter, applies in cyberspace. As a complement to binding international law, the EU endorses the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour that have been articulated by the UN Group of Governmental Experts. It also encourages the development and implementation of regional confidence building measures, both in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and other regions. On a bilateral level, the EU has established cyber dialogues with strategic partners to reinforce the exchange of good practices, lessons learnt and further the idea of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.
An EU candidate country since 2012, Serbia is an important partner in the Western Balkans. The 2020 iteration of the Digital Evolution Scorecard characterised Serbia as a ‘break out’ economy, meaning that despite a relative lack of digital infrastructure the country is rapidly digitalising; internet penetration is one of the highest across the region, standing at 79%. Over the past decade, Serbia’s digital policy has been focused on attracting foreign investment, deepening the digital transformation across the public and private sectors, and promoting economic growth in line with EU targets. These objectives have been operationalised through a series of strategies, notably the Strategy for the Development of Information Security for the period 2017-2020 and the Strategy for combat against cyber crime 2019-2023. The ITU notes, however, that “while innovative, internet-based e-commerce is expected to bring significant growth and development, obsolete legislation and a lack of harmonisation with EU standards and best practice persist, hampering progress”. As the country becomes increasingly more digitalised, the challenge for Serbian cyber diplomacy will be to develop and enhance avenues of European, regional, and international cooperation.
Japan is a trusted partner and shares the same basic values of human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance. This common set of values also applies to cyberspace as both the EU and Japan have publicly expressed strong support for an open, free and secure internet and the application of international norms to state activities in cyberspace. Japan is also an important trading partner of the EU. The recently adopted Economic Partnership Agreement also reinforces the need for a closer integration of the digital economies. Alignment in broader international economic and political issues is also evident in the field of cyber diplomacy and thus constitutes a strong foundation for close cooperation and partnership.
Under the auspices of the UN, the EU and its Member States have consistently reaffirmed that a universal cyber security framework can only be grounded in existing international law, including the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law.
Addressing issues as to how existing international law and international humanitarian law, including the principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality and distinction, apply to the use ICTs by States is necessary to increase accountability and transparency. International humanitarian law is fully applicable in cyberspace and this should not be misunderstood as legitimising the use of force between states in the cyber domain. The EU has typically opposed calls for the need to adapt existing international law as a means to develop a new legal instrument for cyber issues. The country has not assumed a firm stance on the application of international law in cyberspace. Serbia’s position paper concerning the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) highlighted that multilateral dialogue on “information security” must occur “with strict respect for the Charter of the United Nations”. Echoing the stance of states such as China, Russia, and Cuba, Serbia also raised the alarm about the “danger of developing offensive ICT and militarising the digital space”. Japan has highlighted the importance of promoting the rule of law in cyberspace, noting that cyberspace “should not be a lawless zone”. It further endorses the applicability of international law, in particular the UN Charter, in the cyber domain. In relation to the use of countermeasures, it has stated that it is not necessary for countermeasures to be limited to the same means as internationally wrongful acts.
Japan has cautioned against the launch of “premature” discussions on developing a legally binding new instrument, arguing that the adoption of such an instrument might “roll back” the achievement of past multilateral efforts in confirming the applicability of existing international law in cyberspace. Instead, Japan believes that it is necessary to consolidate, elaborate, and clarify the interpretation of existing treaties and content of customary international law.
During the drafting phase of the 2021 Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) Report, Japan had proposed to include language explicitly affirming the applicability of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, the inherent right of self-defence recognized under the UN Charter, and International Humanitarian Law.
Addressing issues as to how existing international law and international humanitarian law, including the principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality and distinction, apply to the use ICTs by States is necessary to increase accountability and transparency. International humanitarian law is fully applicable in cyberspace and this should not be misunderstood as legitimising the use of force between states in the cyber domain. The EU has typically opposed calls for the need to adapt existing international law as a means to develop a new legal instrument for cyber issues. The country has not assumed a firm stance on the application of international law in cyberspace. Serbia’s position paper concerning the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) highlighted that multilateral dialogue on “information security” must occur “with strict respect for the Charter of the United Nations”. Echoing the stance of states such as China, Russia, and Cuba, Serbia also raised the alarm about the “danger of developing offensive ICT and militarising the digital space”. Japan has highlighted the importance of promoting the rule of law in cyberspace, noting that cyberspace “should not be a lawless zone”. It further endorses the applicability of international law, in particular the UN Charter, in the cyber domain. In relation to the use of countermeasures, it has stated that it is not necessary for countermeasures to be limited to the same means as internationally wrongful acts.
Japan has cautioned against the launch of “premature” discussions on developing a legally binding new instrument, arguing that the adoption of such an instrument might “roll back” the achievement of past multilateral efforts in confirming the applicability of existing international law in cyberspace. Instead, Japan believes that it is necessary to consolidate, elaborate, and clarify the interpretation of existing treaties and content of customary international law.
During the drafting phase of the 2021 Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) Report, Japan had proposed to include language explicitly affirming the applicability of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, the inherent right of self-defence recognized under the UN Charter, and International Humanitarian Law.
Since 2014, the EU’s ambition has been to act as an ‘honest broker’ on multilateral discussions surrounding issues of cyber governance and norms of responsible state behaviour, aiming to ensure the support and partnership of proactive players in the context of the global debate. The EU has long promoted the need for voluntary, non-binding norms. It believes that norms crystallised under the UN GGE process should generally not be revisited and that progress should be made on matters relating to their implementation.
Within the OEWG, the EU advanced a suggestion to develop a global repository of existing practice within the United Nations, which would enable UN member states to showcase how they are implementing the voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour, confidence building and other measures. Serbia was represented in the 2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE). Despite its EU candidate status, Serbia does not typically vote in alignment with the EU on key cybersecurity resolutions presented before the UN First Committee. Notable examples include UNGA resolution 73/27, which first established the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), as well as later resolutions 74/29 and 75/240. In multilateral fora, Japan has frequently emphasised the need to implement voluntary and non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. The country believes that any discussion on norm-building should exclusively occur on the basis of the 11 norms affirmed within the 2015 UNGGE Report; possible new norms should be “carefully scrutinised” so as to avoid any change to these 11 norms or duplication with them.
Japan also strongly opposes the adoption of additional legally binding obligations, maintaining that such an endeavour would take a very long time whereas the evolution of technology is extremely fast-paced. Instead, countries should work on parallel mechanisms for capacity-building, raising awareness, and promoting a common understanding of norms.
Within the OEWG, the EU advanced a suggestion to develop a global repository of existing practice within the United Nations, which would enable UN member states to showcase how they are implementing the voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour, confidence building and other measures. Serbia was represented in the 2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE). Despite its EU candidate status, Serbia does not typically vote in alignment with the EU on key cybersecurity resolutions presented before the UN First Committee. Notable examples include UNGA resolution 73/27, which first established the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), as well as later resolutions 74/29 and 75/240. In multilateral fora, Japan has frequently emphasised the need to implement voluntary and non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. The country believes that any discussion on norm-building should exclusively occur on the basis of the 11 norms affirmed within the 2015 UNGGE Report; possible new norms should be “carefully scrutinised” so as to avoid any change to these 11 norms or duplication with them.
Japan also strongly opposes the adoption of additional legally binding obligations, maintaining that such an endeavour would take a very long time whereas the evolution of technology is extremely fast-paced. Instead, countries should work on parallel mechanisms for capacity-building, raising awareness, and promoting a common understanding of norms.
The EU places great importance on cyber resilience and capacity building. Internally, the Union has built a robust legal acquis in relation to the resilience of critical infrastructures, the cornerstone of which rests upon the 2016 Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive and the 2013 and 2019 Cybersecurity Acts. This legal meshwork seeks to integrate cybersecurity into all elements of the supply chain and introduce soft law mechanisms like the EU cybersecurity certification scheme. In doing so, it harmonises national cybersecurity capabilities, cross-border collaboration and the supervision of critical sectors across the EU.
In the coming months, the Commission intends to add upon the existing cyber-acquis by introducing an array of new initiatives, such as the updated NIS Directive (the so-called NIS2), a proposal on a Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive, and a plan to launch a network of Security Operations Centres across the Union. The aim is to create a Union-wide ‘cybersecurity shield’ that will facilitate the detection of cyberattacks and provide an impetus for proactive action.
This internal buildup of capabilities is supplemented by the development of a specialised ‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’ that allows the Union and its Member States to address cyber incidents through various joint policies, from cooperation and stabilisation measures to restrictive measures and attribution. Serbia’s legislative framework on cybersecurity is structured upon the 2016 Law on Information Security and its bylaws. The Law ushered in several institutional developments, including the creation of a national CERT in the regulatory agency for electronic communications and postal services (RATEL). The national CERT “monitors the status of incidents on national level, provides early warnings, alerts and announcements, and reacts on incidents by providing the information on affected entities and persons”. [x] It also holds seminars and technical trainings for operators of special importance (critical infrastructure) [x].
Meanwhile, the 2021 Cyber Tesla drill (organised in collaboration with the US state of Ohio) constitutes only one example of Serbia’s increased emphasis on critical infrastructure through the prism of cyber defence; the stated objectives included the “construction of military defence system capacities and the National CERT’s capacities for the protection from high-tech attacks, as well as an enhanced cooperation with relevant government and private sector organisations and academic institutions for the purpose of protection of the IT systems”.
In its UNGGE position paper in 2016, Serbia emphasised the importance of interstate cooperation in “maintaining effective and responsive mechanisms for information exchange, alerts and announcements on cybersecurity incidents”. The paper goes on to posit that “the special focus should be on the protection of critical infrastructure”, especially in the case of transnational attacks. In 2021, Norway donated a platform worth €1.2 million which will “[serve] to hold cyber exercises at the national level enables the real situation of different attack scenarios, and will contribute to capacity building and training of officials in various state institutions”, according to State Secretary of the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications Milos Cvetanovic [x]. Resilience constitutes one of the central objectives of Japan’s 2018 Cybersecurity Strategy, whose core components include international cooperation in sharing expertise and coordination of policies, incidence response, and cyber capacity-building (CCB). Japan has traditionally argued that global initiatives are required to reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities and has advocated for a tailor-made approach that takes into account the national situation of recipient countries and the importance of national ownership.
Japan recognises the ‘trickle-up’ effect of national initiatives, stating that CCB “not only improves the capabilities of the recipient country, but also directly leads to enhanced security and stability in cyberspace as a whole”; in that sense, it disfavours the understanding of CCB as a “common but differentiated responsibility”, believing that such a view “does not fit the context” of international cyber cooperation. As a result, the country has assumed a balanced approach to CCB. On the one hand, it has successfully utilised multilateral fora such as the G7 and G20 summits to promote its own normative standards.
At the G7 Ise-Shina Summit in May 2016, for instance, Japan introduced the Ise-Shima Principles, which included the enhancement of cooperation on CCB. On the other hand, Japan considers its own security and that of its nationals as intrinsically tied to the cyber capabilities of developing countries, since attacks on the IT infrastructure of regional partners can adversely affect Japanese trade. Japan has thus acted primarily through ASEAN to promote regional capacity-building efforts.
In the coming months, the Commission intends to add upon the existing cyber-acquis by introducing an array of new initiatives, such as the updated NIS Directive (the so-called NIS2), a proposal on a Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive, and a plan to launch a network of Security Operations Centres across the Union. The aim is to create a Union-wide ‘cybersecurity shield’ that will facilitate the detection of cyberattacks and provide an impetus for proactive action.
This internal buildup of capabilities is supplemented by the development of a specialised ‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’ that allows the Union and its Member States to address cyber incidents through various joint policies, from cooperation and stabilisation measures to restrictive measures and attribution. Serbia’s legislative framework on cybersecurity is structured upon the 2016 Law on Information Security and its bylaws. The Law ushered in several institutional developments, including the creation of a national CERT in the regulatory agency for electronic communications and postal services (RATEL). The national CERT “monitors the status of incidents on national level, provides early warnings, alerts and announcements, and reacts on incidents by providing the information on affected entities and persons”. [x] It also holds seminars and technical trainings for operators of special importance (critical infrastructure) [x].
Meanwhile, the 2021 Cyber Tesla drill (organised in collaboration with the US state of Ohio) constitutes only one example of Serbia’s increased emphasis on critical infrastructure through the prism of cyber defence; the stated objectives included the “construction of military defence system capacities and the National CERT’s capacities for the protection from high-tech attacks, as well as an enhanced cooperation with relevant government and private sector organisations and academic institutions for the purpose of protection of the IT systems”.
In its UNGGE position paper in 2016, Serbia emphasised the importance of interstate cooperation in “maintaining effective and responsive mechanisms for information exchange, alerts and announcements on cybersecurity incidents”. The paper goes on to posit that “the special focus should be on the protection of critical infrastructure”, especially in the case of transnational attacks. In 2021, Norway donated a platform worth €1.2 million which will “[serve] to hold cyber exercises at the national level enables the real situation of different attack scenarios, and will contribute to capacity building and training of officials in various state institutions”, according to State Secretary of the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications Milos Cvetanovic [x]. Resilience constitutes one of the central objectives of Japan’s 2018 Cybersecurity Strategy, whose core components include international cooperation in sharing expertise and coordination of policies, incidence response, and cyber capacity-building (CCB). Japan has traditionally argued that global initiatives are required to reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities and has advocated for a tailor-made approach that takes into account the national situation of recipient countries and the importance of national ownership.
Japan recognises the ‘trickle-up’ effect of national initiatives, stating that CCB “not only improves the capabilities of the recipient country, but also directly leads to enhanced security and stability in cyberspace as a whole”; in that sense, it disfavours the understanding of CCB as a “common but differentiated responsibility”, believing that such a view “does not fit the context” of international cyber cooperation. As a result, the country has assumed a balanced approach to CCB. On the one hand, it has successfully utilised multilateral fora such as the G7 and G20 summits to promote its own normative standards.
At the G7 Ise-Shina Summit in May 2016, for instance, Japan introduced the Ise-Shima Principles, which included the enhancement of cooperation on CCB. On the other hand, Japan considers its own security and that of its nationals as intrinsically tied to the cyber capabilities of developing countries, since attacks on the IT infrastructure of regional partners can adversely affect Japanese trade. Japan has thus acted primarily through ASEAN to promote regional capacity-building efforts.
The EU has been an early champion of the Budapest Convention signed under the auspices of the Council of Europe, given the overlapping membership of the two organisations. Much of the EU’s cyber diplomatic efforts have focused on promoting the Convention as the main instrument of choice for fighting cybercrime on a global level. EU member states have consistently opposed Russian bids for replacing this regime with another legal framework.
The Union is represented in the recently constituted Ad Hoc Committee established by UNGA resolution 74/247 by its Member States and is currently focused on ensuring that the process is inclusive, transparent, consistent with the progress of the UNGGE and OEWG processes, and committed to legal consistency. The Information Society and Information Security Development Strategy for the period 2021-2026 provides a comprehensive approach to the field of information security, which includes both (a) information security of ICT systems of special importance and security of the Republic of Serbia, and (b) security of citizens and businesses, which is particularly reflected through the fight against cybercrime. Its predecessor, the 2017 Strategy for the Development of Information Security, in turn, indicates the fight against cybercrime as one of the government’s five key priorities.
In light of EU accession negotiations, Serbia has signed and ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), including its Additional Protocol on Xenophobia and Racism Committed Through Computer Systems. Nevertheless, the country also voted in favour of UNGA resolution 74/247 calling for an international legal instrument to govern this domain. Domestically, the national legislative framework has been developed in accordance with the Budapest Convention and EU legislation. A High-Tech Crime Unit has recently been established within the special prosecutor’s office, along with three specialised units: crime analysis; terrorism and extremism; and drug prevention, addiction and repression.
Serbia is a member of Interpol, with which the country has discussed ways to enhance cooperation with regard to combatting cybercrime. Serbia is also gradually developing its own bilateral cooperation network, signing a Cooperation Memoranda with India in 2016 [x] and Romania in 2017 [x] as well as receiving assistance from Russian experts [x].
Special thanks to Ms Maja Lakusic for her valuable comments. According to Japan’s 2018 Cybersecurity Strategy, the country is committed to “further [promoting] international partnership through international investigative cooperation and information sharing with international organisations, law enforcement agencies and security information agencies in foreign countries.”
Japan is a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and mutual assistance treaties (MLAT), voting against the Russian-sponsored UNGA resolution calling for a new binding cybercrime treaty. Japan has pursued dialogues related to cybercrime cooperation in the context of ASEAN, as well as on a bilateral basis with countries like the UK, USA, and Australia.
The Union is represented in the recently constituted Ad Hoc Committee established by UNGA resolution 74/247 by its Member States and is currently focused on ensuring that the process is inclusive, transparent, consistent with the progress of the UNGGE and OEWG processes, and committed to legal consistency. The Information Society and Information Security Development Strategy for the period 2021-2026 provides a comprehensive approach to the field of information security, which includes both (a) information security of ICT systems of special importance and security of the Republic of Serbia, and (b) security of citizens and businesses, which is particularly reflected through the fight against cybercrime. Its predecessor, the 2017 Strategy for the Development of Information Security, in turn, indicates the fight against cybercrime as one of the government’s five key priorities.
In light of EU accession negotiations, Serbia has signed and ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), including its Additional Protocol on Xenophobia and Racism Committed Through Computer Systems. Nevertheless, the country also voted in favour of UNGA resolution 74/247 calling for an international legal instrument to govern this domain. Domestically, the national legislative framework has been developed in accordance with the Budapest Convention and EU legislation. A High-Tech Crime Unit has recently been established within the special prosecutor’s office, along with three specialised units: crime analysis; terrorism and extremism; and drug prevention, addiction and repression.
Serbia is a member of Interpol, with which the country has discussed ways to enhance cooperation with regard to combatting cybercrime. Serbia is also gradually developing its own bilateral cooperation network, signing a Cooperation Memoranda with India in 2016 [x] and Romania in 2017 [x] as well as receiving assistance from Russian experts [x].
Special thanks to Ms Maja Lakusic for her valuable comments. According to Japan’s 2018 Cybersecurity Strategy, the country is committed to “further [promoting] international partnership through international investigative cooperation and information sharing with international organisations, law enforcement agencies and security information agencies in foreign countries.”
Japan is a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and mutual assistance treaties (MLAT), voting against the Russian-sponsored UNGA resolution calling for a new binding cybercrime treaty. Japan has pursued dialogues related to cybercrime cooperation in the context of ASEAN, as well as on a bilateral basis with countries like the UK, USA, and Australia.
