Compare
Compare
China has the largest amount of users in the world, a significant digital economy growth potential, and its national Internet giants Alibaba, Didi, Tencent and Baidu are increasingly able to rival the biggest Western competitors in terms of market value and influence on the global tech landscape. China’s cyber diplomacy puts special attention towards equal participation, the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes, and support for multilateral institutions to shape normative views on the governance of cyberspace. However, China’s propagation of the cyber-sovereignty approach to international cybersecurity policy and an absolutist reading of sovereignty in cyberspace provide a legal cloak for state practices that often run counter to the core European values of a global, open, and free Internet.
In October 2021, North Macedonia became one of the first countries among the Western Balkans partners to issue a digital ID to its citizens [x]; the deployment of the digital identity project is only indicative of the country’s turn towards digitalisation and e-government. With a total population of about 2.08 million, Internet penetration in North Macedonia stands at 84%, while data shows that there are about 2.25 million cellular mobile connections. [x] The rapid drive towards digitalisation, but also its accompanying risks and vulnerabilities, are accounted for by the 2022 Cybersecurity Strategy, the country’s first comprehensive cybersecurity strategy. The document largely reflects the country’s European ambitions and is explicitly based on the “principles of the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union and the NATO Cyber Defence Pledge”.
South Korea has made significant progress over the last decades when it comes to connectivity and is currently one of the leading states in terms of access and use of ICTs. While in 1995 less than one percent of Koreans used the internet, four years later the country passed the developed nation average and nowadays South Korea is a global leader in the field of connectivity and internet access. Government support for internet access has been instrumental in fostering this progress in connectivity through governmental programs, trainings and low interest loans to companies providing broadband access. Consequently, cyber issues were recognised as important to the bilateral relationship at the EU-South Korea Summit in 2015, and five cyber dialogues have taken place between 2015 and 2020.
In theory, China accepts that the principles enshrined within the UN Charter, including sovereign equality, prohibition on the use of force, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, non-intervention in the affairs of other states and fulfilment of international obligations in good faith, apply in cyberspace.
Nevertheless, the Chinese position is generally characterized by a reluctance to crystallise the precise ways in which existing customary and international treaty law might govern the cyber domain; the exact application of specific aspects of international law, such as laws on self-defence, state responsibility, and international humanitarian law, is claimed to remain unclear in the absence of international consensus.
Chinese delegations have also repeatedly cautioned against the “indiscriminate application of the law of armed conflicts”, arguing that the undue emphasis on jus ad bellum undermines stability in cyberspace by presupposing and thus effectively legitimising cyber conflict, consequently turning cyberspace into a “new battlefield”.
China regards proposals on regional exchanges of views and development of common understanding on the application of international law with particular scepticism, stating that states must work on reaching “universally-accepted consensus” on the application of international law, rather than engage in “self-explanations at regional levels or among a small group of countries”. The Chinese have also consistently favoured the adoption of new international legal instruments tailored to the attributes of cyberspace (lex specialis). At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, recalling its candidate status, North Macedonia aligned itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] North Macedonia has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29. As a member of the 2015 Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and as per the Seoul Framework for and Commitment to an Open and Secure Cyberspace, the ROK recognises that international law, and in particular the UN Charter, is applicable in cyberspace and essential for maintaining security and stability as well as promoting an open, secure, peaceful, and accessible ICT environment.
The country also acknowledges that cybersecurity must go hand-in-hand with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments. The ROK notably co-sponsored the Human Rights Council Resolutions 20/8 and 26/13 concerning the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet.
The country supports the idea of increasing interstate engagement and exchanging national views on how international law applies in cyberspace, both at the multilateral level as well as at the bilateral and regional levels.
Nevertheless, the Chinese position is generally characterized by a reluctance to crystallise the precise ways in which existing customary and international treaty law might govern the cyber domain; the exact application of specific aspects of international law, such as laws on self-defence, state responsibility, and international humanitarian law, is claimed to remain unclear in the absence of international consensus.
Chinese delegations have also repeatedly cautioned against the “indiscriminate application of the law of armed conflicts”, arguing that the undue emphasis on jus ad bellum undermines stability in cyberspace by presupposing and thus effectively legitimising cyber conflict, consequently turning cyberspace into a “new battlefield”.
China regards proposals on regional exchanges of views and development of common understanding on the application of international law with particular scepticism, stating that states must work on reaching “universally-accepted consensus” on the application of international law, rather than engage in “self-explanations at regional levels or among a small group of countries”. The Chinese have also consistently favoured the adoption of new international legal instruments tailored to the attributes of cyberspace (lex specialis). At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, recalling its candidate status, North Macedonia aligned itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] North Macedonia has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29. As a member of the 2015 Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and as per the Seoul Framework for and Commitment to an Open and Secure Cyberspace, the ROK recognises that international law, and in particular the UN Charter, is applicable in cyberspace and essential for maintaining security and stability as well as promoting an open, secure, peaceful, and accessible ICT environment.
The country also acknowledges that cybersecurity must go hand-in-hand with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments. The ROK notably co-sponsored the Human Rights Council Resolutions 20/8 and 26/13 concerning the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet.
The country supports the idea of increasing interstate engagement and exchanging national views on how international law applies in cyberspace, both at the multilateral level as well as at the bilateral and regional levels.
China’s International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation highlights that the country is committed to the maintenance of peace and stability in cyberspace through international cooperation on norms of responsible state behaviour. In 2018, Chinese support for the Russia-sponsored UNGA Resolution A/RES/73/27 was instrumental in establishing the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) as an alternative forum to the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE), whose fifth iteration in 2017 had failed to reach consensus.
The country is in favour of formulating new norms of responsible state behaviour in light of recent ICT developments; during the latest OEWG discussions, China put forward specific proposals on formulating new rules on data security, in accordance with its own Global Initiative on Data Security.
China has repeatedly expressed a preference for non-voluntary, binding legal norms, arguing that the best option is to formulate “new international legal instruments consummate with the characteristics of cyberspace, with a view to maintaining peace in cyberspace, instead of using legal instruments as a tool to pursue accountability and punishment unilaterally.” At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, North Macedonia aligned itself with the EU’s position that the previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus, form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x]. North Macedonia was also the only EU candidate country to have co-sponsored the 2020 Programme of Action (PoA), which explored the possibility of ending the dual-track discussions (UNGGE/OEWG) in favour of a permanent UN forum. The ROK stands in favour of the adoption and elaboration of voluntary, non-binding norms of state behaviour during peacetime. It strongly upholds the 11 non-binding norms agreed upon in the 2015 UNGGE report and believes that further efforts should be undertaken to clarify and concretise them.
In addition, the ROK has put great emphasis on the principle of due diligence, consistently demonstrating its commitment through public statements at regional and international forums. The country believes that no new legally binding instrument is necessary for the moment, retaining a preference for the ‘soft law’ approach and maintaining that less resilient states should first focus on building capacity rather than reforming regulatory frameworks.
The country is in favour of formulating new norms of responsible state behaviour in light of recent ICT developments; during the latest OEWG discussions, China put forward specific proposals on formulating new rules on data security, in accordance with its own Global Initiative on Data Security.
China has repeatedly expressed a preference for non-voluntary, binding legal norms, arguing that the best option is to formulate “new international legal instruments consummate with the characteristics of cyberspace, with a view to maintaining peace in cyberspace, instead of using legal instruments as a tool to pursue accountability and punishment unilaterally.” At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, North Macedonia aligned itself with the EU’s position that the previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus, form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x]. North Macedonia was also the only EU candidate country to have co-sponsored the 2020 Programme of Action (PoA), which explored the possibility of ending the dual-track discussions (UNGGE/OEWG) in favour of a permanent UN forum. The ROK stands in favour of the adoption and elaboration of voluntary, non-binding norms of state behaviour during peacetime. It strongly upholds the 11 non-binding norms agreed upon in the 2015 UNGGE report and believes that further efforts should be undertaken to clarify and concretise them.
In addition, the ROK has put great emphasis on the principle of due diligence, consistently demonstrating its commitment through public statements at regional and international forums. The country believes that no new legally binding instrument is necessary for the moment, retaining a preference for the ‘soft law’ approach and maintaining that less resilient states should first focus on building capacity rather than reforming regulatory frameworks.
The Chinese International Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation places a large emphasis on the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and engagement with partner countries through predictability-increasing practical measures to prevent unintended conflicts, respond to information operations, and ensure supply chain security in network equipment and industrial control systems.
Another key pillar of China’s cyber strategy is providing capacity-building assistance to developing countries. The Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2017, and 'the Digital Silk Road' seek to internationalise Chinese technology made by state-owned or affiliated companies, including Huawei and ZTE, and therefore export Chinese technical standards abroad. Chinese outreach in this domain is most active in Africa, South America, and Central and Southeast Asia through projects such as the China-ASEAN Information Harbour and the China-Arabia Digital Silk Road Ningxia Hub. In addition to infrastructure investment, capacity building also focuses on enhancing information-sharing capacities, cyber defence personnel training, and crisis management. The 2018-2022 Cybersecurity Strategy dedicates a full section to cyber resilience and the protection of ICT infrastructure. The stated objectives include expanding the capabilities of the national CERT (MKD-CIRT), identifying types of critical infrastructure, developing national procedures for cyber crisis management, developing incident reporting and monitoring mechanisms, and establishing a single and comprehensive legal framework for cyber resilience. In 2021, upon joining NATO, North Macedonia signed a Memorandum of Understanding aiming at enhancing cyber defence cooperation between NATO and the country’s defence authorities; the MoU particularly focuses on information-sharing, exchanging best practices, and increasing resilience. [x] Driven by a proliferation of cyberthreats originating in the DPRK, Korean diplomats have consistently maintained that bridging the global gap in cybersecurity capabilities constitutes a central task for states; as such, countries should develop cyber defence capabilities to foster resilience in the global cyber ecosystem.
The South Korean government has introduced several international cooperation mechanisms, especially through the Korean Internet & Security Agency (KISA) and its Global Cybersecurity Centre for Development (GCCD) project. Through the GCCD, South Korea has worked with the World Bank and a series of partner countries in Latin America to organise workshops and exercises. Another important initiative is the Cybersecurity Alliance for Mutual Progress (CAMP) network, a mechanism launched in 2016 that provides a platform for Korea to share its expertise with a large group of partner countries and help them exchange knowledge and best practices.
Another key pillar of China’s cyber strategy is providing capacity-building assistance to developing countries. The Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2017, and 'the Digital Silk Road' seek to internationalise Chinese technology made by state-owned or affiliated companies, including Huawei and ZTE, and therefore export Chinese technical standards abroad. Chinese outreach in this domain is most active in Africa, South America, and Central and Southeast Asia through projects such as the China-ASEAN Information Harbour and the China-Arabia Digital Silk Road Ningxia Hub. In addition to infrastructure investment, capacity building also focuses on enhancing information-sharing capacities, cyber defence personnel training, and crisis management. The 2018-2022 Cybersecurity Strategy dedicates a full section to cyber resilience and the protection of ICT infrastructure. The stated objectives include expanding the capabilities of the national CERT (MKD-CIRT), identifying types of critical infrastructure, developing national procedures for cyber crisis management, developing incident reporting and monitoring mechanisms, and establishing a single and comprehensive legal framework for cyber resilience. In 2021, upon joining NATO, North Macedonia signed a Memorandum of Understanding aiming at enhancing cyber defence cooperation between NATO and the country’s defence authorities; the MoU particularly focuses on information-sharing, exchanging best practices, and increasing resilience. [x] Driven by a proliferation of cyberthreats originating in the DPRK, Korean diplomats have consistently maintained that bridging the global gap in cybersecurity capabilities constitutes a central task for states; as such, countries should develop cyber defence capabilities to foster resilience in the global cyber ecosystem.
The South Korean government has introduced several international cooperation mechanisms, especially through the Korean Internet & Security Agency (KISA) and its Global Cybersecurity Centre for Development (GCCD) project. Through the GCCD, South Korea has worked with the World Bank and a series of partner countries in Latin America to organise workshops and exercises. Another important initiative is the Cybersecurity Alliance for Mutual Progress (CAMP) network, a mechanism launched in 2016 that provides a platform for Korea to share its expertise with a large group of partner countries and help them exchange knowledge and best practices.
The Chinese Strategy on Cyberspace Cooperation notes that the country “supports the UN Security Council to play an important part in international cooperation against cyber terrorism” and “supports and contributes to UN effort on fighting cyber crimes”. China is not a party to or observer of the Budapest Convention; instead, it has consistently backed Russian bids in the UN to establish a new cybercrime treaty, with these efforts culminating in Resolution A/74/247 that created an Ad Hoc Committee for that purpose.
China has also signed the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright Treaty) in 1985 as well as the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and is a member of Interpol.
In addition, China has pursued regional avenues of cooperative engagement; within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, for instance, the country agreed to participate in efforts to fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, and international cybercrime.
It also supports joint cybersecurity exercises under the auspices of the Organisation. North Macedonia has ratified the Budapest Convention and its Additional Protocol [x]. Nevertheless, full harmonisation of the Macedonian legal regime with Budapest provisions is still a primary issue. In terms of institutional setup, analysis has pointed out that North Macedonia is lagging behind compared to other countries in the Western Balkans [x]. That said, the 2018-2022 Cybersecurity Strategy identifies several priorities regarding the “prevention, research, and adequate response” to cybercrime. These include: harmonising the national with international policies; developing a single, comprehensive legal framework for cybercrime; modernising authorities in charge of cybercrime; establishing formal procedures of information exchange; participating actively in the creation of international cybercrime regulations and standards, as well as their implementation on a national level; and providing continuous education and training for law enforcement entities in the field of cybersecurity, cybercrime, and electronic evidence. The country’s law enforcement authorities regularly cooperate with Europol, following the conclusion of a strategic agreement in 2007 and an operational agreement in 2011. [x] The ROK is generally a strong advocate of strengthening global cooperation against cybercrime. While it is not formally a signatory to the Budapest Convention, the country voted against the Russian-sponsored UNGA resolution calling for a new binding cybercrime treaty.
To promote cooperation among law enforcement agencies, the ROK’s Supreme Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) convenes regular meetings with the FBI, while also engaging with the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) in Germany and the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) in the Netherlands.
On the basis of an increased awareness that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are becoming “important partners to secure electronic evidences”, the SPO works along with Microsoft to operate the Government Security Program (GSP).
China has also signed the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright Treaty) in 1985 as well as the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and is a member of Interpol.
In addition, China has pursued regional avenues of cooperative engagement; within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, for instance, the country agreed to participate in efforts to fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, and international cybercrime.
It also supports joint cybersecurity exercises under the auspices of the Organisation. North Macedonia has ratified the Budapest Convention and its Additional Protocol [x]. Nevertheless, full harmonisation of the Macedonian legal regime with Budapest provisions is still a primary issue. In terms of institutional setup, analysis has pointed out that North Macedonia is lagging behind compared to other countries in the Western Balkans [x]. That said, the 2018-2022 Cybersecurity Strategy identifies several priorities regarding the “prevention, research, and adequate response” to cybercrime. These include: harmonising the national with international policies; developing a single, comprehensive legal framework for cybercrime; modernising authorities in charge of cybercrime; establishing formal procedures of information exchange; participating actively in the creation of international cybercrime regulations and standards, as well as their implementation on a national level; and providing continuous education and training for law enforcement entities in the field of cybersecurity, cybercrime, and electronic evidence. The country’s law enforcement authorities regularly cooperate with Europol, following the conclusion of a strategic agreement in 2007 and an operational agreement in 2011. [x] The ROK is generally a strong advocate of strengthening global cooperation against cybercrime. While it is not formally a signatory to the Budapest Convention, the country voted against the Russian-sponsored UNGA resolution calling for a new binding cybercrime treaty.
To promote cooperation among law enforcement agencies, the ROK’s Supreme Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) convenes regular meetings with the FBI, while also engaging with the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) in Germany and the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) in the Netherlands.
On the basis of an increased awareness that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are becoming “important partners to secure electronic evidences”, the SPO works along with Microsoft to operate the Government Security Program (GSP).
