According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), as of 2021, Peru had an internet penetration rate of around 71.1 %. However other indexes place this number in the mid 60’s. Although many improvements were made in the past few years, Peru still possesses low network coverage, especially in rural areas and a relatively low network performance.
The government of Peru has been implementing initiatives to increase connectivity in rural areas, including a national broadband plan and a program to deploy free Wi-Fi hotspots in public spaces, with a year-on-year increase of almost 100 %.
Peru ranked 86 out of 182 countries surveyed in the ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index in 2020.
Compare
Compare
According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), as of 2021, Peru had an internet penetration rate of around 71.1 %. However other indexes place this number in the mid 60’s. Although many improvements were made in the past few years, Peru still possesses low network coverage, especially in rural areas and a relatively low network performance.
The government of Peru has been implementing initiatives to increase connectivity in rural areas, including a national broadband plan and a program to deploy free Wi-Fi hotspots in public spaces, with a year-on-year increase of almost 100 %.
Peru ranked 86 out of 182 countries surveyed in the ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index in 2020. In October 2021, North Macedonia became one of the first countries among the Western Balkans partners to issue a digital ID to its citizens [x]; the deployment of the digital identity project is only indicative of the country’s turn towards digitalisation and e-government. With a total population of about 2.08 million, Internet penetration in North Macedonia stands at 84%, while data shows that there are about 2.25 million cellular mobile connections. [x] The rapid drive towards digitalisation, but also its accompanying risks and vulnerabilities, are accounted for by the 2022 Cybersecurity Strategy, the country’s first comprehensive cybersecurity strategy. The document largely reflects the country’s European ambitions and is explicitly based on the “principles of the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union and the NATO Cyber Defence Pledge”. Over the past decade, Australia has been a frontrunner in terms of digital transformation; the country ranked 11th globally on the 2020 Global Connectivity Index and 2nd in the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s better-than-expected economic performance in 2021 was largely owed to increased government efforts at promoting the digitalisation of businesses and government services, with significant investment being poured into the ICT sector under the Digital Economy Strategy and the Regional Connectivity Program. Meanwhile, however, self-reported losses from cybercrime amounted to more than $33 billion during the 2020-2021 financial year (E), while roughly a quarter of cyber incidents reported during the same period involved Australia’s critical infrastructure or essential services (E). In the cyber diplomacy realm, Australia has traditionally been a prominent member of the ‘like-minded’ group, promoting a vision of a free, open, and secure cyberspace that is very much in line with EU values and efforts.
The government of Peru has been implementing initiatives to increase connectivity in rural areas, including a national broadband plan and a program to deploy free Wi-Fi hotspots in public spaces, with a year-on-year increase of almost 100 %.
Peru ranked 86 out of 182 countries surveyed in the ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index in 2020. In October 2021, North Macedonia became one of the first countries among the Western Balkans partners to issue a digital ID to its citizens [x]; the deployment of the digital identity project is only indicative of the country’s turn towards digitalisation and e-government. With a total population of about 2.08 million, Internet penetration in North Macedonia stands at 84%, while data shows that there are about 2.25 million cellular mobile connections. [x] The rapid drive towards digitalisation, but also its accompanying risks and vulnerabilities, are accounted for by the 2022 Cybersecurity Strategy, the country’s first comprehensive cybersecurity strategy. The document largely reflects the country’s European ambitions and is explicitly based on the “principles of the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union and the NATO Cyber Defence Pledge”. Over the past decade, Australia has been a frontrunner in terms of digital transformation; the country ranked 11th globally on the 2020 Global Connectivity Index and 2nd in the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s better-than-expected economic performance in 2021 was largely owed to increased government efforts at promoting the digitalisation of businesses and government services, with significant investment being poured into the ICT sector under the Digital Economy Strategy and the Regional Connectivity Program. Meanwhile, however, self-reported losses from cybercrime amounted to more than $33 billion during the 2020-2021 financial year (E), while roughly a quarter of cyber incidents reported during the same period involved Australia’s critical infrastructure or essential services (E). In the cyber diplomacy realm, Australia has traditionally been a prominent member of the ‘like-minded’ group, promoting a vision of a free, open, and secure cyberspace that is very much in line with EU values and efforts.
Peru is one of the Latin American countries to have signed and ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention 108+.
The country has also participated in the United Nations Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. As a matter of fact, after the third substantive session of the OEWG, Peru issued a statement supporting the primacy of the UN Charter and the application of international law in the use of ICTs and in cyberspace, as well as the future establishment of legally binding obligations.
On the other hand, Peru along with Chile and the United States of America, has a divergent view on the notion of cyber attack and the applicability of international law. Peru states that in order for a cyber operation to be considered an attack, it results in direct death, injury or physical harm. At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, recalling its candidate status, North Macedonia aligned itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] North Macedonia has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29. Australia believes that “the foundation for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace is our mutual commitment to existing international law” and that, as per the 2021 report of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), international law is “essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, […] stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.” In particular, Australia has affirmed that the UN Charter applies in its entirety to state actions in cyberspace, including the prohibition on the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the right to self-defence in response to an armed attack, the law of state responsibility during peacetime, and the doctrine of countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts. International legal obligations also include the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (especially the right to privacy and freedom of expression), as well as the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber operations in armed conflict. On the application of IHL, Australia echoes the position taken by the ICRC that “recognition of the application of IHL neither encourages militarisation, nor legitimises resort to conflict in any domain”.
The country has also participated in the United Nations Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. As a matter of fact, after the third substantive session of the OEWG, Peru issued a statement supporting the primacy of the UN Charter and the application of international law in the use of ICTs and in cyberspace, as well as the future establishment of legally binding obligations.
On the other hand, Peru along with Chile and the United States of America, has a divergent view on the notion of cyber attack and the applicability of international law. Peru states that in order for a cyber operation to be considered an attack, it results in direct death, injury or physical harm. At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, recalling its candidate status, North Macedonia aligned itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] North Macedonia has also consistently aligned itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29. Australia believes that “the foundation for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace is our mutual commitment to existing international law” and that, as per the 2021 report of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), international law is “essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, […] stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.” In particular, Australia has affirmed that the UN Charter applies in its entirety to state actions in cyberspace, including the prohibition on the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the right to self-defence in response to an armed attack, the law of state responsibility during peacetime, and the doctrine of countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts. International legal obligations also include the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (especially the right to privacy and freedom of expression), as well as the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber operations in armed conflict. On the application of IHL, Australia echoes the position taken by the ICRC that “recognition of the application of IHL neither encourages militarisation, nor legitimises resort to conflict in any domain”.
Peru stresses the need to make a distinction between 'cyber attacks' (which involve 'damage being caused to a militarily relevant target, which may be totally or partially destroyed, even captured or neutralised') and an 'abrupt disruption of communications in cyberspace', i.e. cyber operations that cause inconvenience, even extreme inconvenience, but not direct injury or death, or destruction of property. Accordingly, Peru emphasises the determination of the legality of cyber operations in the context of the use of force by taking into account whether they may result in death or injury to persons or property.
Peru has noted the difficulty of attribution in cyberspace. Coinciding with other American states, Peru has focused on the state's duty to ensure that its territory is not used by non-state actors to launch attacks. In this regard, Peru states that the inertia of a state towards a non-state actor that could unleash a cyber-attack on another state and that it was in a position to control could make its behaviour attributable to the state.
In any case, Peru highlights the validity of various human rights in cyberspace, including 'the right to privacy and intimacy, freedom of information, freedom of expression, free and equal access to information, bridging the digital divide, intellectual property rights, free flow of information, the right to secrecy of communications'. At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, North Macedonia aligned itself with the EU’s position that the previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus, form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x]. North Macedonia was also the only EU candidate country to have co-sponsored the 2020 Programme of Action (PoA), which explored the possibility of ending the dual-track discussions (UNGGE/OEWG) in favour of a permanent UN forum. Australia has been actively involved in both norm-building processes that have been occurring under the auspices of the UN, namely the UN Open-Ended Working Group (GGE) and the OEWG. The country’s 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy notes that the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms on responsible state behaviour agreed under the 2015 UN GGE consensus reports serve to “promote predictability, stability, and security” in cyberspace and should be seen as the “point of departure” for any constructive norm-building discussion. Australian diplomats have consistently reiterated the complementarity between international law and norms of responsible state behaviour, stating that “norms are not a panacea” and that they should not be understood as a standalone “normative framework”, since they do not replace existing state obligations under international law. For this reason, Australia stands against the establishment of binding norms or agreements. The country is not prima facie opposed to discussing other states’ proposals for the development of new norms, but Australia’s own “proactive priority” is reaching agreement of guidance on the implementation of the existing norms. In the current environment, Australia believes that “we will have the biggest impact on international peace and stability if we translate norms ‘on paper’ into norms ‘in practice’”. While not discounting the value of “norms agreed among friends”, it has also highlighted that the framework will only be effective when it is any proposals for new norms would first need to be negotiated, agreed upon, and endorsed by universal consensus.
Peru has noted the difficulty of attribution in cyberspace. Coinciding with other American states, Peru has focused on the state's duty to ensure that its territory is not used by non-state actors to launch attacks. In this regard, Peru states that the inertia of a state towards a non-state actor that could unleash a cyber-attack on another state and that it was in a position to control could make its behaviour attributable to the state.
In any case, Peru highlights the validity of various human rights in cyberspace, including 'the right to privacy and intimacy, freedom of information, freedom of expression, free and equal access to information, bridging the digital divide, intellectual property rights, free flow of information, the right to secrecy of communications'. At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, North Macedonia aligned itself with the EU’s position that the previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus, form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x]. North Macedonia was also the only EU candidate country to have co-sponsored the 2020 Programme of Action (PoA), which explored the possibility of ending the dual-track discussions (UNGGE/OEWG) in favour of a permanent UN forum. Australia has been actively involved in both norm-building processes that have been occurring under the auspices of the UN, namely the UN Open-Ended Working Group (GGE) and the OEWG. The country’s 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy notes that the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms on responsible state behaviour agreed under the 2015 UN GGE consensus reports serve to “promote predictability, stability, and security” in cyberspace and should be seen as the “point of departure” for any constructive norm-building discussion. Australian diplomats have consistently reiterated the complementarity between international law and norms of responsible state behaviour, stating that “norms are not a panacea” and that they should not be understood as a standalone “normative framework”, since they do not replace existing state obligations under international law. For this reason, Australia stands against the establishment of binding norms or agreements. The country is not prima facie opposed to discussing other states’ proposals for the development of new norms, but Australia’s own “proactive priority” is reaching agreement of guidance on the implementation of the existing norms. In the current environment, Australia believes that “we will have the biggest impact on international peace and stability if we translate norms ‘on paper’ into norms ‘in practice’”. While not discounting the value of “norms agreed among friends”, it has also highlighted that the framework will only be effective when it is any proposals for new norms would first need to be negotiated, agreed upon, and endorsed by universal consensus.
The Personal Data Protection Law N° 29733 (PDPL) was enacted in June 2011. In March 2013, the Supreme Decree N° 003-2013-JUS-Regulation of the PDLP (Regulation) was published in order to develop, clarify and expand on the requirements of the PDPL and set forth specific rules, terms and provisions regarding data protection.
Together, the PDLP and its Regulation are the primary data protection laws in Peru.
As of 2021, Peru approved the Bill that creates the National Authority for Transparency, Access to Public Information and Protection of Personal Data.
Peru possesses a Digital Trust Framework, as a means to establish certain obligations for public or private entities acting as digital service providers. These include reporting when a digital security incident involving personal data occurs, as well as implementing technical, organisational, and legal security measures to guarantee the confidentiality of information transmitted through its communications services.
Over the last decades, the Peruvian state has made efforts to promote digital transformation, both within its institutions and in the services it offers to citizens and has outlined a Digital Agenda in 2021 for Digital Transformation.
The 2018-2022 Cybersecurity Strategy dedicates a full section to cyber resilience and the protection of ICT infrastructure. The stated objectives include expanding the capabilities of the national CERT (MKD-CIRT), identifying types of critical infrastructure, developing national procedures for cyber crisis management, developing incident reporting and monitoring mechanisms, and establishing a single and comprehensive legal framework for cyber resilience. In 2021, upon joining NATO, North Macedonia signed a Memorandum of Understanding aiming at enhancing cyber defence cooperation between NATO and the country’s defence authorities; the MoU particularly focuses on information-sharing, exchanging best practices, and increasing resilience. [x] In recent years, Australia has emerged as a regional leader in conversations surrounding cyber resilience in the Indo-Pacific as well as globally. The new 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Strategy constitutes one of the most comprehensive documents of its kind, with “secure, resilient, and trusted technology” representing a crucial objective. Key initiatives include enhanced protections for critical infrastructure and systems of national significance, as well as greater support for businesses and individuals to develop their cybersecurity resilience. In the past three years, Australian cyber diplomats have brokered a series of bilateral partnerships in the form of cyber Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs); currently there are agreements with India (2020), Indonesia (2018), Papua New Guinea (2018), Singapore (2020), and Thailand (2019), all of which include capacity-building and information-sharing elements. On a regional level, the country is chairing the Asia-Pacific CERT community and the Asia-Pacific cybersecurity operations network. Australians have also significantly extended their regional outreach through their flagship capacity-building initiative, the Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation Program. Meanwhile, Australia participates in several multipartite initiatives with a strong cyber component such as the Structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the eponymous Quad) along with India, Japan, and the US, and the tripartite AUKUS coalition along with the US and the UK. In international fora, Australia has been a vocal champion of increased international collaboration in cyber capacity building (CCB), welcoming references to further cooperation within the 2021 OEWG report but cautioning against limiting such cooperation to the protection of national, translational and supranational infrastructure. Australia has also argued that CCB should be mainstreamed into the larger development agenda of the UN, specifically the Sustainable Development Goals.
Together, the PDLP and its Regulation are the primary data protection laws in Peru.
As of 2021, Peru approved the Bill that creates the National Authority for Transparency, Access to Public Information and Protection of Personal Data.
Peru possesses a Digital Trust Framework, as a means to establish certain obligations for public or private entities acting as digital service providers. These include reporting when a digital security incident involving personal data occurs, as well as implementing technical, organisational, and legal security measures to guarantee the confidentiality of information transmitted through its communications services.
Over the last decades, the Peruvian state has made efforts to promote digital transformation, both within its institutions and in the services it offers to citizens and has outlined a Digital Agenda in 2021 for Digital Transformation.
The 2018-2022 Cybersecurity Strategy dedicates a full section to cyber resilience and the protection of ICT infrastructure. The stated objectives include expanding the capabilities of the national CERT (MKD-CIRT), identifying types of critical infrastructure, developing national procedures for cyber crisis management, developing incident reporting and monitoring mechanisms, and establishing a single and comprehensive legal framework for cyber resilience. In 2021, upon joining NATO, North Macedonia signed a Memorandum of Understanding aiming at enhancing cyber defence cooperation between NATO and the country’s defence authorities; the MoU particularly focuses on information-sharing, exchanging best practices, and increasing resilience. [x] In recent years, Australia has emerged as a regional leader in conversations surrounding cyber resilience in the Indo-Pacific as well as globally. The new 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Strategy constitutes one of the most comprehensive documents of its kind, with “secure, resilient, and trusted technology” representing a crucial objective. Key initiatives include enhanced protections for critical infrastructure and systems of national significance, as well as greater support for businesses and individuals to develop their cybersecurity resilience. In the past three years, Australian cyber diplomats have brokered a series of bilateral partnerships in the form of cyber Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs); currently there are agreements with India (2020), Indonesia (2018), Papua New Guinea (2018), Singapore (2020), and Thailand (2019), all of which include capacity-building and information-sharing elements. On a regional level, the country is chairing the Asia-Pacific CERT community and the Asia-Pacific cybersecurity operations network. Australians have also significantly extended their regional outreach through their flagship capacity-building initiative, the Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation Program. Meanwhile, Australia participates in several multipartite initiatives with a strong cyber component such as the Structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the eponymous Quad) along with India, Japan, and the US, and the tripartite AUKUS coalition along with the US and the UK. In international fora, Australia has been a vocal champion of increased international collaboration in cyber capacity building (CCB), welcoming references to further cooperation within the 2021 OEWG report but cautioning against limiting such cooperation to the protection of national, translational and supranational infrastructure. Australia has also argued that CCB should be mainstreamed into the larger development agenda of the UN, specifically the Sustainable Development Goals.
Peru’s signature and ratification of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which is the only binding international instrument dealing with cybercrime, was a great step towards advancing a cyber agenda.
In 2019, Peru passed a Cyber Defence Act, with the objectives of defending and protecting sovereignty, national interests, critical national assets and key resources to maintain national capabilities against threats or attacks in and through cyberspace, when these affect national security.Peru has also passed a Cybersecurity Framework for the private sector, with the objective of identifying and protecting information assets, detecting security events, and providing for response and recovery from cybersecurity incidents.
In this context, there are more and more reports of cybercrime in the country. According to data from the Public Prosecutor's Office, in 2021 they received 18,596 reports of cybercrime cases, which represents a percentage increase of 92.9% compared to 2020, with phishing and ransomware being the most common attacks.
North Macedonia has ratified the Budapest Convention and its Additional Protocol [x]. Nevertheless, full harmonisation of the Macedonian legal regime with Budapest provisions is still a primary issue. In terms of institutional setup, analysis has pointed out that North Macedonia is lagging behind compared to other countries in the Western Balkans [x]. That said, the 2018-2022 Cybersecurity Strategy identifies several priorities regarding the “prevention, research, and adequate response” to cybercrime. These include: harmonising the national with international policies; developing a single, comprehensive legal framework for cybercrime; modernising authorities in charge of cybercrime; establishing formal procedures of information exchange; participating actively in the creation of international cybercrime regulations and standards, as well as their implementation on a national level; and providing continuous education and training for law enforcement entities in the field of cybersecurity, cybercrime, and electronic evidence. The country’s law enforcement authorities regularly cooperate with Europol, following the conclusion of a strategic agreement in 2007 and an operational agreement in 2011. [x] The 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy recognises that Australia, and the Indo-Pacific region more widely, faces a “worsening” cybercrime landscape characterized by “expanding threats, low barriers to entry, and increasingly resourceful actors”. Australia acceded to the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention in 2013 and has since been vocal about the Convention’s status as the “most comprehensive and effective basis upon which to pursue a common international approach”. The country voted against the Russia-sponsored UN resolution on the establishment of a new cybercrime treaty; however, upon the passage of the resolution and the subsequent creation of a dedicated Ad Hoc Committee, Australia has been active in advocating for a “transparent, inclusive, and consensus-based process with multi-stakeholder participation”. More specifically, it has stated that the new Convention should “draw heavily” from existing international instruments such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and especially the Budapest Convention, so as to avoid undermining these regimes and ensure the protection of human rights. Australia has additionally placed great emphasis on the need for international cooperation, with the 2021 Strategy noting that “information sharing, discussion and capacity building are vital to any meaningful response to the threat posed by cybercrime”. The country has launched numerous regional cooperation and capacity-building initiatives, partnering with Pacific Island countries (Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Niue, Tuvalu) to advance cybercrime law reform and ensure alignment with Budapest provisions.
In 2019, Peru passed a Cyber Defence Act, with the objectives of defending and protecting sovereignty, national interests, critical national assets and key resources to maintain national capabilities against threats or attacks in and through cyberspace, when these affect national security.Peru has also passed a Cybersecurity Framework for the private sector, with the objective of identifying and protecting information assets, detecting security events, and providing for response and recovery from cybersecurity incidents.
In this context, there are more and more reports of cybercrime in the country. According to data from the Public Prosecutor's Office, in 2021 they received 18,596 reports of cybercrime cases, which represents a percentage increase of 92.9% compared to 2020, with phishing and ransomware being the most common attacks.
North Macedonia has ratified the Budapest Convention and its Additional Protocol [x]. Nevertheless, full harmonisation of the Macedonian legal regime with Budapest provisions is still a primary issue. In terms of institutional setup, analysis has pointed out that North Macedonia is lagging behind compared to other countries in the Western Balkans [x]. That said, the 2018-2022 Cybersecurity Strategy identifies several priorities regarding the “prevention, research, and adequate response” to cybercrime. These include: harmonising the national with international policies; developing a single, comprehensive legal framework for cybercrime; modernising authorities in charge of cybercrime; establishing formal procedures of information exchange; participating actively in the creation of international cybercrime regulations and standards, as well as their implementation on a national level; and providing continuous education and training for law enforcement entities in the field of cybersecurity, cybercrime, and electronic evidence. The country’s law enforcement authorities regularly cooperate with Europol, following the conclusion of a strategic agreement in 2007 and an operational agreement in 2011. [x] The 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy recognises that Australia, and the Indo-Pacific region more widely, faces a “worsening” cybercrime landscape characterized by “expanding threats, low barriers to entry, and increasingly resourceful actors”. Australia acceded to the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention in 2013 and has since been vocal about the Convention’s status as the “most comprehensive and effective basis upon which to pursue a common international approach”. The country voted against the Russia-sponsored UN resolution on the establishment of a new cybercrime treaty; however, upon the passage of the resolution and the subsequent creation of a dedicated Ad Hoc Committee, Australia has been active in advocating for a “transparent, inclusive, and consensus-based process with multi-stakeholder participation”. More specifically, it has stated that the new Convention should “draw heavily” from existing international instruments such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and especially the Budapest Convention, so as to avoid undermining these regimes and ensure the protection of human rights. Australia has additionally placed great emphasis on the need for international cooperation, with the 2021 Strategy noting that “information sharing, discussion and capacity building are vital to any meaningful response to the threat posed by cybercrime”. The country has launched numerous regional cooperation and capacity-building initiatives, partnering with Pacific Island countries (Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Niue, Tuvalu) to advance cybercrime law reform and ensure alignment with Budapest provisions.
