The digital economy is amongst the most powerful loci of Canadian economic growth; over the past decade, the digital economy grew roughly 40 per cent faster than – and generated almost four times as many jobs as – the overall economy. However, this spurt has also led to increased vulnerabilities in relation to cybersecurity; in 2020, successful cyber attacks affected 78% of Canadian companies. Canada has quietly developed a robust cyber diplomacy approach aiming at promoting a rules-based international order in cyberspace, in line with the goals of other ‘like-minded’ states (including European Union countries). Both the EU and Canada share a vision of cyberspace as a domain of human activity that is open, free, and secure, and which is characterized by due regard for fundamental rights and democratic values. As such, Canada is an important strategic partner for Europe.

An EU candidate country since 2014, Albania has been eagerly embracing its digital revolution with the government ushering in an array of cyber and digital policy initiatives. In recent years, Albania has worked on adapting its legal framework to comply with the EU’s acquis communautaire and further approach the Digital Single Market. The Albanian policy framework ranks 1^st across the Western Balkans region in fostering the inclusivity and competitiveness of digital society [x], while the country currently ranks 80^th in the Global Security Index [x]. An OECD report praised Albania for enhancing intragovernmental cooperation, emphasising the cross-cutting character of ICT in its development strategies, and allocating resources towards the implementation of its digital strategy. Despite the proliferation of such policies, however, the country is currently the 5^th largest source of cybercrime in Europe, suffering at least 1.3 million cyberattacks yearly [x]. As such, modernising cybercrime legislation and upgrading critical infrastructure protection constitute key priorities for Albanian policymakers.

Japan is a trusted partner and shares the same basic values of human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance. This common set of values also applies to cyberspace as both the EU and Japan have publicly expressed strong support for an open, free and secure internet and the application of international norms to state activities in cyberspace. Japan is also an important trading partner of the EU. The recently adopted Economic Partnership Agreement also reinforces the need for a closer integration of the digital economies. Alignment in broader international economic and political issues is also evident in the field of cyber diplomacy and thus constitutes a strong foundation for close cooperation and partnership.

As per the conclusions of the 2013, 2015, and 2021 UN GGE (Group of Governmental Experts) reports, Canada believes that international law applies in cyberspace and is “essential to maintaining peace and stability” as well as “promoting an open, secure, peaceful, and accessible ICT environment”; according to Canada, the applicability of international law “puts guardrails on states’ behaviour in cyberspace”. Applicable legal instruments include the UN Charter, the law on state responsibility (including countermeasures), International Human Rights Law, and International Human Rights Law (IHL). Canada does not favour the establishment of a treaty or binding legal instrument on cyber issues, arguing that it would undermine existing international law and norms of responsible state behaviour. Instead, Canada believes that existing international law and agreed-upon norms are sufficient to guide State behaviour in cyberspace.

At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UN Group of Governmental exports (UNGGE), Albania aligned itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] Albania has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29. A 2015 policy paper notes that cybersecurity will only be “efficient” if it is “based on the fundamental human rights and freedoms, pursuant to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the universal values of the EU”. In the same vein, the 2020-2025 National Cybersecurity Strategy includes “improving the legal framework providing norms and regulating cybersecurity in the country, and aligning this framework with European Union directives and regulation” as a stated objective.

Japan has highlighted the importance of promoting the rule of law in cyberspace, noting that cyberspace “should not be a lawless zone”. It further endorses the applicability of international law, in particular the UN Charter, in the cyber domain. In relation to the use of countermeasures, it has stated that it is not necessary for countermeasures to be limited to the same means as internationally wrongful acts. 
Japan has cautioned against the launch of “premature” discussions on developing a legally binding new instrument, arguing that the adoption of such an instrument might “roll back” the achievement of past multilateral efforts in confirming the applicability of existing international law in cyberspace. Instead, Japan believes that it is necessary to consolidate, elaborate, and clarify the interpretation of existing treaties and content of customary international law. 
During the drafting phase of the 2021 Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) Report, Japan had proposed to include language explicitly affirming the applicability of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, the inherent right of self-defence recognized under the UN Charter, and International Humanitarian Law.

Canada regards the applicability of norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, together with existing international law, as the “foundation of sustaining international peace and security […] in cyberspace”. This is why it has strongly promoted the adoption and implementation of the UN GGE norms in various fora, including the G7, G20, North American Leaders’ Summit, NATO, ASEAN, and the OSCE. From Canada’s perspective, there is no need to develop new norms; international cooperation efforts should instead focus on fostering States’ capacity-building abilities, as well as the implementation and operationalization of existing norms. Canada has also been the biggest proponent of taking gender considerations into account when discussing the implementation of cyber norms, advocating for greater women’s participation and gender equality in the field of cybersecurity.

At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, Albania aligned itself with the EU’s position that the previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus” form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x]. In 2018, Albania voted against the Russian-sponsored resolution A/73/27, which launched the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) format.

In multilateral fora, Japan has frequently emphasised the need to implement voluntary and non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. The country believes that any discussion on norm-building should exclusively occur on the basis of the 11 norms affirmed within the 2015 UNGGE Report; possible new norms should be “carefully scrutinised” so as to avoid any change to these 11 norms or duplication with them. 
Japan also strongly opposes the adoption of additional legally binding obligations, maintaining that such an endeavour would take a very long time whereas the evolution of technology is extremely fast-paced. Instead, countries should work on parallel mechanisms for capacity-building, raising awareness, and promoting a common understanding of norms.

The Canadian National Cyber Security Strategy puts an emphasis on “secure and resilient Canadian systems”, specifically critical infrastructure such as electricity grids, communications networks, and financial institutions. The ambition to help other countries expand their capacity building activities has been a key aspect of Canada’s cyber engagement strategy and its concurrent aim of promoting an “open, secure, and multistakeholder-led Internet”. Under the auspices of the OEWG, Canada has argued that “member States must make cyber security capacity development a priority at the highest level” and that “it is […] important to analyze and assess the capacity building needs collaboratively and agree on a collective approach”. Through the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program (ACCBP), Canada has committed $27.7M to cyber capacity building, primarily in Latin America. ACCBP also assists countries in developing their own national cyber strategies and cybersecurity standards while also ensuring respect for human rights and privacy for all citizens. Meanwhile, Canada has been cooperating with several international and regional organizations on the development and implementation of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs); for instance, there have been several Canadian initiatives at the OSCE, including workshops on international law and cyber operations as well as scenario-based discussions on CBM 5 (information sharing about national responses to regional cyber incidents). Canada believes that capacity-building should be multistakeholder and integrate the insights of the technical community as much as possible. The Canadian representative at the OEWG has also highlighted the importance of gender balance and the participation of women in capacity-building efforts.

In recent years, Albania has significantly expanded its capacity-building activities, modernising both the relevant institutional apparatus and the diplomatic outreach accompanying it. Since 2017, ALCIRT, Albania’s national CSIRT, has been given an expanded mandate and merged with the National Authority for Electronic Certification and Cyber Security (AKCESK). AKCESK is responsible for preparing strategic documents relating to cybersecurity, drafting legislation, collaborating with relevant stakeholders (international organisations, civil society organisations, the private sector) and providing training. [x] Through AKCESK, Albania has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with several regional national CERTs (Kosovo, North Macedonia, Romania) and is currently negotiating similar MoUs with Serbia, Montenegro, Cyprus, and Slovenia. [x] AKCESK also frequently collaborates with the Council of Europe in relation to incident response and awareness training. [x] As a member of NATO, Albania signed the MoU with the NATO Cyber Incident Response Centre (NCIRC) on enhancing cyber defence in 2013 [x] and has participated in numerous NATO-led training initiatives, including the flagship Cyber Coalition exercise. Meanwhile, increased emphasis has been placed on the protection of critical infrastructure, with a 2015 government paper stating that future actions will be focused on “the protection and resilience capacity of critical infrastructure” and on “encouraging operators that own them to implement a full security architecture (including risk management and emergencies)”. [x] In 2020, Albania adopted its first-ever cybersecurity regulation for the electricity sector, which establishes incident reporting and assessment criteria for electricity operators. [x] This was reportedly only the first of many planned initiatives intended to reduce the country’s cyber vulnerabilities and increase trust in digital services.

Resilience constitutes one of the central objectives of Japan’s 2018 Cybersecurity Strategy, whose core components include international cooperation in sharing expertise and coordination of policies, incidence response, and cyber capacity-building (CCB). Japan has traditionally argued that global initiatives are required to reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities and has advocated for a tailor-made approach that takes into account the national situation of recipient countries and the importance of national ownership. 
Japan recognises the ‘trickle-up’ effect of national initiatives, stating that CCB “not only improves the capabilities of the recipient country, but also directly leads to enhanced security and stability in cyberspace as a whole”; in that sense, it disfavours the understanding of CCB as a “common but differentiated responsibility”, believing that such a view “does not fit the context” of international cyber cooperation. As a result, the country has assumed a balanced approach to CCB. On the one hand, it has successfully utilised multilateral fora such as the G7 and G20 summits to promote its own normative standards. 
At the G7 Ise-Shina Summit in May 2016, for instance, Japan introduced the Ise-Shima Principles, which included the enhancement of cooperation on CCB. On the other hand, Japan considers its own security and that of its nationals as intrinsically tied to the cyber capabilities of developing countries, since attacks on the IT infrastructure of regional partners can adversely affect Japanese trade. Japan has thus acted primarily through ASEAN to promote regional capacity-building efforts.

Canada’s National Cyber Security Strategy identifies the activities of malicious cyber actors as a “growing challenge”. Following the adoption of the ‘Protecting Canadians from Online Crime’ Act, Canada acceded to the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention in 2015 and has since consistently promoted the instrument as the “best tool to fight cybercrime at the international level”. Canada has specifically “encourage[d] countries to bolster their anti-cybercrime efforts by becoming Parties to the Convention, or using it as a model to implement their own cybercrime laws”. Moreover, upon Canada’s initiative, the Quintet of Attorneys General (which brings together Attorneys General from Canada, the US, Australia, New Zealand and the UK) issued a public statement at their July 2019 meeting, expressing their support for the Budapest Convention as a “necessary basic framework for fighting cybercrime” and for the work of the United Nations Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group on Cybercrime (UNIEG). Being part of the ‘like-minded’ group of states, Canada voted against the Russian-sponsored UNGA Resolution 74/247 aiming at establishing an alternative cybercrime instrument; upon the passage of 74/247 and its follow-up UNGA Resolution 75/282, however, Canada has been a vocal member of the Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime. Prior to the Committee’s May 2021 organizational session, the Canadian position paper on the Implementation of 74/247 noted that the Committee must “ensure consistency with existing UN treaties in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice, in particular the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the United Nations Convention against Corruption and take into account multilateral instruments that have already proven their usefulness in the fight against cybercrime, in particular the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime”. In the same document, Canada emphasized the need for an “inclusive, transparent, constructive, and consensus-based process that will lead to a fair outcome to the benefit of all”. The first session of the Ad Hoc Committee will be held in New York from 17 to 28 January 2022. Canada’s perspective on the scope, objectives, and structure of the convention was submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee in advance of the start of the first negotiation session (E).

Albania is a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, with the Albanian Parliament ratifying the Convention in 2002 [x]. Since then, however, national strategic documents have been acknowledging the incomplete harmonisation of national legislation with Budapest provisions. The most recent five-year National Cybersecurity Strategy states that “legislation in the cybersecurity field should be harmonised with EU legislation, thus creating a complete and codified mechanism to adequately address and resolve issues. Besides, where possible, international internet security mechanisms should be accessed, signed, ratified, and implemented”. The Strategy also places special emphasis on children’s online protection, elevating it into a key priority [x]. Aiming to implement the policy goals listed within the National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Strategy for Investigation of Cybercrime (2021-2025) lays out a number of objectives for law enforcement [x]: (1) extending the cybercrime investigation structure throughout the country and building technological and legal capacity; (2) presenting a prompt and efficient response to cybercrime, raising public awareness, taking legislative initiatives, and building professional capacity; (3) presenting a rapid and professional response to the prevention, prosecution, and investigation of cybercrime against children; and (4) increasing national and international cooperation in the field of cybercrime investigation with strategic partners. Albanian police forces have also collaborated with Europol in coordinated action against cyber fraud and through the launch of the Sell Safe awareness campaign. [x]

According to Japan’s 2018 Cybersecurity Strategy, the country is committed to “further [promoting] international partnership through international investigative cooperation and information sharing with international organisations, law enforcement agencies and security information agencies in foreign countries.” 
Japan is a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and mutual assistance treaties (MLAT), voting against the Russian-sponsored UNGA resolution calling for a new binding cybercrime treaty. Japan has pursued dialogues related to cybercrime cooperation in the context of ASEAN, as well as on a bilateral basis with countries like the UK, USA, and Australia.