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Japan is a trusted partner and shares the same basic values of human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance. This common set of values also applies to cyberspace as both the EU and Japan have publicly expressed strong support for an open, free and secure internet and the application of international norms to state activities in cyberspace. Japan is also an important trading partner of the EU. The recently adopted Economic Partnership Agreement also reinforces the need for a closer integration of the digital economies. Alignment in broader international economic and political issues is also evident in the field of cyber diplomacy and thus constitutes a strong foundation for close cooperation and partnership.
An EU candidate country since 2014, Albania has been eagerly embracing its digital revolution with the government ushering in an array of cyber and digital policy initiatives. In recent years, Albania has worked on adapting its legal framework to comply with the EU’s acquis communautaire and further approach the Digital Single Market. The Albanian policy framework ranks 1st across the Western Balkans region in fostering the inclusivity and competitiveness of digital society [x], while the country currently ranks 80th in the Global Security Index [x]. An OECD report praised Albania for enhancing intragovernmental cooperation, emphasising the cross-cutting character of ICT in its development strategies, and allocating resources towards the implementation of its digital strategy. Despite the proliferation of such policies, however, the country is currently the 5th largest source of cybercrime in Europe, suffering at least 1.3 million cyberattacks yearly [x]. As such, modernising cybercrime legislation and upgrading critical infrastructure protection constitute key priorities for Albanian policymakers.
Overall, Cuba's internet and social media penetration is limited due to access limitations, slow network speeds, and high costs, resulting in a rather slow internet adoption. The Cuban government has attempted to expand public Wi-Fi hotspots launching 3G and 4G mobile networks. Despite these efforts, internet access in Cuba remains expensive and limited compared to other countries in the region.
According to a 2021 report by Freedom House, the Cuban government uses a range of tactics to restrict online speech, including censorship, surveillance, and intimidation of online activists. The report notes that online criticism of the government can result in arrest and imprisonment.
According to a 2021 report by Freedom House, the Cuban government uses a range of tactics to restrict online speech, including censorship, surveillance, and intimidation of online activists. The report notes that online criticism of the government can result in arrest and imprisonment.
Japan has highlighted the importance of promoting the rule of law in cyberspace, noting that cyberspace “should not be a lawless zone”. It further endorses the applicability of international law, in particular the UN Charter, in the cyber domain. In relation to the use of countermeasures, it has stated that it is not necessary for countermeasures to be limited to the same means as internationally wrongful acts.
Japan has cautioned against the launch of “premature” discussions on developing a legally binding new instrument, arguing that the adoption of such an instrument might “roll back” the achievement of past multilateral efforts in confirming the applicability of existing international law in cyberspace. Instead, Japan believes that it is necessary to consolidate, elaborate, and clarify the interpretation of existing treaties and content of customary international law.
During the drafting phase of the 2021 Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) Report, Japan had proposed to include language explicitly affirming the applicability of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, the inherent right of self-defence recognized under the UN Charter, and International Humanitarian Law. At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UN Group of Governmental exports (UNGGE), Albania aligned itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] Albania has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29. A 2015 policy paper notes that cybersecurity will only be “efficient” if it is “based on the fundamental human rights and freedoms, pursuant to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the universal values of the EU”. In the same vein, the 2020-2025 National Cybersecurity Strategy includes “improving the legal framework providing norms and regulating cybersecurity in the country, and aligning this framework with European Union directives and regulation” as a stated objective. It's worth noting that while Cuba has participated in international discussions and informal negotiations related to cybersecurity, it has not signed or ratified binding agreements regarding cyberspace or digital rights. Its government has also been criticised by human rights groups for its restrictions on internet access and online freedom of expression, which have limited its ability to fully engage in these discussions.
Japan has cautioned against the launch of “premature” discussions on developing a legally binding new instrument, arguing that the adoption of such an instrument might “roll back” the achievement of past multilateral efforts in confirming the applicability of existing international law in cyberspace. Instead, Japan believes that it is necessary to consolidate, elaborate, and clarify the interpretation of existing treaties and content of customary international law.
During the drafting phase of the 2021 Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) Report, Japan had proposed to include language explicitly affirming the applicability of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, the inherent right of self-defence recognized under the UN Charter, and International Humanitarian Law. At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UN Group of Governmental exports (UNGGE), Albania aligned itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] Albania has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29. A 2015 policy paper notes that cybersecurity will only be “efficient” if it is “based on the fundamental human rights and freedoms, pursuant to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the universal values of the EU”. In the same vein, the 2020-2025 National Cybersecurity Strategy includes “improving the legal framework providing norms and regulating cybersecurity in the country, and aligning this framework with European Union directives and regulation” as a stated objective. It's worth noting that while Cuba has participated in international discussions and informal negotiations related to cybersecurity, it has not signed or ratified binding agreements regarding cyberspace or digital rights. Its government has also been criticised by human rights groups for its restrictions on internet access and online freedom of expression, which have limited its ability to fully engage in these discussions.
In multilateral fora, Japan has frequently emphasised the need to implement voluntary and non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. The country believes that any discussion on norm-building should exclusively occur on the basis of the 11 norms affirmed within the 2015 UNGGE Report; possible new norms should be “carefully scrutinised” so as to avoid any change to these 11 norms or duplication with them.
Japan also strongly opposes the adoption of additional legally binding obligations, maintaining that such an endeavour would take a very long time whereas the evolution of technology is extremely fast-paced. Instead, countries should work on parallel mechanisms for capacity-building, raising awareness, and promoting a common understanding of norms. At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, Albania aligned itself with the EU’s position that the previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus” form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x]. In 2018, Albania voted against the Russian-sponsored resolution A/73/27, which launched the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) format. Cuba has been represented in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. It participated in multiple sessions of the UN GGE and has made contributions as part of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), a group of countries that are not formally aligned with any major power bloc. As such, a 2017 statement by Cuba emphasised the need to avoid a ‘state militarisation’ of cyberspace and concentrate on peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention. In 2019, for instance, Cuba called for the development of a safe cyberspace environment that can promote well-being, knowledge and human development.
Japan also strongly opposes the adoption of additional legally binding obligations, maintaining that such an endeavour would take a very long time whereas the evolution of technology is extremely fast-paced. Instead, countries should work on parallel mechanisms for capacity-building, raising awareness, and promoting a common understanding of norms. At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, Albania aligned itself with the EU’s position that the previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus” form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x]. In 2018, Albania voted against the Russian-sponsored resolution A/73/27, which launched the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) format. Cuba has been represented in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. It participated in multiple sessions of the UN GGE and has made contributions as part of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), a group of countries that are not formally aligned with any major power bloc. As such, a 2017 statement by Cuba emphasised the need to avoid a ‘state militarisation’ of cyberspace and concentrate on peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention. In 2019, for instance, Cuba called for the development of a safe cyberspace environment that can promote well-being, knowledge and human development.
Resilience constitutes one of the central objectives of Japan’s 2018 Cybersecurity Strategy, whose core components include international cooperation in sharing expertise and coordination of policies, incidence response, and cyber capacity-building (CCB). Japan has traditionally argued that global initiatives are required to reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities and has advocated for a tailor-made approach that takes into account the national situation of recipient countries and the importance of national ownership.
Japan recognises the ‘trickle-up’ effect of national initiatives, stating that CCB “not only improves the capabilities of the recipient country, but also directly leads to enhanced security and stability in cyberspace as a whole”; in that sense, it disfavours the understanding of CCB as a “common but differentiated responsibility”, believing that such a view “does not fit the context” of international cyber cooperation. As a result, the country has assumed a balanced approach to CCB. On the one hand, it has successfully utilised multilateral fora such as the G7 and G20 summits to promote its own normative standards.
At the G7 Ise-Shina Summit in May 2016, for instance, Japan introduced the Ise-Shima Principles, which included the enhancement of cooperation on CCB. On the other hand, Japan considers its own security and that of its nationals as intrinsically tied to the cyber capabilities of developing countries, since attacks on the IT infrastructure of regional partners can adversely affect Japanese trade. Japan has thus acted primarily through ASEAN to promote regional capacity-building efforts. In recent years, Albania has significantly expanded its capacity-building activities, modernising both the relevant institutional apparatus and the diplomatic outreach accompanying it. Since 2017, ALCIRT, Albania’s national CSIRT, has been given an expanded mandate and merged with the National Authority for Electronic Certification and Cyber Security (AKCESK). AKCESK is responsible for preparing strategic documents relating to cybersecurity, drafting legislation, collaborating with relevant stakeholders (international organisations, civil society organisations, the private sector) and providing training. [x] Through AKCESK, Albania has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with several regional national CERTs (Kosovo, North Macedonia, Romania) and is currently negotiating similar MoUs with Serbia, Montenegro, Cyprus, and Slovenia. [x] AKCESK also frequently collaborates with the Council of Europe in relation to incident response and awareness training. [x] As a member of NATO, Albania signed the MoU with the NATO Cyber Incident Response Centre (NCIRC) on enhancing cyber defence in 2013 [x] and has participated in numerous NATO-led training initiatives, including the flagship Cyber Coalition exercise. Meanwhile, increased emphasis has been placed on the protection of critical infrastructure, with a 2015 government paper stating that future actions will be focused on “the protection and resilience capacity of critical infrastructure” and on “encouraging operators that own them to implement a full security architecture (including risk management and emergencies)”. [x] In 2020, Albania adopted its first-ever cybersecurity regulation for the electricity sector, which establishes incident reporting and assessment criteria for electricity operators. [x] This was reportedly only the first of many planned initiatives intended to reduce the country’s cyber vulnerabilities and increase trust in digital services. Cuba launched its first strategy on cybersecurity in 2019, emphasising the need for 'cybersecurity and cyber resilience' in the face of potential threats to national security and the economy, as well as protecting critical infrastructure. The resolution also focused on capacity-building and training in cybersecurity and cyber resilience, both within the government and in the private sector.
Japan recognises the ‘trickle-up’ effect of national initiatives, stating that CCB “not only improves the capabilities of the recipient country, but also directly leads to enhanced security and stability in cyberspace as a whole”; in that sense, it disfavours the understanding of CCB as a “common but differentiated responsibility”, believing that such a view “does not fit the context” of international cyber cooperation. As a result, the country has assumed a balanced approach to CCB. On the one hand, it has successfully utilised multilateral fora such as the G7 and G20 summits to promote its own normative standards.
At the G7 Ise-Shina Summit in May 2016, for instance, Japan introduced the Ise-Shima Principles, which included the enhancement of cooperation on CCB. On the other hand, Japan considers its own security and that of its nationals as intrinsically tied to the cyber capabilities of developing countries, since attacks on the IT infrastructure of regional partners can adversely affect Japanese trade. Japan has thus acted primarily through ASEAN to promote regional capacity-building efforts. In recent years, Albania has significantly expanded its capacity-building activities, modernising both the relevant institutional apparatus and the diplomatic outreach accompanying it. Since 2017, ALCIRT, Albania’s national CSIRT, has been given an expanded mandate and merged with the National Authority for Electronic Certification and Cyber Security (AKCESK). AKCESK is responsible for preparing strategic documents relating to cybersecurity, drafting legislation, collaborating with relevant stakeholders (international organisations, civil society organisations, the private sector) and providing training. [x] Through AKCESK, Albania has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with several regional national CERTs (Kosovo, North Macedonia, Romania) and is currently negotiating similar MoUs with Serbia, Montenegro, Cyprus, and Slovenia. [x] AKCESK also frequently collaborates with the Council of Europe in relation to incident response and awareness training. [x] As a member of NATO, Albania signed the MoU with the NATO Cyber Incident Response Centre (NCIRC) on enhancing cyber defence in 2013 [x] and has participated in numerous NATO-led training initiatives, including the flagship Cyber Coalition exercise. Meanwhile, increased emphasis has been placed on the protection of critical infrastructure, with a 2015 government paper stating that future actions will be focused on “the protection and resilience capacity of critical infrastructure” and on “encouraging operators that own them to implement a full security architecture (including risk management and emergencies)”. [x] In 2020, Albania adopted its first-ever cybersecurity regulation for the electricity sector, which establishes incident reporting and assessment criteria for electricity operators. [x] This was reportedly only the first of many planned initiatives intended to reduce the country’s cyber vulnerabilities and increase trust in digital services. Cuba launched its first strategy on cybersecurity in 2019, emphasising the need for 'cybersecurity and cyber resilience' in the face of potential threats to national security and the economy, as well as protecting critical infrastructure. The resolution also focused on capacity-building and training in cybersecurity and cyber resilience, both within the government and in the private sector.
According to Japan’s 2018 Cybersecurity Strategy, the country is committed to “further [promoting] international partnership through international investigative cooperation and information sharing with international organisations, law enforcement agencies and security information agencies in foreign countries.”
Japan is a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and mutual assistance treaties (MLAT), voting against the Russian-sponsored UNGA resolution calling for a new binding cybercrime treaty. Japan has pursued dialogues related to cybercrime cooperation in the context of ASEAN, as well as on a bilateral basis with countries like the UK, USA, and Australia. Albania is a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, with the Albanian Parliament ratifying the Convention in 2002 [x]. Since then, however, national strategic documents have been acknowledging the incomplete harmonisation of national legislation with Budapest provisions. The most recent five-year National Cybersecurity Strategy states that “legislation in the cybersecurity field should be harmonised with EU legislation, thus creating a complete and codified mechanism to adequately address and resolve issues. Besides, where possible, international internet security mechanisms should be accessed, signed, ratified, and implemented”. The Strategy also places special emphasis on children’s online protection, elevating it into a key priority [x]. Aiming to implement the policy goals listed within the National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Strategy for Investigation of Cybercrime (2021-2025) lays out a number of objectives for law enforcement [x]: (1) extending the cybercrime investigation structure throughout the country and building technological and legal capacity; (2) presenting a prompt and efficient response to cybercrime, raising public awareness, taking legislative initiatives, and building professional capacity; (3) presenting a rapid and professional response to the prevention, prosecution, and investigation of cybercrime against children; and (4) increasing national and international cooperation in the field of cybercrime investigation with strategic partners. Albanian police forces have also collaborated with Europol in coordinated action against cyber fraud and through the launch of the Sell Safe awareness campaign. [x] Cuba is not a signatory of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and has developed its own domestic legal framework in the matter, such as Decree-Law No. 360/2019 which covers a wide range of crimes related to information and communication technologies. In an ongoing debate surrounding this new legislation, critics say that the law could be used to suppress dissent and limit freedom of expression online.
Japan is a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and mutual assistance treaties (MLAT), voting against the Russian-sponsored UNGA resolution calling for a new binding cybercrime treaty. Japan has pursued dialogues related to cybercrime cooperation in the context of ASEAN, as well as on a bilateral basis with countries like the UK, USA, and Australia. Albania is a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, with the Albanian Parliament ratifying the Convention in 2002 [x]. Since then, however, national strategic documents have been acknowledging the incomplete harmonisation of national legislation with Budapest provisions. The most recent five-year National Cybersecurity Strategy states that “legislation in the cybersecurity field should be harmonised with EU legislation, thus creating a complete and codified mechanism to adequately address and resolve issues. Besides, where possible, international internet security mechanisms should be accessed, signed, ratified, and implemented”. The Strategy also places special emphasis on children’s online protection, elevating it into a key priority [x]. Aiming to implement the policy goals listed within the National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Strategy for Investigation of Cybercrime (2021-2025) lays out a number of objectives for law enforcement [x]: (1) extending the cybercrime investigation structure throughout the country and building technological and legal capacity; (2) presenting a prompt and efficient response to cybercrime, raising public awareness, taking legislative initiatives, and building professional capacity; (3) presenting a rapid and professional response to the prevention, prosecution, and investigation of cybercrime against children; and (4) increasing national and international cooperation in the field of cybercrime investigation with strategic partners. Albanian police forces have also collaborated with Europol in coordinated action against cyber fraud and through the launch of the Sell Safe awareness campaign. [x] Cuba is not a signatory of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and has developed its own domestic legal framework in the matter, such as Decree-Law No. 360/2019 which covers a wide range of crimes related to information and communication technologies. In an ongoing debate surrounding this new legislation, critics say that the law could be used to suppress dissent and limit freedom of expression online.
