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Thanks to its regulatory powers, robust digital economy, and active foreign and security policy, the European Union is one of the key players in cyberspace. The EU strongly promotes the position that international law, and in particular the United Nations (UN) Charter, applies in cyberspace. As a complement to binding international law, the EU endorses the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour that have been articulated by the UN Group of Governmental Experts. It also encourages the development and implementation of regional confidence building measures, both in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and other regions. On a bilateral level, the EU has established cyber dialogues with strategic partners to reinforce the exchange of good practices, lessons learnt and further the idea of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.
Overall, Cuba's internet and social media penetration is limited due to access limitations, slow network speeds, and high costs, resulting in a rather slow internet adoption. The Cuban government has attempted to expand public Wi-Fi hotspots launching 3G and 4G mobile networks. Despite these efforts, internet access in Cuba remains expensive and limited compared to other countries in the region.
According to a 2021 report by Freedom House, the Cuban government uses a range of tactics to restrict online speech, including censorship, surveillance, and intimidation of online activists. The report notes that online criticism of the government can result in arrest and imprisonment. India and the European Union share many values and principles, such as inclusiveness, democracy, and multilateralism. With 1.4 billion people, India is the largest democracy in the world and considers itself as a leader among the Global South. India and the EU share common visions of a rules-based global order and are aligned on their commitment to an open, free, secure, stable, peaceful, and accessible cyberspace, enabling economic growth and innovation. In light of India’s rapid digitization and connectivity, the EU-India Strategic Partnership & Roadmap to 2025 includes commitments to cooperate on new and emerging technologies, norms and regulatory frameworks, and international standards.
According to a 2021 report by Freedom House, the Cuban government uses a range of tactics to restrict online speech, including censorship, surveillance, and intimidation of online activists. The report notes that online criticism of the government can result in arrest and imprisonment. India and the European Union share many values and principles, such as inclusiveness, democracy, and multilateralism. With 1.4 billion people, India is the largest democracy in the world and considers itself as a leader among the Global South. India and the EU share common visions of a rules-based global order and are aligned on their commitment to an open, free, secure, stable, peaceful, and accessible cyberspace, enabling economic growth and innovation. In light of India’s rapid digitization and connectivity, the EU-India Strategic Partnership & Roadmap to 2025 includes commitments to cooperate on new and emerging technologies, norms and regulatory frameworks, and international standards.
Under the auspices of the UN, the EU and its Member States have consistently reaffirmed that a universal cyber security framework can only be grounded in existing international law, including the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law.
Addressing issues as to how existing international law and international humanitarian law, including the principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality and distinction, apply to the use ICTs by States is necessary to increase accountability and transparency. International humanitarian law is fully applicable in cyberspace and this should not be misunderstood as legitimising the use of force between states in the cyber domain. The EU has typically opposed calls for the need to adapt existing international law as a means to develop a new legal instrument for cyber issues. It's worth noting that while Cuba has participated in international discussions and informal negotiations related to cybersecurity, it has not signed or ratified binding agreements regarding cyberspace or digital rights. Its government has also been criticised by human rights groups for its restrictions on internet access and online freedom of expression, which have limited its ability to fully engage in these discussions. As a member of the 2015 UNGGE group, India accepts that international law and specifically the UN Charter applies in its entirety in the cyber domain. India has noted the need to develop common understandings as to how international law should be interpreted, especially on the issues of what constitutes force and/or an armed attack in cyberspace and what the threshold of cyber-attacks should be to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter.
In statements at the UN General Assembly, India has also specifically called for further elaboration on peacetime rules of international law, the law concerning the right of self-defence and international humanitarian law.
Apart from these calls for clarification and elaboration, however, India’s stance on specific aspects of international law and their interpretation remains unclear. This seems consistent with India’s recent reorientation of its foreign policy; since 2019, India’s wider approach has been marked by a shift from traditional non-alignment to issue-based ‘multi-alignment’ that reflects national priorities and interests.
Addressing issues as to how existing international law and international humanitarian law, including the principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality and distinction, apply to the use ICTs by States is necessary to increase accountability and transparency. International humanitarian law is fully applicable in cyberspace and this should not be misunderstood as legitimising the use of force between states in the cyber domain. The EU has typically opposed calls for the need to adapt existing international law as a means to develop a new legal instrument for cyber issues. It's worth noting that while Cuba has participated in international discussions and informal negotiations related to cybersecurity, it has not signed or ratified binding agreements regarding cyberspace or digital rights. Its government has also been criticised by human rights groups for its restrictions on internet access and online freedom of expression, which have limited its ability to fully engage in these discussions. As a member of the 2015 UNGGE group, India accepts that international law and specifically the UN Charter applies in its entirety in the cyber domain. India has noted the need to develop common understandings as to how international law should be interpreted, especially on the issues of what constitutes force and/or an armed attack in cyberspace and what the threshold of cyber-attacks should be to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter.
In statements at the UN General Assembly, India has also specifically called for further elaboration on peacetime rules of international law, the law concerning the right of self-defence and international humanitarian law.
Apart from these calls for clarification and elaboration, however, India’s stance on specific aspects of international law and their interpretation remains unclear. This seems consistent with India’s recent reorientation of its foreign policy; since 2019, India’s wider approach has been marked by a shift from traditional non-alignment to issue-based ‘multi-alignment’ that reflects national priorities and interests.
Since 2014, the EU’s ambition has been to act as an ‘honest broker’ on multilateral discussions surrounding issues of cyber governance and norms of responsible state behaviour, aiming to ensure the support and partnership of proactive players in the context of the global debate. The EU has long promoted the need for voluntary, non-binding norms. It believes that norms crystallised under the UN GGE process should generally not be revisited and that progress should be made on matters relating to their implementation.
Within the OEWG, the EU advanced a suggestion to develop a global repository of existing practice within the United Nations, which would enable UN member states to showcase how they are implementing the voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour, confidence building and other measures. Cuba has been represented in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. It participated in multiple sessions of the UN GGE and has made contributions as part of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), a group of countries that are not formally aligned with any major power bloc. As such, a 2017 statement by Cuba emphasised the need to avoid a ‘state militarisation’ of cyberspace and concentrate on peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention. In 2019, for instance, Cuba called for the development of a safe cyberspace environment that can promote well-being, knowledge and human development. India has assumed a stance of strategic ambiguity on the proliferation of norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, positioning itself as a ‘bridge builder’ between the two camps that have emerged during multilateral cyber norm negotiations.
Its insistence on an enhanced role for intergovernmental institutions (such as the ITU) and its oscillating allegiance to the two polarised factions largely reflect the country’s long-standing focus on Westphalian sovereignty and the consequent belief in the primacy of the state as an actor in international affairs. This brings India to a certain degree of alignment with sovereignty-focused countries like China and Russia in the context of norm-building debates.
At the second substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), India argued that voluntary norms do not necessarily increase the predictability of state behaviour within the ICT environment, but was not openly against the adoption of new voluntary norms; for instance, the country proposed the adoption of a new norm on refraining from weaponisation and offensive uses of ICTs along with countries like Iran, Cuba, and Nigeria.
Within the OEWG, the EU advanced a suggestion to develop a global repository of existing practice within the United Nations, which would enable UN member states to showcase how they are implementing the voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour, confidence building and other measures. Cuba has been represented in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. It participated in multiple sessions of the UN GGE and has made contributions as part of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), a group of countries that are not formally aligned with any major power bloc. As such, a 2017 statement by Cuba emphasised the need to avoid a ‘state militarisation’ of cyberspace and concentrate on peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention. In 2019, for instance, Cuba called for the development of a safe cyberspace environment that can promote well-being, knowledge and human development. India has assumed a stance of strategic ambiguity on the proliferation of norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, positioning itself as a ‘bridge builder’ between the two camps that have emerged during multilateral cyber norm negotiations.
Its insistence on an enhanced role for intergovernmental institutions (such as the ITU) and its oscillating allegiance to the two polarised factions largely reflect the country’s long-standing focus on Westphalian sovereignty and the consequent belief in the primacy of the state as an actor in international affairs. This brings India to a certain degree of alignment with sovereignty-focused countries like China and Russia in the context of norm-building debates.
At the second substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), India argued that voluntary norms do not necessarily increase the predictability of state behaviour within the ICT environment, but was not openly against the adoption of new voluntary norms; for instance, the country proposed the adoption of a new norm on refraining from weaponisation and offensive uses of ICTs along with countries like Iran, Cuba, and Nigeria.
The EU places great importance on cyber resilience and capacity building. Internally, the Union has built a robust legal acquis in relation to the resilience of critical infrastructures, the cornerstone of which rests upon the 2016 Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive and the 2013 and 2019 Cybersecurity Acts. This legal meshwork seeks to integrate cybersecurity into all elements of the supply chain and introduce soft law mechanisms like the EU cybersecurity certification scheme. In doing so, it harmonises national cybersecurity capabilities, cross-border collaboration and the supervision of critical sectors across the EU.
In the coming months, the Commission intends to add upon the existing cyber-acquis by introducing an array of new initiatives, such as the updated NIS Directive (the so-called NIS2), a proposal on a Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive, and a plan to launch a network of Security Operations Centres across the Union. The aim is to create a Union-wide ‘cybersecurity shield’ that will facilitate the detection of cyberattacks and provide an impetus for proactive action.
This internal buildup of capabilities is supplemented by the development of a specialised ‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’ that allows the Union and its Member States to address cyber incidents through various joint policies, from cooperation and stabilisation measures to restrictive measures and attribution. Cuba launched its first strategy on cybersecurity in 2019, emphasising the need for 'cybersecurity and cyber resilience' in the face of potential threats to national security and the economy, as well as protecting critical infrastructure. The resolution also focused on capacity-building and training in cybersecurity and cyber resilience, both within the government and in the private sector. In matters related to cyber resilience, India has proven to be an active proponent of bilateralism. It has initiated cyber dialogues with actors like the US, the UK, Russia, Malaysia, the EU, and ASEAN, all of which include capacity-building elements. Internationally, the country has also been especially vocal on the need to establish cooperative mechanisms for developing and implementing bilateral, regional, and global confidence-building measures (CBMs).
In the context of multilateral fora, India has many a time reiterated that the issue of supply chain protection enjoys particular significance for them, especially in relation to ‘trust and trusted sources’ when it comes to preferring suppliers of ICT products and systems. It has also noted that capacity building actually goes beyond what is being dealt with under international security and is inherently tied to discussions on international legal instruments on cyberspace, where all states are equal and have the capacity to discuss legitimate matters under the auspices of the UN.
In the coming months, the Commission intends to add upon the existing cyber-acquis by introducing an array of new initiatives, such as the updated NIS Directive (the so-called NIS2), a proposal on a Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive, and a plan to launch a network of Security Operations Centres across the Union. The aim is to create a Union-wide ‘cybersecurity shield’ that will facilitate the detection of cyberattacks and provide an impetus for proactive action.
This internal buildup of capabilities is supplemented by the development of a specialised ‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’ that allows the Union and its Member States to address cyber incidents through various joint policies, from cooperation and stabilisation measures to restrictive measures and attribution. Cuba launched its first strategy on cybersecurity in 2019, emphasising the need for 'cybersecurity and cyber resilience' in the face of potential threats to national security and the economy, as well as protecting critical infrastructure. The resolution also focused on capacity-building and training in cybersecurity and cyber resilience, both within the government and in the private sector. In matters related to cyber resilience, India has proven to be an active proponent of bilateralism. It has initiated cyber dialogues with actors like the US, the UK, Russia, Malaysia, the EU, and ASEAN, all of which include capacity-building elements. Internationally, the country has also been especially vocal on the need to establish cooperative mechanisms for developing and implementing bilateral, regional, and global confidence-building measures (CBMs).
In the context of multilateral fora, India has many a time reiterated that the issue of supply chain protection enjoys particular significance for them, especially in relation to ‘trust and trusted sources’ when it comes to preferring suppliers of ICT products and systems. It has also noted that capacity building actually goes beyond what is being dealt with under international security and is inherently tied to discussions on international legal instruments on cyberspace, where all states are equal and have the capacity to discuss legitimate matters under the auspices of the UN.
The EU has been an early champion of the Budapest Convention signed under the auspices of the Council of Europe, given the overlapping membership of the two organisations. Much of the EU’s cyber diplomatic efforts have focused on promoting the Convention as the main instrument of choice for fighting cybercrime on a global level. EU member states have consistently opposed Russian bids for replacing this regime with another legal framework.
The Union is represented in the recently constituted Ad Hoc Committee established by UNGA resolution 74/247 by its Member States and is currently focused on ensuring that the process is inclusive, transparent, consistent with the progress of the UNGGE and OEWG processes, and committed to legal consistency. Cuba is not a signatory of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and has developed its own domestic legal framework in the matter, such as Decree-Law No. 360/2019 which covers a wide range of crimes related to information and communication technologies. In an ongoing debate surrounding this new legislation, critics say that the law could be used to suppress dissent and limit freedom of expression online. Under the auspices of the OEWG, India has highlighted the need for “real-time cooperation between government agencies” in combatting cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyber threats more widely. To date, however, India has not signed any international cybercrime agreement. It voted in favour of a Russia-sponsored UNGA Resolution calling for the establishment of a separate cybercrime treaty.
Despite having brought its legal framework largely in alignment with the Budapest Convention, India remains a non-party because the document was drafted without the country’s participation, thus rending the treaty discriminatory. Another big objection has been raised on the basis of section 32.b, which gives intelligence agencies trans-border access to data for the purposes of criminal investigations with lawful and voluntary consent - a concern shared by Russia.
It has also been argued that the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) regime under Budapest is not effective, as it does not commit states to a firm promise of cooperation; from the perspective of the Indians, it would be preferable to replace this regime with a UN-driven process.
The Union is represented in the recently constituted Ad Hoc Committee established by UNGA resolution 74/247 by its Member States and is currently focused on ensuring that the process is inclusive, transparent, consistent with the progress of the UNGGE and OEWG processes, and committed to legal consistency. Cuba is not a signatory of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and has developed its own domestic legal framework in the matter, such as Decree-Law No. 360/2019 which covers a wide range of crimes related to information and communication technologies. In an ongoing debate surrounding this new legislation, critics say that the law could be used to suppress dissent and limit freedom of expression online. Under the auspices of the OEWG, India has highlighted the need for “real-time cooperation between government agencies” in combatting cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyber threats more widely. To date, however, India has not signed any international cybercrime agreement. It voted in favour of a Russia-sponsored UNGA Resolution calling for the establishment of a separate cybercrime treaty.
Despite having brought its legal framework largely in alignment with the Budapest Convention, India remains a non-party because the document was drafted without the country’s participation, thus rending the treaty discriminatory. Another big objection has been raised on the basis of section 32.b, which gives intelligence agencies trans-border access to data for the purposes of criminal investigations with lawful and voluntary consent - a concern shared by Russia.
It has also been argued that the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) regime under Budapest is not effective, as it does not commit states to a firm promise of cooperation; from the perspective of the Indians, it would be preferable to replace this regime with a UN-driven process.
