China has the largest amount of users in the world, a significant digital economy growth potential, and its national Internet giants Alibaba, Didi, Tencent and Baidu are increasingly able to rival the biggest Western competitors in terms of market value and influence on the global tech landscape. China’s cyber diplomacy puts special attention towards equal participation, the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes, and support for multilateral institutions to shape normative views on the governance of cyberspace. However, China’s propagation of the cyber-sovereignty approach to international cybersecurity policy and an absolutist reading of sovereignty in cyberspace provide a legal cloak for state practices that often run counter to the core European values of a global, open, and free Internet.

As of 2020, 86 % of Uruguayans are active internet users, second in South America, only behind Chile. 9 out of 10 individuals in Uruguay are social media users. This provides a fabric for efficient digital policies and strategies that have transformed Uruguay since the 2010s. Uruguay is ranked first in Latin America and 35th place in the world on Digital Government Development, according to the UNDESA index, which measures dimensions related to technological infrastructure, availability of online services, and ability of citizens to take advantage of those resources. Uruguay also ranks first in Latin America and 42nd in the world on ICT Development, according to the 2017 IDI, published by the International Telecommunications Union. In all, this South American country has positioned itself at the forefront as a regional and world benchmark in Digital Government.

Brazil is the world’s eighth largest economy in terms of GDP, and by far South America’s most populous and powerful state. While the country has suffered economic and political crises since 2014, it has made significant advances in domestic digitization and played a pivotal, albeit ambiguous role in international negotiations on cyberspace. Brazil has the world’s fifth largest internet user base, after China, India, the United States and Indonesia, and is a leading country in South America when it comes to ICTs usage. The share of Brazilians using the internet has increased from less than 3% of the population in 2000 to more than 68% in 2019. As such, Brazil remains a critical partner for the EU’s efforts to build a secure, stable and rights-based cyberspace.

In theory, China accepts that the principles enshrined within the UN Charter, including sovereign equality, prohibition on the use of force, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, non-intervention in the affairs of other states and fulfilment of international obligations in good faith, apply in cyberspace. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese position is generally characterized by a reluctance to crystallise the precise ways in which existing customary and international treaty law might govern the cyber domain; the exact application of specific aspects of international law, such as laws on self-defence, state responsibility, and international humanitarian law, is claimed to remain unclear in the absence of international consensus. 
Chinese delegations have also repeatedly cautioned against the “indiscriminate application of the law of armed conflicts”, arguing that the undue emphasis on jus ad bellum undermines stability in cyberspace by presupposing and thus effectively legitimising cyber conflict, consequently turning cyberspace into a “new battlefield”. 
China regards proposals on regional exchanges of views and development of common understanding on the application of international law with particular scepticism, stating that states must work on reaching “universally-accepted consensus” on the application of international law, rather than engage in “self-explanations at regional levels or among a small group of countries”. The Chinese have also consistently favoured the adoption of new international legal instruments tailored to the attributes of cyberspace (lex specialis).

As a member state of the UNGA, Uruguay expressed their views at the OEWG in 2021, considering cybersecurity an essential element in the prevention of international conflicts. Uruguay provides a rather humanitarian approach to international law and its application on cyber issues. The country is a member of international organisations that promote the development and compliance with standards of transparency and access to information, such as the Open Government Partnership, the Electronic Government Network of Latin America and the Caribbean (GEALC) and Digital Nations.
Uruguay was the first Latin American country, in 2013, to sign the only existing binding, international document concerning the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (known as Convention 108). Its signature and membership have been ratified in 2021.
Uruguay’s Digital initiatives at the national level are also in compliance with the Digital Agenda for Latin America and the Caribbean (eLAC by CEPAL). In particular, Uruguay’s Cybersecurity goal is in line with CEPAL’s framework for confidence-building measures such as combating digital crime by formulating public policies and strategies for cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection.

In accordance with the output produced by the 2013, 2015, and 2021 consensual reports of the United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UNGGE), Brazil believes that international law enjoys general applicability in cyberspace. For Brazil, this also includes international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Nevertheless, Brazilian delegations have expressed concern that unqualified transfers of international humanitarian law and an unlimited right of self-defence could legitimise cyberspace as a military domain, while also challenging the protective value of sovereignty and cementing a Western-biased status quo.

China’s International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation highlights that the country is committed to the maintenance of peace and stability in cyberspace through international cooperation on norms of responsible state behaviour. In 2018, Chinese support for the Russia-sponsored UNGA Resolution A/RES/73/27 was instrumental in establishing the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) as an alternative forum to the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE), whose fifth iteration in 2017 had failed to reach consensus. 
The country is in favour of formulating new norms of responsible state behaviour in light of recent ICT developments; during the latest OEWG discussions, China put forward specific proposals on formulating new rules on data security, in accordance with its own Global Initiative on Data Security. 
China has repeatedly expressed a preference for non-voluntary, binding legal norms, arguing that the best option is to formulate “new international legal instruments consummate with the characteristics of cyberspace, with a view to maintaining peace in cyberspace, instead of using legal instruments as a tool to pursue accountability and punishment unilaterally.”

Uruguay is a represented member in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. The South American country has openly stated that the voluntary norms included in the Report of the Group of Experts (GGE) represent an inescapable guide for the responsible behaviour of States in cyberspace. In session 5 of the second substantive session of the OEWG 2021-2025, Uruguay along with seven other States pointed out the importance of the protection of critical infrastructure, according to norm 13(f).

Brazilian diplomats portray Brazil’s role in the often polarised debates on norms of responsible state behaviour as that of a broker or strategic bridge-builder between the different camps rather than a mere ‘swing state’ and highlight that balancing between both camps serves to maintain an independent foreign policy. Brazil sought to focus its chairmanship of UN GGE’s third and fourth iterations on three issues: the role of civilians in cyber conflict, the right to respond, and attribution. Since the 2013 Snowden revelations, the country has been a stark champion of data protection, showcasing exceptional norm entrepreneurship
in relation to cyber-surveillance norms. Brazil has also expressed support for the proposal of adopting a legally binding instrument in the medium to long-term to prevent the militarisation of cyberspace.

The Chinese International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation places a large emphasis on the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and engagement with partner countries through predictability-increasing practical measures to prevent unintended conflicts, respond to information operations, and ensure supply chain security in network equipment and industrial control systems. 
Another key pillar of China’s cyber strategy is providing capacity-building assistance to developing countries. The Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2017, and 'the Digital Silk Road' seek to internationalise Chinese technology made by state-owned or affiliated companies, including Huawei and ZTE, and therefore export Chinese technical standards abroad. Chinese outreach in this domain is most active in Africa, South America, and Central and Southeast Asia through projects such as the China-ASEAN Information Harbour and the China-Arabia Digital Silk Road Ningxia Hub. In addition to infrastructure investment, capacity building also focuses on enhancing information-sharing capacities, cyber defence personnel training, and crisis management.

Objective 10 of Uruguay’s Digital Agenda for 2025 provides a clear guideline for resilience measures in cybersecurity and ICT. Uruguay is focused on enhancing cybersecurity to prevent and mitigate risks in cyberspace, advancing compliance with the national cyber-security framework, based on public-private cooperation and ensuring the availability of critical information assets. Uruguay intends to achieve this goal by improving efficiency in detecting and responding to cyber incidents by implementing new technologies that allow for predictive analytics and response automation, among others.

Brazil’s 2020 National Cybersecurity Strategy (E-Ciber) outlines ten strategic actions to be undertaken in relation to cyber resilience, which include the extension of international cooperation and the enhancement of protection for critical infrastructure. The Strategy pledges Brazil to encourage international cooperation in cybersecurity, participate in joint cyber resilience events and exercises, and expand cybersecurity cooperation agreements. On the level of discourse, Brazil remains committed to international cyber cooperation in resilience, staying true to its traditional stance in favour of multilateral solutions.

The Chinese Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation notes that the country “supports the UN Security Council to play an important part in international cooperation against cyber terrorism” and “supports and contributes to UN effort on fighting cyber crimes”. China is not a party to or observer of the Budapest Convention; instead, it has consistently backed Russian bids in the UN to establish a new cybercrime treaty, with these efforts culminating in Resolution A/74/247 that created an Ad Hoc Committee for that purpose. 
China has also signed the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright Treaty) in 1985 as well as the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and is a member of Interpol. 
In addition, China has pursued regional avenues of cooperative engagement; within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, for instance, the country agreed to participate in efforts to fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, and international cybercrime. 
It also supports joint cybersecurity exercises under the auspices of the Organisation.

Uruguay is not a signatory State of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, cooperating in international affairs outside of the framework established by the Council of Europe. However, it has a relatively low rate of cybercrime compared to other countries in the region, staking its position as one of the most advanced countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of cybersecurity. Much of its success relies on the Cybersecurity Framework published in 2021, which is allowing Uruguay to start using artificial intelligence to automate incident response and pattern detection, as well as incorporating data analytics to make projections and anticipate incidents.
Regarding Data Protection, Uruguay has adapted its national framework to the European GDPR, despite its latest Data Protection Law dating back to 2008.

Brazil originally refrained from signing the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and had expressed scepticism in response to invitations to accede. The argument advanced was that the treaty is Western-biased and lacking in inclusivity, given that Brazil was not part of the original drafting process. During voting for UNGA Resolution A/74/401, the Russian-sponsored proposal for a new binding Cybercrime Convention, Brazil abstained; during meetings with the BRICS leaders, however, Brazil had endorsed Russian pleas for a new cybercrime instrument to replace the Budapest regime. Upon invitation by the Council of Europe, Brazil finally initiated the process of accession to the Convention in December 2019 and is now an observer country.