The United Kingdom ranks 10^th in the 2021 Network Readiness Index (NRI), 9^th in the 2021 Digital Skills Gap Index and 14^th in the 2021 IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking. The British digital sector contributes roughly £149 billion each year to the economy and employs more than 1.5 million people [x]. The country also remains Europe’s unofficial ‘start-up capital’, with British tech startups attracting more than $15 billion in venture capital investment in the midst of a global pandemic. Nevertheless, new and emerging challenges to peace and security in cyberspace represent pressing concerns for the UK [x]. Over the course of 2021, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre dealt with 777 significant incidents, with around 20% of supported organisations being linked to the health sector and Covid vaccines [x]. In the face of ever-increasing cyber vulnerabilities, the UK government has recently adopted a strategy of ‘levelling up’ protection for British cyberspace. This has brought international collaboration on cyber issues to the forefront of Britain’s diplomatic agenda. British diplomacy has traditionally championed the rules-based international system both online and offline, placing great emphasis on human rights, democratic values and free trade.

Costa Rica has established itself as a leading country in technological adoption, in combination with a complete commitment to sustainability and the protection of the environment. Information and communications technology services accounted for 49% of the country’s exports (twice the average of OECD countries), placing the Central American country at the forefront of the digital economy.

In October 2021, North Macedonia became one of the first countries among the Western Balkans partners to issue a digital ID to its citizens [x]; the deployment of the digital identity project is only indicative of the country’s turn towards digitalisation and e-government. With a total population of about 2.08 million, Internet penetration in North Macedonia stands at 84%, while data shows that there are about 2.25 million cellular mobile connections. [x] The rapid drive towards digitalisation, but also its accompanying risks and vulnerabilities, are accounted for by the 2022 Cybersecurity Strategy, the country’s first comprehensive cybersecurity strategy. The document largely reflects the country’s European ambitions and is explicitly based on the “principles of the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union and the NATO Cyber Defence Pledge”.

The UK views international law as “a critical tool for ensuring stability and security in cyberspace”. In accordance with the 2013, 2015 and 2021 UNGGE reports as well the 2021 OEWG report, the UK has affirmed that international law, including the UN Charter in its entirety, applies in cyberspace; a position paper notably states that “we do not consider it is for States to pick and choose which international law instruments are applicable”. This includes the prohibition of the use of force (Article 2(4)), the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33) and the inherent right of states to act in self-defence in response to an armed attack (Article 51). The law of state responsibility applies to cyber operations in peacetime, including the doctrine of countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts. Meanwhile, the country has professed a strong commitment to the respect of human rights law in cyberspace, co-sponsoring the 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018 and 2021 UN Human Rights Council resolutions on the protection, promotion and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet. Likewise, the UK believes in the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber operations in armed conflict. In response to concerns expressed by other states that this might lead to an undue ‘militarisation’ of cyberspace, the UK has responded that the application of IHL does not encourage armed conflict but only serves to limit humanitarian consequences in the event of such conflict. In addition, the country has stated and that there are ways for cyber capabilities to be developed in a manner “consistent with international law” and called on states to be transparent about the existence of their own capabilities. Those statements do not entirely dismiss the idea of cyberspace as a new military domain, with the British position at the OEWG being that “the use of ICTs in military contexts may be preferable to use of kinetic weapons and can be de-escalatory”. The UK is against the establishment of new, binding international instruments to regulate state behaviour in cyberspace, arguing that “pursuing […] the development of new treaties is only likely to entrench existing divides in this area and will progress us no further on the question of how International Law applies”.

Costa Rica has played a paramount role in the Organisation of American States as is one of seven American countries that sponsored a resolution within the framework of the OAS as part of a Working Group on Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace. The resolution is inspired by the work of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts and aims at enhancing interstate cooperation, transparency, predictability, and stability in cyberspace.

At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, recalling its candidate status, North Macedonia aligned itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] North Macedonia has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29.

The UK regards voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour as one of the three key pillars upon which the framework for international stability in cyberspace is currently built, the other two being international law and confidence-building measures (CBMs). The British have argued that “stronger awareness and understanding by all countries of the framework in general” is necessary and stated that they “remain concerned that the elaboration of new norms could undermine the existing norms by weakening the overarching protection they provide, or their technology neutral and ‘future-proofed’ nature”. The focus should instead be on the universalisation, operationalisation and implementation of existing norms, with regional organisations and capacity-building efforts playing a central role in this endeavour.

Costa Rica has a long history of collaborating on cyber issues within the OAS Cyber Security Program, from training to capacity-building for both the public and private sectors. At a 2019 intervention, Costa Rica recognised the leadership carried out by the aforementioned Working Group in coordinating the response to cyber incidents regionally and establishing a cooperative framework of action to cyber threats.
Costa Rican participation in the UN OEWG is guaranteed until 2025. As part of the second substantive session in 2022, Costa Rica confirmed - along with several other countries - that international law is fully applicable to the use of ICT by states [OH1], with a focus on how international humanitarian law and the principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and distinction apply in cyberspace.
An interesting approach was taken by Costa Rica during this session, as the Caribbean country emphasised a multi-stakeholder approach to cybersecurity, involving the private sector, civil society, and researchers’ analysis, information, and capacity on threat.

At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, North Macedonia aligned itself with the EU’s position that the previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus, form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x]. North Macedonia was also the only EU candidate country to have co-sponsored the 2020 Programme of Action (PoA), which explored the possibility of ending the dual-track discussions (UNGGE/OEWG) in favour of a permanent UN forum.

The July 2021 policy paper on Global Britain in a Competitive Age makes extensive reference to resilience in the post-Covid ICT environment, pledging that the UK will “strengthen global resilience” and “ensur[e] that more resilient countries worldwide can come together through stronger international institutions to act on the most pressing shared challenges”. In the cyber domain, this pledge has been further operationalised by the 2022 National Cyber Strategy, which frames cyber resilience in terms of risk awareness, system security and preparedness. The Strategy prioritises capacity building, adopting a whole-of-government approach and focusing on three elements: protecting critical international supply chains and infrastructure, advancing the secure use of digital technologies and working with industry partners and academia. Since 2016, the UK has worked through the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to adopt an integrated approach to cyber incident management, streamlining across the public and private sectors. Meanwhile, Britain has championed
capacity-building assistance efforts abroad by providing advice, training and exercises and enabling the creation and maintenance of national Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs). It has also provided funding to international capacity-building platforms, such as the Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams (FIRST) and the Americas CSIRT network. The UK has been working with partners within the OSCE to encourage the implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs).

In 2016, Costa Rican Cybersecurity Incident Response Team (CSIRT) joined CAMP, an international alliance that serves as a platform for the members to enhance their cybersecurity capacity.
Costa Rica is also collaborating with Israel on cyber issues and digital transformation in an effort that has the potential to streamline innovation in the public sector, transforming public services and institutions and positioning Costa Rica as a regional benchmark in cybersecurity.
On a national scale, Costa Rica launched a digital transformation strategy for the public sector in 2018 and is now working to create a strategy for the implementation of Artificial Intelligence. The initiative seeks to promote the use of digital technologies and access to scientific knowledge, innovation, technology, and telecommunications for social and productive transformation.
Having suffered a cyber attack in 2022, Costa Rica is now positioning cybersecurity as a top national priority, and the Ministry of Science, Innovation, Technology and Telecommunications is beginning to implement various actions to detect, respond and correct cyber intrusions, build faster and more robust response protocols, and train individuals in skilled threat detection.

The 2018-2022 Cybersecurity Strategy dedicates a full section to cyber resilience and the protection of ICT infrastructure. The stated objectives include expanding the capabilities of the national CERT (MKD-CIRT), identifying types of critical infrastructure, developing national procedures for cyber crisis management, developing incident reporting and monitoring mechanisms, and establishing a single and comprehensive legal framework for cyber resilience. In 2021, upon joining NATO, North Macedonia signed a Memorandum of Understanding aiming at enhancing cyber defence cooperation between NATO and the country’s defence authorities; the MoU particularly focuses on information-sharing, exchanging best practices, and increasing resilience. [x]

According to the 2022 National Cyber Strategy, the UK is committed to promoting the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on cybercrime as the primary international instrument for inter-state cooperation, while simultaneously engaging constructively with the UN process to develop a new international cybercrime treaty that will sit comfortably alongside the Budapest regime. In terms of law enforcement, the UK has developed well established mechanisms through the National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU), operating under the umbrella of the National Crime Agency (NCA). The NCCU is tasked with leading the operational response, coordinating activity across different stakeholders and providing specialist cyber support across the law enforcement domain. The NCA has also developed a network of international liaison officers, which regularly cooperate with Interpol and Europol. Bilateral cooperation with international partners occurs on the basis of the Budapest Convention and associated Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), which facilitate information sharing amongst signatory states. The UK has been an active participant – and has provided voluntary contributions – in the context of discussions for developing a Second Additional Protocol to the Convention to enhance the speed and efficiency of international evidence sharing; the Protocol will be opened for signature in May 2022. The UK has also provided capacity-building assistance to over 100 partner countries, especially in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and Africa.

Costa Rica is one of the few Latin American countries to have signed the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, along with the First and Second Protocol (this one was signed in 2022 but yet to be ratified), and is at the forefront of cybercrime legislation in the region.
National legislation on cybercrime is fully compliant with the Convention and is contained in the Law on Intervention of Telecommunications and the Law of Computer Crimes and Related Crimes. It includes penalties for committing cybercrimes in the country. Additionally, legislative regulations were introduced to govern the use of social networks and other electronic means.
Their Cybersecurity Policy from 2017 was updated in 2021 with the creation of the CSIRT, the implementation of cybersecurity protocols across public institutions and the establishment of partnerships with strategic actors, mainly in the private sector.

North Macedonia has ratified the Budapest Convention and its Additional Protocol [x]. Nevertheless, full harmonisation of the Macedonian legal regime with Budapest provisions is still a primary issue. In terms of institutional setup, analysis has pointed out that North Macedonia is lagging behind compared to other countries in the Western Balkans [x]. That said, the 2018-2022 Cybersecurity Strategy identifies several priorities regarding the “prevention, research, and adequate response” to cybercrime. These include: harmonising the national with international policies; developing a single, comprehensive legal framework for cybercrime; modernising authorities in charge of cybercrime; establishing formal procedures of information exchange; participating actively in the creation of international cybercrime regulations and standards, as well as their implementation on a national level; and providing continuous education and training for law enforcement entities in the field of cybersecurity, cybercrime, and electronic evidence. The country’s law enforcement authorities regularly cooperate with Europol, following the conclusion of a strategic agreement in 2007 and an operational agreement in 2011. [x]