Overall, Cuba's internet and social media penetration is limited due to access limitations, slow network speeds, and high costs, resulting in a rather slow internet adoption. The Cuban government has attempted to expand public Wi-Fi hotspots launching 3G and 4G mobile networks. Despite these efforts, internet access in Cuba remains expensive and limited compared to other countries in the region.
According to a 2021 report by Freedom House, the Cuban government uses a range of tactics to restrict online speech, including censorship, surveillance, and intimidation of online activists. The report notes that online criticism of the government can result in arrest and imprisonment.
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Overall, Cuba's internet and social media penetration is limited due to access limitations, slow network speeds, and high costs, resulting in a rather slow internet adoption. The Cuban government has attempted to expand public Wi-Fi hotspots launching 3G and 4G mobile networks. Despite these efforts, internet access in Cuba remains expensive and limited compared to other countries in the region.
According to a 2021 report by Freedom House, the Cuban government uses a range of tactics to restrict online speech, including censorship, surveillance, and intimidation of online activists. The report notes that online criticism of the government can result in arrest and imprisonment. China has the largest amount of users in the world, a significant digital economy growth potential, and its national Internet giants Alibaba, Didi, Tencent and Baidu are increasingly able to rival the biggest Western competitors in terms of market value and influence on the global tech landscape. China’s cyber diplomacy puts special attention towards equal participation, the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes, and support for multilateral institutions to shape normative views on the governance of cyberspace. However, China’s propagation of the cyber-sovereignty approach to international cybersecurity policy and an absolutist reading of sovereignty in cyberspace provide a legal cloak for state practices that often run counter to the core European values of a global, open, and free Internet. Brazil is the world’s eighth largest economy in terms of GDP, and by far South America’s most populous and powerful state. While the country has suffered economic and political crises since 2014, it has made significant advances in domestic digitization and played a pivotal, albeit ambiguous role in international negotiations on cyberspace. Brazil has the world’s fifth largest internet user base, after China, India, the United States and Indonesia, and is a leading country in South America when it comes to ICTs usage. The share of Brazilians using the internet has increased from less than 3% of the population in 2000 to more than 68% in 2019. As such, Brazil remains a critical partner for the EU’s efforts to build a secure, stable and rights-based cyberspace.
According to a 2021 report by Freedom House, the Cuban government uses a range of tactics to restrict online speech, including censorship, surveillance, and intimidation of online activists. The report notes that online criticism of the government can result in arrest and imprisonment. China has the largest amount of users in the world, a significant digital economy growth potential, and its national Internet giants Alibaba, Didi, Tencent and Baidu are increasingly able to rival the biggest Western competitors in terms of market value and influence on the global tech landscape. China’s cyber diplomacy puts special attention towards equal participation, the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes, and support for multilateral institutions to shape normative views on the governance of cyberspace. However, China’s propagation of the cyber-sovereignty approach to international cybersecurity policy and an absolutist reading of sovereignty in cyberspace provide a legal cloak for state practices that often run counter to the core European values of a global, open, and free Internet. Brazil is the world’s eighth largest economy in terms of GDP, and by far South America’s most populous and powerful state. While the country has suffered economic and political crises since 2014, it has made significant advances in domestic digitization and played a pivotal, albeit ambiguous role in international negotiations on cyberspace. Brazil has the world’s fifth largest internet user base, after China, India, the United States and Indonesia, and is a leading country in South America when it comes to ICTs usage. The share of Brazilians using the internet has increased from less than 3% of the population in 2000 to more than 68% in 2019. As such, Brazil remains a critical partner for the EU’s efforts to build a secure, stable and rights-based cyberspace.
It's worth noting that while Cuba has participated in international discussions and informal negotiations related to cybersecurity, it has not signed or ratified binding agreements regarding cyberspace or digital rights. Its government has also been criticised by human rights groups for its restrictions on internet access and online freedom of expression, which have limited its ability to fully engage in these discussions.
In theory, China accepts that the principles enshrined within the UN Charter, including sovereign equality, prohibition on the use of force, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, non-intervention in the affairs of other states and fulfilment of international obligations in good faith, apply in cyberspace.
Nevertheless, the Chinese position is generally characterized by a reluctance to crystallise the precise ways in which existing customary and international treaty law might govern the cyber domain; the exact application of specific aspects of international law, such as laws on self-defence, state responsibility, and international humanitarian law, is claimed to remain unclear in the absence of international consensus.
Chinese delegations have also repeatedly cautioned against the “indiscriminate application of the law of armed conflicts”, arguing that the undue emphasis on jus ad bellum undermines stability in cyberspace by presupposing and thus effectively legitimising cyber conflict, consequently turning cyberspace into a “new battlefield”.
China regards proposals on regional exchanges of views and development of common understanding on the application of international law with particular scepticism, stating that states must work on reaching “universally-accepted consensus” on the application of international law, rather than engage in “self-explanations at regional levels or among a small group of countries”. The Chinese have also consistently favoured the adoption of new international legal instruments tailored to the attributes of cyberspace (lex specialis). In accordance with the output produced by the 2013, 2015, and 2021 consensual reports of the United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UNGGE), Brazil believes that international law enjoys general applicability in cyberspace. For Brazil, this also includes international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Nevertheless, Brazilian delegations have expressed concern that unqualified transfers of international humanitarian law and an unlimited right of self-defence could legitimise cyberspace as a military domain, while also challenging the protective value of sovereignty and cementing a Western-biased status quo.
Nevertheless, the Chinese position is generally characterized by a reluctance to crystallise the precise ways in which existing customary and international treaty law might govern the cyber domain; the exact application of specific aspects of international law, such as laws on self-defence, state responsibility, and international humanitarian law, is claimed to remain unclear in the absence of international consensus.
Chinese delegations have also repeatedly cautioned against the “indiscriminate application of the law of armed conflicts”, arguing that the undue emphasis on jus ad bellum undermines stability in cyberspace by presupposing and thus effectively legitimising cyber conflict, consequently turning cyberspace into a “new battlefield”.
China regards proposals on regional exchanges of views and development of common understanding on the application of international law with particular scepticism, stating that states must work on reaching “universally-accepted consensus” on the application of international law, rather than engage in “self-explanations at regional levels or among a small group of countries”. The Chinese have also consistently favoured the adoption of new international legal instruments tailored to the attributes of cyberspace (lex specialis). In accordance with the output produced by the 2013, 2015, and 2021 consensual reports of the United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UNGGE), Brazil believes that international law enjoys general applicability in cyberspace. For Brazil, this also includes international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Nevertheless, Brazilian delegations have expressed concern that unqualified transfers of international humanitarian law and an unlimited right of self-defence could legitimise cyberspace as a military domain, while also challenging the protective value of sovereignty and cementing a Western-biased status quo.
Cuba has been represented in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. It participated in multiple sessions of the UN GGE and has made contributions as part of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), a group of countries that are not formally aligned with any major power bloc. As such, a 2017 statement by Cuba emphasised the need to avoid a ‘state militarisation’ of cyberspace and concentrate on peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention. In 2019, for instance, Cuba called for the development of a safe cyberspace environment that can promote well-being, knowledge and human development.
China’s International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation highlights that the country is committed to the maintenance of peace and stability in cyberspace through international cooperation on norms of responsible state behaviour. In 2018, Chinese support for the Russia-sponsored UNGA Resolution A/RES/73/27 was instrumental in establishing the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) as an alternative forum to the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE), whose fifth iteration in 2017 had failed to reach consensus.
The country is in favour of formulating new norms of responsible state behaviour in light of recent ICT developments; during the latest OEWG discussions, China put forward specific proposals on formulating new rules on data security, in accordance with its own Global Initiative on Data Security.
China has repeatedly expressed a preference for non-voluntary, binding legal norms, arguing that the best option is to formulate “new international legal instruments consummate with the characteristics of cyberspace, with a view to maintaining peace in cyberspace, instead of using legal instruments as a tool to pursue accountability and punishment unilaterally.” Brazilian diplomats portray Brazil’s role in the often polarised debates on norms of responsible state behaviour as that of a broker or strategic bridge-builder between the different camps rather than a mere ‘swing state’ and highlight that balancing between both camps serves to maintain an independent foreign policy. Brazil sought to focus its chairmanship of UN GGE’s third and fourth iterations on three issues: the role of civilians in cyber conflict, the right to respond, and attribution. Since the 2013 Snowden revelations, the country has been a stark champion of data protection, showcasing exceptional norm entrepreneurship
in relation to cyber-surveillance norms. Brazil has also expressed support for the proposal of adopting a legally binding instrument in the medium to long-term to prevent the militarisation of cyberspace.
The country is in favour of formulating new norms of responsible state behaviour in light of recent ICT developments; during the latest OEWG discussions, China put forward specific proposals on formulating new rules on data security, in accordance with its own Global Initiative on Data Security.
China has repeatedly expressed a preference for non-voluntary, binding legal norms, arguing that the best option is to formulate “new international legal instruments consummate with the characteristics of cyberspace, with a view to maintaining peace in cyberspace, instead of using legal instruments as a tool to pursue accountability and punishment unilaterally.” Brazilian diplomats portray Brazil’s role in the often polarised debates on norms of responsible state behaviour as that of a broker or strategic bridge-builder between the different camps rather than a mere ‘swing state’ and highlight that balancing between both camps serves to maintain an independent foreign policy. Brazil sought to focus its chairmanship of UN GGE’s third and fourth iterations on three issues: the role of civilians in cyber conflict, the right to respond, and attribution. Since the 2013 Snowden revelations, the country has been a stark champion of data protection, showcasing exceptional norm entrepreneurship
in relation to cyber-surveillance norms. Brazil has also expressed support for the proposal of adopting a legally binding instrument in the medium to long-term to prevent the militarisation of cyberspace.
Cuba launched its first strategy on cybersecurity in 2019, emphasising the need for 'cybersecurity and cyber resilience' in the face of potential threats to national security and the economy, as well as protecting critical infrastructure. The resolution also focused on capacity-building and training in cybersecurity and cyber resilience, both within the government and in the private sector.
The Chinese International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation places a large emphasis on the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and engagement with partner countries through predictability-increasing practical measures to prevent unintended conflicts, respond to information operations, and ensure supply chain security in network equipment and industrial control systems.
Another key pillar of China’s cyber strategy is providing capacity-building assistance to developing countries. The Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2017, and 'the Digital Silk Road' seek to internationalise Chinese technology made by state-owned or affiliated companies, including Huawei and ZTE, and therefore export Chinese technical standards abroad. Chinese outreach in this domain is most active in Africa, South America, and Central and Southeast Asia through projects such as the China-ASEAN Information Harbour and the China-Arabia Digital Silk Road Ningxia Hub. In addition to infrastructure investment, capacity building also focuses on enhancing information-sharing capacities, cyber defence personnel training, and crisis management. Brazil’s 2020 National Cybersecurity Strategy (E-Ciber) outlines ten strategic actions to be undertaken in relation to cyber resilience, which include the extension of international cooperation and the enhancement of protection for critical infrastructure. The Strategy pledges Brazil to encourage international cooperation in cybersecurity, participate in joint cyber resilience events and exercises, and expand cybersecurity cooperation agreements. On the level of discourse, Brazil remains committed to international cyber cooperation in resilience, staying true to its traditional stance in favour of multilateral solutions.
Another key pillar of China’s cyber strategy is providing capacity-building assistance to developing countries. The Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2017, and 'the Digital Silk Road' seek to internationalise Chinese technology made by state-owned or affiliated companies, including Huawei and ZTE, and therefore export Chinese technical standards abroad. Chinese outreach in this domain is most active in Africa, South America, and Central and Southeast Asia through projects such as the China-ASEAN Information Harbour and the China-Arabia Digital Silk Road Ningxia Hub. In addition to infrastructure investment, capacity building also focuses on enhancing information-sharing capacities, cyber defence personnel training, and crisis management. Brazil’s 2020 National Cybersecurity Strategy (E-Ciber) outlines ten strategic actions to be undertaken in relation to cyber resilience, which include the extension of international cooperation and the enhancement of protection for critical infrastructure. The Strategy pledges Brazil to encourage international cooperation in cybersecurity, participate in joint cyber resilience events and exercises, and expand cybersecurity cooperation agreements. On the level of discourse, Brazil remains committed to international cyber cooperation in resilience, staying true to its traditional stance in favour of multilateral solutions.
Cuba is not a signatory of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and has developed its own domestic legal framework in the matter, such as Decree-Law No. 360/2019 which covers a wide range of crimes related to information and communication technologies. In an ongoing debate surrounding this new legislation, critics say that the law could be used to suppress dissent and limit freedom of expression online.
The Chinese Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation notes that the country “supports the UN Security Council to play an important part in international cooperation against cyber terrorism” and “supports and contributes to UN effort on fighting cyber crimes”. China is not a party to or observer of the Budapest Convention; instead, it has consistently backed Russian bids in the UN to establish a new cybercrime treaty, with these efforts culminating in Resolution A/74/247 that created an Ad Hoc Committee for that purpose.
China has also signed the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright Treaty) in 1985 as well as the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and is a member of Interpol.
In addition, China has pursued regional avenues of cooperative engagement; within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, for instance, the country agreed to participate in efforts to fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, and international cybercrime.
It also supports joint cybersecurity exercises under the auspices of the Organisation. Brazil originally refrained from signing the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and had expressed scepticism in response to invitations to accede. The argument advanced was that the treaty is Western-biased and lacking in inclusivity, given that Brazil was not part of the original drafting process. During voting for UNGA Resolution A/74/401, the Russian-sponsored proposal for a new binding Cybercrime Convention, Brazil abstained; during meetings with the BRICS leaders, however, Brazil had endorsed Russian pleas for a new cybercrime instrument to replace the Budapest regime. Upon invitation by the Council of Europe, Brazil finally initiated the process of accession to the Convention in December 2019 and is now an observer country.
China has also signed the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright Treaty) in 1985 as well as the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and is a member of Interpol.
In addition, China has pursued regional avenues of cooperative engagement; within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, for instance, the country agreed to participate in efforts to fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, and international cybercrime.
It also supports joint cybersecurity exercises under the auspices of the Organisation. Brazil originally refrained from signing the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and had expressed scepticism in response to invitations to accede. The argument advanced was that the treaty is Western-biased and lacking in inclusivity, given that Brazil was not part of the original drafting process. During voting for UNGA Resolution A/74/401, the Russian-sponsored proposal for a new binding Cybercrime Convention, Brazil abstained; during meetings with the BRICS leaders, however, Brazil had endorsed Russian pleas for a new cybercrime instrument to replace the Budapest regime. Upon invitation by the Council of Europe, Brazil finally initiated the process of accession to the Convention in December 2019 and is now an observer country.
