Peru stresses the need to make a
distinction between 'cyber attacks' (which involve 'damage being caused to a militarily relevant target, which may be totally or partially destroyed, even captured or neutralised') and an 'abrupt disruption of communications in cyberspace', i.e. cyber operations that cause inconvenience, even extreme inconvenience, but not direct injury or death, or destruction of property. Accordingly, Peru emphasises the determination of the legality of cyber operations in the context of the use of force by taking into account whether they may result in death or injury to persons or property.
Peru has noted the difficulty of attribution in cyberspace. Coinciding with other American states, Peru has focused on the state's duty to ensure that its territory is not used by non-state actors to launch attacks. In this regard, Peru
states that the inertia of a state towards a non-state actor that could unleash a cyber-attack on another state and that it was in a position to control could make its behaviour attributable to the state.
In any case, Peru
highlights the validity of various human rights in cyberspace, including 'the right to privacy and intimacy, freedom of information, freedom of expression, free and equal access to information, bridging the digital divide, intellectual property rights, free flow of information, the right to secrecy of communications'.
India has assumed a stance of strategic ambiguity on the proliferation of norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, positioning itself as a
‘bridge builder’ between the two camps that have emerged during multilateral cyber norm negotiations.
Its insistence on an enhanced role for intergovernmental institutions (such as the ITU) and its oscillating allegiance to the two polarised factions largely reflect the country’s long-standing focus on Westphalian sovereignty and the consequent belief in the primacy of the state as an actor in international affairs. This brings India to a certain degree of alignment with sovereignty-focused countries like China and Russia in the context of norm-building debates.
At the second substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), India
argued that voluntary norms do not necessarily increase the predictability of state behaviour within the ICT environment, but was not openly against the adoption of new voluntary norms; for instance, the country
proposed the adoption of a new norm on refraining from weaponisation and offensive uses of ICTs along with countries like Iran, Cuba, and Nigeria.
Since 2014, the EU’s ambition has been to act as an
‘honest broker’ on multilateral discussions surrounding issues of cyber governance and norms of responsible state behaviour, aiming to ensure the support and partnership of proactive players in the context of the global debate. The EU has long promoted the need for voluntary, non-binding norms. It believes that norms crystallised under the UN GGE process should generally not be revisited and that progress should be made on matters relating to their implementation.
Within the OEWG, the EU advanced a
suggestion to develop a global repository of existing practice within the United Nations, which would enable UN member states to showcase how they are implementing the voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour, confidence building and other measures.