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The United States has historically been a strong partner in cyber diplomacy for the EU based on common values (human rights, rule of law), goals (open, stable and secure cyberspace) and interpretation of international law. Cyber diplomacy with the US has also been operationalised in the form of information-sharing and cooperation to tackle cybercrime, cooperation on cyber defence via NATO and cyber capacity building in third countries. Despite differences over certain foreign policy issues, the EU and the US remain close allies in cyberspace.
China has the largest amount of users in the world, a significant digital economy growth potential, and its national Internet giants Alibaba, Didi, Tencent and Baidu are increasingly able to rival the biggest Western competitors in terms of market value and influence on the global tech landscape. China’s cyber diplomacy puts special attention towards equal participation, the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes, and support for multilateral institutions to shape normative views on the governance of cyberspace. However, China’s propagation of the cyber-sovereignty approach to international cybersecurity policy and an absolutist reading of sovereignty in cyberspace provide a legal cloak for state practices that often run counter to the core European values of a global, open, and free Internet.
Over the past decade, Australia has been a frontrunner in terms of digital transformation; the country ranked 11th globally on the 2020 Global Connectivity Index and 2nd in the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s better-than-expected economic performance in 2021 was largely owed to increased government efforts at promoting the digitalisation of businesses and government services, with significant investment being poured into the ICT sector under the Digital Economy Strategy and the Regional Connectivity Program. Meanwhile, however, self-reported losses from cybercrime amounted to more than $33 billion during the 2020-2021 financial year (E), while roughly a quarter of cyber incidents reported during the same period involved Australia’s critical infrastructure or essential services (E). In the cyber diplomacy realm, Australia has traditionally been a prominent member of the ‘like-minded’ group, promoting a vision of a free, open, and secure cyberspace that is very much in line with EU values and efforts.
The US believes that international law is applicable in cyberspace. As part of the ‘like-minded’ coalition, the US recognises a need to acknowledge the full breadth of relevant international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights law, customary international law on the responsibilities of states for internationally wrongful acts. The general applicability of IHL in cyberspace is not to be misconstrued as a tacit endorsement of aggression in the cyber domain; instead, it only serves to remind states of the responsibility to respect and protect civilians in the event of armed conflict.
In the context of multilateral fora, US diplomats have specifically emphasised the applicability of the right to self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter, noting that a State may lawfully take cyber-based or non-cyber-based countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful cyber activities attributable to another State, but only subject to the requirements of the doctrine under international law and the principles of necessity and proportionality. In theory, China accepts that the principles enshrined within the UN Charter, including sovereign equality, prohibition on the use of force, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, non-intervention in the affairs of other states and fulfilment of international obligations in good faith, apply in cyberspace.
Nevertheless, the Chinese position is generally characterized by a reluctance to crystallise the precise ways in which existing customary and international treaty law might govern the cyber domain; the exact application of specific aspects of international law, such as laws on self-defence, state responsibility, and international humanitarian law, is claimed to remain unclear in the absence of international consensus.
Chinese delegations have also repeatedly cautioned against the “indiscriminate application of the law of armed conflicts”, arguing that the undue emphasis on jus ad bellum undermines stability in cyberspace by presupposing and thus effectively legitimising cyber conflict, consequently turning cyberspace into a “new battlefield”.
China regards proposals on regional exchanges of views and development of common understanding on the application of international law with particular scepticism, stating that states must work on reaching “universally-accepted consensus” on the application of international law, rather than engage in “self-explanations at regional levels or among a small group of countries”. The Chinese have also consistently favoured the adoption of new international legal instruments tailored to the attributes of cyberspace (lex specialis). Australia believes that “the foundation for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace is our mutual commitment to existing international law” and that, as per the 2021 report of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), international law is “essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, […] stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.” In particular, Australia has affirmed that the UN Charter applies in its entirety to state actions in cyberspace, including the prohibition on the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the right to self-defence in response to an armed attack, the law of state responsibility during peacetime, and the doctrine of countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts. International legal obligations also include the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (especially the right to privacy and freedom of expression), as well as the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber operations in armed conflict. On the application of IHL, Australia echoes the position taken by the ICRC that “recognition of the application of IHL neither encourages militarisation, nor legitimises resort to conflict in any domain”.
In the context of multilateral fora, US diplomats have specifically emphasised the applicability of the right to self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter, noting that a State may lawfully take cyber-based or non-cyber-based countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful cyber activities attributable to another State, but only subject to the requirements of the doctrine under international law and the principles of necessity and proportionality. In theory, China accepts that the principles enshrined within the UN Charter, including sovereign equality, prohibition on the use of force, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, non-intervention in the affairs of other states and fulfilment of international obligations in good faith, apply in cyberspace.
Nevertheless, the Chinese position is generally characterized by a reluctance to crystallise the precise ways in which existing customary and international treaty law might govern the cyber domain; the exact application of specific aspects of international law, such as laws on self-defence, state responsibility, and international humanitarian law, is claimed to remain unclear in the absence of international consensus.
Chinese delegations have also repeatedly cautioned against the “indiscriminate application of the law of armed conflicts”, arguing that the undue emphasis on jus ad bellum undermines stability in cyberspace by presupposing and thus effectively legitimising cyber conflict, consequently turning cyberspace into a “new battlefield”.
China regards proposals on regional exchanges of views and development of common understanding on the application of international law with particular scepticism, stating that states must work on reaching “universally-accepted consensus” on the application of international law, rather than engage in “self-explanations at regional levels or among a small group of countries”. The Chinese have also consistently favoured the adoption of new international legal instruments tailored to the attributes of cyberspace (lex specialis). Australia believes that “the foundation for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace is our mutual commitment to existing international law” and that, as per the 2021 report of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), international law is “essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, […] stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.” In particular, Australia has affirmed that the UN Charter applies in its entirety to state actions in cyberspace, including the prohibition on the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the right to self-defence in response to an armed attack, the law of state responsibility during peacetime, and the doctrine of countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts. International legal obligations also include the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (especially the right to privacy and freedom of expression), as well as the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber operations in armed conflict. On the application of IHL, Australia echoes the position taken by the ICRC that “recognition of the application of IHL neither encourages militarisation, nor legitimises resort to conflict in any domain”.
As stated in the 2018 National Security Strategy, the United States views voluntary, non-binding norms of state behaviour during peacetime as essential components of a framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. The US has participated in all iterations of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) as well as the latest Open-Ended Working Group.
In these multilateral fora, US diplomats have typically opposed attempts at shifting to a legally binding status for norms of responsible state behaviour, arguing that such discussions are “premature” and do not represent the best way to address the immediate threats given the fast pace of technological developments.
The starting basis for any further discussions on the part of the US rests on the current buildup of consensus surrounding the norms identified in the 2015 and 2021 GGE reports. Efforts should be concentrated on the implementation of existing consensus norms, not the creation of entirely new normative concepts (i.e. in relation to harmful hidden functions and specific critical infrastructure sectors). China’s International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation highlights that the country is committed to the maintenance of peace and stability in cyberspace through international cooperation on norms of responsible state behaviour. In 2018, Chinese support for the Russia-sponsored UNGA Resolution A/RES/73/27 was instrumental in establishing the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) as an alternative forum to the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE), whose fifth iteration in 2017 had failed to reach consensus.
The country is in favour of formulating new norms of responsible state behaviour in light of recent ICT developments; during the latest OEWG discussions, China put forward specific proposals on formulating new rules on data security, in accordance with its own Global Initiative on Data Security.
China has repeatedly expressed a preference for non-voluntary, binding legal norms, arguing that the best option is to formulate “new international legal instruments consummate with the characteristics of cyberspace, with a view to maintaining peace in cyberspace, instead of using legal instruments as a tool to pursue accountability and punishment unilaterally.” Australia has been actively involved in both norm-building processes that have been occurring under the auspices of the UN, namely the UN Open-Ended Working Group (GGE) and the OEWG. The country’s 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy notes that the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms on responsible state behaviour agreed under the 2015 UN GGE consensus reports serve to “promote predictability, stability, and security” in cyberspace and should be seen as the “point of departure” for any constructive norm-building discussion. Australian diplomats have consistently reiterated the complementarity between international law and norms of responsible state behaviour, stating that “norms are not a panacea” and that they should not be understood as a standalone “normative framework”, since they do not replace existing state obligations under international law. For this reason, Australia stands against the establishment of binding norms or agreements. The country is not prima facie opposed to discussing other states’ proposals for the development of new norms, but Australia’s own “proactive priority” is reaching agreement of guidance on the implementation of the existing norms. In the current environment, Australia believes that “we will have the biggest impact on international peace and stability if we translate norms ‘on paper’ into norms ‘in practice’”. While not discounting the value of “norms agreed among friends”, it has also highlighted that the framework will only be effective when it is any proposals for new norms would first need to be negotiated, agreed upon, and endorsed by universal consensus.
In these multilateral fora, US diplomats have typically opposed attempts at shifting to a legally binding status for norms of responsible state behaviour, arguing that such discussions are “premature” and do not represent the best way to address the immediate threats given the fast pace of technological developments.
The starting basis for any further discussions on the part of the US rests on the current buildup of consensus surrounding the norms identified in the 2015 and 2021 GGE reports. Efforts should be concentrated on the implementation of existing consensus norms, not the creation of entirely new normative concepts (i.e. in relation to harmful hidden functions and specific critical infrastructure sectors). China’s International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation highlights that the country is committed to the maintenance of peace and stability in cyberspace through international cooperation on norms of responsible state behaviour. In 2018, Chinese support for the Russia-sponsored UNGA Resolution A/RES/73/27 was instrumental in establishing the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) as an alternative forum to the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE), whose fifth iteration in 2017 had failed to reach consensus.
The country is in favour of formulating new norms of responsible state behaviour in light of recent ICT developments; during the latest OEWG discussions, China put forward specific proposals on formulating new rules on data security, in accordance with its own Global Initiative on Data Security.
China has repeatedly expressed a preference for non-voluntary, binding legal norms, arguing that the best option is to formulate “new international legal instruments consummate with the characteristics of cyberspace, with a view to maintaining peace in cyberspace, instead of using legal instruments as a tool to pursue accountability and punishment unilaterally.” Australia has been actively involved in both norm-building processes that have been occurring under the auspices of the UN, namely the UN Open-Ended Working Group (GGE) and the OEWG. The country’s 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy notes that the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms on responsible state behaviour agreed under the 2015 UN GGE consensus reports serve to “promote predictability, stability, and security” in cyberspace and should be seen as the “point of departure” for any constructive norm-building discussion. Australian diplomats have consistently reiterated the complementarity between international law and norms of responsible state behaviour, stating that “norms are not a panacea” and that they should not be understood as a standalone “normative framework”, since they do not replace existing state obligations under international law. For this reason, Australia stands against the establishment of binding norms or agreements. The country is not prima facie opposed to discussing other states’ proposals for the development of new norms, but Australia’s own “proactive priority” is reaching agreement of guidance on the implementation of the existing norms. In the current environment, Australia believes that “we will have the biggest impact on international peace and stability if we translate norms ‘on paper’ into norms ‘in practice’”. While not discounting the value of “norms agreed among friends”, it has also highlighted that the framework will only be effective when it is any proposals for new norms would first need to be negotiated, agreed upon, and endorsed by universal consensus.
The March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance states that “[the US] will make cybersecurity a top priority, strengthening our capability, readiness, and resilience in cyberspace.” Following the recommendations of the 2020 Solarium Commission, the US government has adopted the concept of ‘layered resilience’ and is gradually rolling out a comprehensive arsenal of resilience measures across a variety of domains.
The US has been active in engaging in strategically-minded capacity building with partners; US capacity building in Africa with organisations such as the African Union and SADC, for instance, have been largely motivated by Washington’s wish to promote an open, secure, and democratic model for Internet governance across the African continent.
In relation to cyber defence, there have been several joint operations and military exercises, both bilaterally (e.g. between the US Cyber Command and the Montenegrin military) and under the auspices of NATO. Recent regional engagement efforts such as the dialogues in the context of the tripartite AUKUS coalition and the Structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the eponymous Quad) also heavily feature references to collaborative cyber-capacity building. In multilateral fora, the US has also welcomed the inclusion of confidence-building measures in the GGE reports and noted that, in order for CBMs to be useful, they need to be implemented at minimum on a bilateral basis and preferably on a multilateral and eventually an international basis. The Chinese International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation places a large emphasis on the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and engagement with partner countries through predictability-increasing practical measures to prevent unintended conflicts, respond to information operations, and ensure supply chain security in network equipment and industrial control systems.
Another key pillar of China’s cyber strategy is providing capacity-building assistance to developing countries. The Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2017, and 'the Digital Silk Road' seek to internationalise Chinese technology made by state-owned or affiliated companies, including Huawei and ZTE, and therefore export Chinese technical standards abroad. Chinese outreach in this domain is most active in Africa, South America, and Central and Southeast Asia through projects such as the China-ASEAN Information Harbour and the China-Arabia Digital Silk Road Ningxia Hub. In addition to infrastructure investment, capacity building also focuses on enhancing information-sharing capacities, cyber defence personnel training, and crisis management. In recent years, Australia has emerged as a regional leader in conversations surrounding cyber resilience in the Indo-Pacific as well as globally. The new 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Strategy constitutes one of the most comprehensive documents of its kind, with “secure, resilient, and trusted technology” representing a crucial objective. Key initiatives include enhanced protections for critical infrastructure and systems of national significance, as well as greater support for businesses and individuals to develop their cybersecurity resilience. In the past three years, Australian cyber diplomats have brokered a series of bilateral partnerships in the form of cyber Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs); currently there are agreements with India (2020), Indonesia (2018), Papua New Guinea (2018), Singapore (2020), and Thailand (2019), all of which include capacity-building and information-sharing elements. On a regional level, the country is chairing the Asia-Pacific CERT community and the Asia-Pacific cybersecurity operations network. Australians have also significantly extended their regional outreach through their flagship capacity-building initiative, the Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation Program. Meanwhile, Australia participates in several multipartite initiatives with a strong cyber component such as the Structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the eponymous Quad) along with India, Japan, and the US, and the tripartite AUKUS coalition along with the US and the UK. In international fora, Australia has been a vocal champion of increased international collaboration in cyber capacity building (CCB), welcoming references to further cooperation within the 2021 OEWG report but cautioning against limiting such cooperation to the protection of national, translational and supranational infrastructure. Australia has also argued that CCB should be mainstreamed into the larger development agenda of the UN, specifically the Sustainable Development Goals.
The US has been active in engaging in strategically-minded capacity building with partners; US capacity building in Africa with organisations such as the African Union and SADC, for instance, have been largely motivated by Washington’s wish to promote an open, secure, and democratic model for Internet governance across the African continent.
In relation to cyber defence, there have been several joint operations and military exercises, both bilaterally (e.g. between the US Cyber Command and the Montenegrin military) and under the auspices of NATO. Recent regional engagement efforts such as the dialogues in the context of the tripartite AUKUS coalition and the Structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the eponymous Quad) also heavily feature references to collaborative cyber-capacity building. In multilateral fora, the US has also welcomed the inclusion of confidence-building measures in the GGE reports and noted that, in order for CBMs to be useful, they need to be implemented at minimum on a bilateral basis and preferably on a multilateral and eventually an international basis. The Chinese International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation places a large emphasis on the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and engagement with partner countries through predictability-increasing practical measures to prevent unintended conflicts, respond to information operations, and ensure supply chain security in network equipment and industrial control systems.
Another key pillar of China’s cyber strategy is providing capacity-building assistance to developing countries. The Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2017, and 'the Digital Silk Road' seek to internationalise Chinese technology made by state-owned or affiliated companies, including Huawei and ZTE, and therefore export Chinese technical standards abroad. Chinese outreach in this domain is most active in Africa, South America, and Central and Southeast Asia through projects such as the China-ASEAN Information Harbour and the China-Arabia Digital Silk Road Ningxia Hub. In addition to infrastructure investment, capacity building also focuses on enhancing information-sharing capacities, cyber defence personnel training, and crisis management. In recent years, Australia has emerged as a regional leader in conversations surrounding cyber resilience in the Indo-Pacific as well as globally. The new 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Strategy constitutes one of the most comprehensive documents of its kind, with “secure, resilient, and trusted technology” representing a crucial objective. Key initiatives include enhanced protections for critical infrastructure and systems of national significance, as well as greater support for businesses and individuals to develop their cybersecurity resilience. In the past three years, Australian cyber diplomats have brokered a series of bilateral partnerships in the form of cyber Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs); currently there are agreements with India (2020), Indonesia (2018), Papua New Guinea (2018), Singapore (2020), and Thailand (2019), all of which include capacity-building and information-sharing elements. On a regional level, the country is chairing the Asia-Pacific CERT community and the Asia-Pacific cybersecurity operations network. Australians have also significantly extended their regional outreach through their flagship capacity-building initiative, the Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation Program. Meanwhile, Australia participates in several multipartite initiatives with a strong cyber component such as the Structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the eponymous Quad) along with India, Japan, and the US, and the tripartite AUKUS coalition along with the US and the UK. In international fora, Australia has been a vocal champion of increased international collaboration in cyber capacity building (CCB), welcoming references to further cooperation within the 2021 OEWG report but cautioning against limiting such cooperation to the protection of national, translational and supranational infrastructure. Australia has also argued that CCB should be mainstreamed into the larger development agenda of the UN, specifically the Sustainable Development Goals.
The US is a signatory and an early proponent of the Budapest Convention. A big part of American cyber diplomatic activity has, in fact, been focused on promoting the Budapest regime as the global model of cybercrime governance. In 2019, the US firmly opposed the Russian-sponsored resolution calling for an alternative legal instrument to the Convention; following the passing of the resolution, however, the US has agreed to participate in the Ad Hoc Committee established under UNGA resolution 74/247 despite the fact that the “surprise text” within the May 2021 resolution was seen as an effort to “circumvent dialogue” and undermine the “balanced, inclusive, consensus-based process” sought by the US.
On a multilateral level, the US is also a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and is a member of Interpol.
Bilaterally, the US has completed an agreement with the UK under the CLOUD Act that facilitates cross-border data sharing directly between US companies and the British government; the US is trying to expand this type of bilateral engagement, currently negotiating a similar agreement with Australia. The Chinese Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation notes that the country “supports the UN Security Council to play an important part in international cooperation against cyber terrorism” and “supports and contributes to UN effort on fighting cyber crimes”. China is not a party to or observer of the Budapest Convention; instead, it has consistently backed Russian bids in the UN to establish a new cybercrime treaty, with these efforts culminating in Resolution A/74/247 that created an Ad Hoc Committee for that purpose.
China has also signed the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright Treaty) in 1985 as well as the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and is a member of Interpol.
In addition, China has pursued regional avenues of cooperative engagement; within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, for instance, the country agreed to participate in efforts to fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, and international cybercrime.
It also supports joint cybersecurity exercises under the auspices of the Organisation. The 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy recognises that Australia, and the Indo-Pacific region more widely, faces a “worsening” cybercrime landscape characterized by “expanding threats, low barriers to entry, and increasingly resourceful actors”. Australia acceded to the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention in 2013 and has since been vocal about the Convention’s status as the “most comprehensive and effective basis upon which to pursue a common international approach”. The country voted against the Russia-sponsored UN resolution on the establishment of a new cybercrime treaty; however, upon the passage of the resolution and the subsequent creation of a dedicated Ad Hoc Committee, Australia has been active in advocating for a “transparent, inclusive, and consensus-based process with multi-stakeholder participation”. More specifically, it has stated that the new Convention should “draw heavily” from existing international instruments such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and especially the Budapest Convention, so as to avoid undermining these regimes and ensure the protection of human rights. Australia has additionally placed great emphasis on the need for international cooperation, with the 2021 Strategy noting that “information sharing, discussion and capacity building are vital to any meaningful response to the threat posed by cybercrime”. The country has launched numerous regional cooperation and capacity-building initiatives, partnering with Pacific Island countries (Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Niue, Tuvalu) to advance cybercrime law reform and ensure alignment with Budapest provisions.
On a multilateral level, the US is also a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and is a member of Interpol.
Bilaterally, the US has completed an agreement with the UK under the CLOUD Act that facilitates cross-border data sharing directly between US companies and the British government; the US is trying to expand this type of bilateral engagement, currently negotiating a similar agreement with Australia. The Chinese Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation notes that the country “supports the UN Security Council to play an important part in international cooperation against cyber terrorism” and “supports and contributes to UN effort on fighting cyber crimes”. China is not a party to or observer of the Budapest Convention; instead, it has consistently backed Russian bids in the UN to establish a new cybercrime treaty, with these efforts culminating in Resolution A/74/247 that created an Ad Hoc Committee for that purpose.
China has also signed the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright Treaty) in 1985 as well as the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and is a member of Interpol.
In addition, China has pursued regional avenues of cooperative engagement; within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, for instance, the country agreed to participate in efforts to fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, and international cybercrime.
It also supports joint cybersecurity exercises under the auspices of the Organisation. The 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy recognises that Australia, and the Indo-Pacific region more widely, faces a “worsening” cybercrime landscape characterized by “expanding threats, low barriers to entry, and increasingly resourceful actors”. Australia acceded to the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention in 2013 and has since been vocal about the Convention’s status as the “most comprehensive and effective basis upon which to pursue a common international approach”. The country voted against the Russia-sponsored UN resolution on the establishment of a new cybercrime treaty; however, upon the passage of the resolution and the subsequent creation of a dedicated Ad Hoc Committee, Australia has been active in advocating for a “transparent, inclusive, and consensus-based process with multi-stakeholder participation”. More specifically, it has stated that the new Convention should “draw heavily” from existing international instruments such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and especially the Budapest Convention, so as to avoid undermining these regimes and ensure the protection of human rights. Australia has additionally placed great emphasis on the need for international cooperation, with the 2021 Strategy noting that “information sharing, discussion and capacity building are vital to any meaningful response to the threat posed by cybercrime”. The country has launched numerous regional cooperation and capacity-building initiatives, partnering with Pacific Island countries (Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Niue, Tuvalu) to advance cybercrime law reform and ensure alignment with Budapest provisions.
