It's worth noting that while Cuba has participated in international discussions and informal negotiations related to cybersecurity, it has not signed or ratified binding agreements regarding cyberspace or digital rights. Its government has also been criticised by
human rights groups for its restrictions on internet access and
online freedom of expression, which have limited its ability to fully engage in these discussions.
Japan has
highlighted the importance of promoting the rule of law in cyberspace,
noting that cyberspace “should not be a lawless zone”. It further
endorses the applicability of international law, in particular the UN Charter, in the cyber domain. In relation to the use of countermeasures, it has stated that it is not necessary for countermeasures to be limited to the same means as internationally wrongful acts.
Japan has
cautioned against the launch of “premature” discussions on developing a legally binding new instrument, arguing that the adoption of such an instrument might “roll back” the achievement of past multilateral efforts in confirming the applicability of existing international law in cyberspace. Instead, Japan
believes that it is necessary to consolidate, elaborate, and clarify the interpretation of existing treaties and content of customary international law.
During the drafting phase of the 2021 Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) Report, Japan had
proposed to include language explicitly affirming the applicability of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, the inherent right of self-defence recognized under the UN Charter, and International Humanitarian Law.
The UK
views international law as “a critical tool for ensuring stability and security in cyberspace”. In accordance with the 2013, 2015 and 2021 UNGGE reports as well the 2021 OEWG report, the UK
has affirmed that international law, including the UN Charter in its entirety, applies in cyberspace; a position paper notably
states that “we do not consider it is for States to pick and choose which international law instruments are applicable”. This includes the prohibition of the use of force (Article 2(4)), the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33) and the inherent right of states to act in self-defence in response to an armed attack (Article 51). The law of state responsibility applies to cyber operations in peacetime, including the doctrine of countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts. Meanwhile, the country has
professed a strong commitment to the respect of human rights law in cyberspace, co-sponsoring the
2012,
2014,
2016,
2018 and
2021 UN Human Rights Council resolutions on the protection, promotion and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet. Likewise, the UK
believes in the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber operations in armed conflict. In response to concerns expressed by other states that this might lead to an undue ‘militarisation’ of cyberspace, the UK has
responded that the application of IHL does not encourage armed conflict but only serves to limit humanitarian consequences in the event of such conflict. In addition, the country has
stated and that there are ways for cyber capabilities to be developed in a manner “consistent with international law” and called on states to be transparent about the existence of their own capabilities. Those statements do not entirely dismiss the idea of cyberspace as a new military domain, with the British position at the OEWG
being that “the use of ICTs in military contexts may be preferable to use of kinetic weapons and can be de-escalatory”. The UK is against the establishment of new, binding international instruments to regulate state behaviour in cyberspace,
arguing that “pursuing […] the development of new treaties is only likely to entrench existing divides in this area and will progress us no further on the question of how International Law applies”.