Internet penetration in Montenegro stands at 83%, while analysis indicates that internet usage increased by 10,000 users (+2%) from 2021 to 2022. [x] As an EU candidate country, Montenegro has strived to align itself with the EU’s cyber priorities and recent strategic documents like the 2018-2021 Cybersecurity Strategy and its 2013-2017 predecessor represent a firm indication of this ambition. In the past five years, however, the Montenegrin government and media outlets have increasingly seen themselves sitting at the bullseye of numerous malicious cyberattacks, suggesting “synchronised action” on the part of several state and non-state actors. [x] A 2022 digital maturity assessment commissioned by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and conducted by e-Governance Academy found Montenegro to have only a “basic” level of digital maturity in seven dimensions, including “financing digitalisation, level of digital skill, and access to services”. The same assessment found that the “right conditions” had been generated for the purposes of digitalisation, but implementation fell short. These conditions included “political will and support, the legal framework, digital infrastructure and interoperability, digital identity/signature and security”. Montenegrin policymakers now perceive an increased need to transform their stated strategic goals into concrete action.

An EU candidate country since 2014, Albania has been eagerly embracing its digital revolution with the government ushering in an array of cyber and digital policy initiatives. In recent years, Albania has worked on adapting its legal framework to comply with the EU’s acquis communautaire and further approach the Digital Single Market. The Albanian policy framework ranks 1^st across the Western Balkans region in fostering the inclusivity and competitiveness of digital society [x], while the country currently ranks 80^th in the Global Security Index [x]. An OECD report praised Albania for enhancing intragovernmental cooperation, emphasising the cross-cutting character of ICT in its development strategies, and allocating resources towards the implementation of its digital strategy. Despite the proliferation of such policies, however, the country is currently the 5^th largest source of cybercrime in Europe, suffering at least 1.3 million cyberattacks yearly [x]. As such, modernising cybercrime legislation and upgrading critical infrastructure protection constitute key priorities for Albanian policymakers.

The United States has historically been a strong partner in cyber diplomacy for the EU based on common values (human rights, rule of law), goals (open, stable and secure cyberspace) and interpretation of international law. Cyber diplomacy with the US has also been operationalised in the form of information-sharing and cooperation to tackle cybercrime, cooperation on cyber defence via NATO and cyber capacity building in third countries. Despite differences over certain foreign policy issues, the EU and the US remain close allies in cyberspace.

Recalling its EU candidate status, the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UN Group of Governmental exports (UNGGE) saw Montenegro aligning itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] Montenegro has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29.

At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UN Group of Governmental exports (UNGGE), Albania aligned itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] Albania has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29. A 2015 policy paper notes that cybersecurity will only be “efficient” if it is “based on the fundamental human rights and freedoms, pursuant to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the universal values of the EU”. In the same vein, the 2020-2025 National Cybersecurity Strategy includes “improving the legal framework providing norms and regulating cybersecurity in the country, and aligning this framework with European Union directives and regulation” as a stated objective.

The US believes that international law is applicable in cyberspace. As part of the ‘like-minded’ coalition, the US recognises a need to acknowledge the full breadth of relevant international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights law, customary international law on the responsibilities of states for internationally wrongful acts. The general applicability of IHL in cyberspace is not to be misconstrued as a tacit endorsement of aggression in the cyber domain; instead, it only serves to remind states of the responsibility to respect and protect civilians in the event of armed conflict. 
In the context of multilateral fora, US diplomats have specifically emphasised the applicability of the right to self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter, noting that a State may lawfully take cyber-based or non-cyber-based countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful cyber activities attributable to another State, but only subject to the requirements of the doctrine under international law and the principles of necessity and proportionality.

At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, Montenegro aligned itself with the EU’s position that the “previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus” form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x].

At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, Albania aligned itself with the EU’s position that the previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus” form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x]. In 2018, Albania voted against the Russian-sponsored resolution A/73/27, which launched the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) format.

As stated in the 2018 National Security Strategy, the United States views voluntary, non-binding norms of state behaviour during peacetime as essential components of a framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. The US has participated in all iterations of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) as well as the latest Open-Ended Working Group.
In these multilateral fora, US diplomats have typically opposed attempts at shifting to a legally binding status for norms of responsible state behaviour, arguing that such discussions are “premature” and do not represent the best way to address the immediate threats given the fast pace of technological developments. 
The starting basis for any further discussions on the part of the US rests on the current buildup of consensus surrounding the norms identified in the 2015 and 2021 GGE reports. Efforts should be concentrated on the implementation of existing consensus norms, not the creation of entirely new normative concepts (i.e. in relation to harmful hidden functions and specific critical infrastructure sectors).

The new Cybersecurity Strategy 2022-2026 aims to improve effective mechanism for responding to cyber incidents and response to cybercrime. The new strategy recognises the establishment of a new body Cyber Security Agency which will be umbrella institution when it comes to cyber security. The CIRT team will be transferred to the new Agency. The 2018-2021 Cybersecurity Strategy explicitly establishes a “reliance” on European and Euro-Atlantic conceptualisations of cybersecurity and resilience. The Strategy points to the EU’s 2016 NIS Directive as the primary source of inspiration, notably in its requirements for the adoption of a national cybersecurity strategy, the definition of relevant authorities, and the creation of a Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT). Indeed, since 2012, the Montenegrin CIRT represents “a central point for coordinating prevention and protection against computer security incidents on the Internet and other IT security risk for the area of Montenegro”. The Strategy also features a dedicated section on cyber defence, highlighting the country’s alignment with NATO targets (E 6202 N). In expanding cyber defence capabilities, the document notes that “special attention will be paid to harmonisation with regard to the standardisation of concepts, methods, policies, and procedures in line with the accepted European and international standards”. It also pledges the country to a set of goals: (1) definition and protection of critical information infrastructure; (2) strengthening the resilience of information systems to incidents; and (3) performing analysis of threats to IT infrastructure. Montenegro completed a bilateral ICT cooperation agreement with Thailand in 2013, while it is also a member of the CAMP initiative, the platform where members “prepare themselves with collective actions to keep cyberspace safe” through training, joint exercises, and dialogues.

In recent years, Albania has significantly expanded its capacity-building activities, modernising both the relevant institutional apparatus and the diplomatic outreach accompanying it. Since 2017, ALCIRT, Albania’s national CSIRT, has been given an expanded mandate and merged with the National Authority for Electronic Certification and Cyber Security (AKCESK). AKCESK is responsible for preparing strategic documents relating to cybersecurity, drafting legislation, collaborating with relevant stakeholders (international organisations, civil society organisations, the private sector) and providing training. [x] Through AKCESK, Albania has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with several regional national CERTs (Kosovo, North Macedonia, Romania) and is currently negotiating similar MoUs with Serbia, Montenegro, Cyprus, and Slovenia. [x] AKCESK also frequently collaborates with the Council of Europe in relation to incident response and awareness training. [x] As a member of NATO, Albania signed the MoU with the NATO Cyber Incident Response Centre (NCIRC) on enhancing cyber defence in 2013 [x] and has participated in numerous NATO-led training initiatives, including the flagship Cyber Coalition exercise. Meanwhile, increased emphasis has been placed on the protection of critical infrastructure, with a 2015 government paper stating that future actions will be focused on “the protection and resilience capacity of critical infrastructure” and on “encouraging operators that own them to implement a full security architecture (including risk management and emergencies)”. [x] In 2020, Albania adopted its first-ever cybersecurity regulation for the electricity sector, which establishes incident reporting and assessment criteria for electricity operators. [x] This was reportedly only the first of many planned initiatives intended to reduce the country’s cyber vulnerabilities and increase trust in digital services.

The March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance states that “[the US] will make cybersecurity a top priority, strengthening our capability, readiness, and resilience in cyberspace.” Following the recommendations of the 2020 Solarium Commission, the US government has adopted the concept of ‘layered resilience’ and is gradually rolling out a comprehensive arsenal of resilience measures across a variety of domains. 
The US has been active in engaging in strategically-minded capacity building with partners; US capacity building in Africa with organisations such as the African Union and SADC, for instance, have been largely motivated by Washington’s wish to promote an open, secure, and democratic model for Internet governance across the African continent. 
In relation to cyber defence, there have been several joint operations and military exercises, both bilaterally (e.g. between the US Cyber Command and the Montenegrin military) and under the auspices of NATO. Recent regional engagement efforts such as the dialogues in the context of the tripartite AUKUS coalition and the Structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the eponymous Quad) also heavily feature references to collaborative cyber-capacity building. In multilateral fora, the US has also welcomed the inclusion of confidence-building measures in the GGE reports and noted that, in order for CBMs to be useful, they need to be implemented at minimum on a bilateral basis and preferably on a multilateral and eventually an international basis.

Montenegro is a party to the Council of Europe-sponsored Budapest Convention, ratifying it in 2010. In February 2013, Montenegro signed the regional Declaration on Strategic Priorities against Cybercrime, which “identified strategic priorities” that largely reflect the spirit and content of the Budapest provisions. [x] The 2018-2021 Strategy lists several developments that have contributed towards strengthening the capabilities of law enforcement authorities in dealing with cybercrime: these include the establishment of a dedicated High-Tech Crime Group within the Ministry of Interior, while the National Security Agency is making “significant efforts aimed at creating normative and operational mechanisms for fighting against cybercrime and espionage”. [x]

Many thanks to Ms Ana Minevski for her valuable comments.

Albania is a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, with the Albanian Parliament ratifying the Convention in 2002 [x]. Since then, however, national strategic documents have been acknowledging the incomplete harmonisation of national legislation with Budapest provisions. The most recent five-year National Cybersecurity Strategy states that “legislation in the cybersecurity field should be harmonised with EU legislation, thus creating a complete and codified mechanism to adequately address and resolve issues. Besides, where possible, international internet security mechanisms should be accessed, signed, ratified, and implemented”. The Strategy also places special emphasis on children’s online protection, elevating it into a key priority [x]. Aiming to implement the policy goals listed within the National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Strategy for Investigation of Cybercrime (2021-2025) lays out a number of objectives for law enforcement [x]: (1) extending the cybercrime investigation structure throughout the country and building technological and legal capacity; (2) presenting a prompt and efficient response to cybercrime, raising public awareness, taking legislative initiatives, and building professional capacity; (3) presenting a rapid and professional response to the prevention, prosecution, and investigation of cybercrime against children; and (4) increasing national and international cooperation in the field of cybercrime investigation with strategic partners. Albanian police forces have also collaborated with Europol in coordinated action against cyber fraud and through the launch of the Sell Safe awareness campaign. [x]

The US is a signatory and an early proponent of the Budapest Convention. A big part of American cyber diplomatic activity has, in fact, been focused on promoting the Budapest regime as the global model of cybercrime governance. In 2019, the US firmly opposed the Russian-sponsored resolution calling for an alternative legal instrument to the Convention; following the passing of the resolution, however, the US has agreed to participate in the Ad Hoc Committee established under UNGA resolution 74/247 despite the fact that the “surprise text” within the May 2021 resolution was seen as an effort to “circumvent dialogue” and undermine the “balanced, inclusive, consensus-based process” sought by the US. 
On a multilateral level, the US is also a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and is a member of Interpol. 
Bilaterally, the US has completed an agreement with the UK under the CLOUD Act that facilitates cross-border data sharing directly between US companies and the British government; the US is trying to expand this type of bilateral engagement, currently negotiating a similar agreement with Australia.