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India and the European Union share many values and principles, such as inclusiveness, democracy, and multilateralism. With 1.4 billion people, India is the largest democracy in the world and considers itself as a leader among the Global South. India and the EU share common visions of a rules-based global order and are aligned on their commitment to an open, free, secure, stable, peaceful, and accessible cyberspace, enabling economic growth and innovation. In light of India’s rapid digitization and connectivity, the EU-India Strategic Partnership & Roadmap to 2025 includes commitments to cooperate on new and emerging technologies, norms and regulatory frameworks, and international standards.
The United States has historically been a strong partner in cyber diplomacy for the EU based on common values (human rights, rule of law), goals (open, stable and secure cyberspace) and interpretation of international law. Cyber diplomacy with the US has also been operationalised in the form of information-sharing and cooperation to tackle cybercrime, cooperation on cyber defence via NATO and cyber capacity building in third countries. Despite differences over certain foreign policy issues, the EU and the US remain close allies in cyberspace.
According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), as of 2021, Peru had an internet penetration rate of around 71.1 %. However other indexes place this number in the mid 60’s. Although many improvements were made in the past few years, Peru still possesses low network coverage, especially in rural areas and a relatively low network performance.
The government of Peru has been implementing initiatives to increase connectivity in rural areas, including a national broadband plan and a program to deploy free Wi-Fi hotspots in public spaces, with a year-on-year increase of almost 100 %.
Peru ranked 86 out of 182 countries surveyed in the ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index in 2020.
The government of Peru has been implementing initiatives to increase connectivity in rural areas, including a national broadband plan and a program to deploy free Wi-Fi hotspots in public spaces, with a year-on-year increase of almost 100 %.
Peru ranked 86 out of 182 countries surveyed in the ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index in 2020.
As a member of the 2015 UNGGE group, India accepts that international law and specifically the UN Charter applies in its entirety in the cyber domain. India has noted the need to develop common understandings as to how international law should be interpreted, especially on the issues of what constitutes force and/or an armed attack in cyberspace and what the threshold of cyber-attacks should be to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter.
In statements at the UN General Assembly, India has also specifically called for further elaboration on peacetime rules of international law, the law concerning the right of self-defence and international humanitarian law.
Apart from these calls for clarification and elaboration, however, India’s stance on specific aspects of international law and their interpretation remains unclear. This seems consistent with India’s recent reorientation of its foreign policy; since 2019, India’s wider approach has been marked by a shift from traditional non-alignment to issue-based ‘multi-alignment’ that reflects national priorities and interests. The US believes that international law is applicable in cyberspace. As part of the ‘like-minded’ coalition, the US recognises a need to acknowledge the full breadth of relevant international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights law, customary international law on the responsibilities of states for internationally wrongful acts. The general applicability of IHL in cyberspace is not to be misconstrued as a tacit endorsement of aggression in the cyber domain; instead, it only serves to remind states of the responsibility to respect and protect civilians in the event of armed conflict.
In the context of multilateral fora, US diplomats have specifically emphasised the applicability of the right to self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter, noting that a State may lawfully take cyber-based or non-cyber-based countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful cyber activities attributable to another State, but only subject to the requirements of the doctrine under international law and the principles of necessity and proportionality. Peru is one of the Latin American countries to have signed and ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention 108+.
The country has also participated in the United Nations Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. As a matter of fact, after the third substantive session of the OEWG, Peru issued a statement supporting the primacy of the UN Charter and the application of international law in the use of ICTs and in cyberspace, as well as the future establishment of legally binding obligations.
On the other hand, Peru along with Chile and the United States of America, has a divergent view on the notion of cyber attack and the applicability of international law. Peru states that in order for a cyber operation to be considered an attack, it results in direct death, injury or physical harm.
In statements at the UN General Assembly, India has also specifically called for further elaboration on peacetime rules of international law, the law concerning the right of self-defence and international humanitarian law.
Apart from these calls for clarification and elaboration, however, India’s stance on specific aspects of international law and their interpretation remains unclear. This seems consistent with India’s recent reorientation of its foreign policy; since 2019, India’s wider approach has been marked by a shift from traditional non-alignment to issue-based ‘multi-alignment’ that reflects national priorities and interests. The US believes that international law is applicable in cyberspace. As part of the ‘like-minded’ coalition, the US recognises a need to acknowledge the full breadth of relevant international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights law, customary international law on the responsibilities of states for internationally wrongful acts. The general applicability of IHL in cyberspace is not to be misconstrued as a tacit endorsement of aggression in the cyber domain; instead, it only serves to remind states of the responsibility to respect and protect civilians in the event of armed conflict.
In the context of multilateral fora, US diplomats have specifically emphasised the applicability of the right to self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter, noting that a State may lawfully take cyber-based or non-cyber-based countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful cyber activities attributable to another State, but only subject to the requirements of the doctrine under international law and the principles of necessity and proportionality. Peru is one of the Latin American countries to have signed and ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention 108+.
The country has also participated in the United Nations Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. As a matter of fact, after the third substantive session of the OEWG, Peru issued a statement supporting the primacy of the UN Charter and the application of international law in the use of ICTs and in cyberspace, as well as the future establishment of legally binding obligations.
On the other hand, Peru along with Chile and the United States of America, has a divergent view on the notion of cyber attack and the applicability of international law. Peru states that in order for a cyber operation to be considered an attack, it results in direct death, injury or physical harm.
India has assumed a stance of strategic ambiguity on the proliferation of norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, positioning itself as a ‘bridge builder’ between the two camps that have emerged during multilateral cyber norm negotiations.
Its insistence on an enhanced role for intergovernmental institutions (such as the ITU) and its oscillating allegiance to the two polarised factions largely reflect the country’s long-standing focus on Westphalian sovereignty and the consequent belief in the primacy of the state as an actor in international affairs. This brings India to a certain degree of alignment with sovereignty-focused countries like China and Russia in the context of norm-building debates.
At the second substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), India argued that voluntary norms do not necessarily increase the predictability of state behaviour within the ICT environment, but was not openly against the adoption of new voluntary norms; for instance, the country proposed the adoption of a new norm on refraining from weaponisation and offensive uses of ICTs along with countries like Iran, Cuba, and Nigeria. As stated in the 2018 National Security Strategy, the United States views voluntary, non-binding norms of state behaviour during peacetime as essential components of a framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. The US has participated in all iterations of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) as well as the latest Open-Ended Working Group.
In these multilateral fora, US diplomats have typically opposed attempts at shifting to a legally binding status for norms of responsible state behaviour, arguing that such discussions are “premature” and do not represent the best way to address the immediate threats given the fast pace of technological developments.
The starting basis for any further discussions on the part of the US rests on the current buildup of consensus surrounding the norms identified in the 2015 and 2021 GGE reports. Efforts should be concentrated on the implementation of existing consensus norms, not the creation of entirely new normative concepts (i.e. in relation to harmful hidden functions and specific critical infrastructure sectors). Peru stresses the need to make a distinction between 'cyber attacks' (which involve 'damage being caused to a militarily relevant target, which may be totally or partially destroyed, even captured or neutralised') and an 'abrupt disruption of communications in cyberspace', i.e. cyber operations that cause inconvenience, even extreme inconvenience, but not direct injury or death, or destruction of property. Accordingly, Peru emphasises the determination of the legality of cyber operations in the context of the use of force by taking into account whether they may result in death or injury to persons or property.
Peru has noted the difficulty of attribution in cyberspace. Coinciding with other American states, Peru has focused on the state's duty to ensure that its territory is not used by non-state actors to launch attacks. In this regard, Peru states that the inertia of a state towards a non-state actor that could unleash a cyber-attack on another state and that it was in a position to control could make its behaviour attributable to the state.
In any case, Peru highlights the validity of various human rights in cyberspace, including 'the right to privacy and intimacy, freedom of information, freedom of expression, free and equal access to information, bridging the digital divide, intellectual property rights, free flow of information, the right to secrecy of communications'.
Its insistence on an enhanced role for intergovernmental institutions (such as the ITU) and its oscillating allegiance to the two polarised factions largely reflect the country’s long-standing focus on Westphalian sovereignty and the consequent belief in the primacy of the state as an actor in international affairs. This brings India to a certain degree of alignment with sovereignty-focused countries like China and Russia in the context of norm-building debates.
At the second substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), India argued that voluntary norms do not necessarily increase the predictability of state behaviour within the ICT environment, but was not openly against the adoption of new voluntary norms; for instance, the country proposed the adoption of a new norm on refraining from weaponisation and offensive uses of ICTs along with countries like Iran, Cuba, and Nigeria. As stated in the 2018 National Security Strategy, the United States views voluntary, non-binding norms of state behaviour during peacetime as essential components of a framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. The US has participated in all iterations of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) as well as the latest Open-Ended Working Group.
In these multilateral fora, US diplomats have typically opposed attempts at shifting to a legally binding status for norms of responsible state behaviour, arguing that such discussions are “premature” and do not represent the best way to address the immediate threats given the fast pace of technological developments.
The starting basis for any further discussions on the part of the US rests on the current buildup of consensus surrounding the norms identified in the 2015 and 2021 GGE reports. Efforts should be concentrated on the implementation of existing consensus norms, not the creation of entirely new normative concepts (i.e. in relation to harmful hidden functions and specific critical infrastructure sectors). Peru stresses the need to make a distinction between 'cyber attacks' (which involve 'damage being caused to a militarily relevant target, which may be totally or partially destroyed, even captured or neutralised') and an 'abrupt disruption of communications in cyberspace', i.e. cyber operations that cause inconvenience, even extreme inconvenience, but not direct injury or death, or destruction of property. Accordingly, Peru emphasises the determination of the legality of cyber operations in the context of the use of force by taking into account whether they may result in death or injury to persons or property.
Peru has noted the difficulty of attribution in cyberspace. Coinciding with other American states, Peru has focused on the state's duty to ensure that its territory is not used by non-state actors to launch attacks. In this regard, Peru states that the inertia of a state towards a non-state actor that could unleash a cyber-attack on another state and that it was in a position to control could make its behaviour attributable to the state.
In any case, Peru highlights the validity of various human rights in cyberspace, including 'the right to privacy and intimacy, freedom of information, freedom of expression, free and equal access to information, bridging the digital divide, intellectual property rights, free flow of information, the right to secrecy of communications'.
In matters related to cyber resilience, India has proven to be an active proponent of bilateralism. It has initiated cyber dialogues with actors like the US, the UK, Russia, Malaysia, the EU, and ASEAN, all of which include capacity-building elements. Internationally, the country has also been especially vocal on the need to establish cooperative mechanisms for developing and implementing bilateral, regional, and global confidence-building measures (CBMs).
In the context of multilateral fora, India has many a time reiterated that the issue of supply chain protection enjoys particular significance for them, especially in relation to ‘trust and trusted sources’ when it comes to preferring suppliers of ICT products and systems. It has also noted that capacity building actually goes beyond what is being dealt with under international security and is inherently tied to discussions on international legal instruments on cyberspace, where all states are equal and have the capacity to discuss legitimate matters under the auspices of the UN. The March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance states that “[the US] will make cybersecurity a top priority, strengthening our capability, readiness, and resilience in cyberspace.” Following the recommendations of the 2020 Solarium Commission, the US government has adopted the concept of ‘layered resilience’ and is gradually rolling out a comprehensive arsenal of resilience measures across a variety of domains.
The US has been active in engaging in strategically-minded capacity building with partners; US capacity building in Africa with organisations such as the African Union and SADC, for instance, have been largely motivated by Washington’s wish to promote an open, secure, and democratic model for Internet governance across the African continent.
In relation to cyber defence, there have been several joint operations and military exercises, both bilaterally (e.g. between the US Cyber Command and the Montenegrin military) and under the auspices of NATO. Recent regional engagement efforts such as the dialogues in the context of the tripartite AUKUS coalition and the Structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the eponymous Quad) also heavily feature references to collaborative cyber-capacity building. In multilateral fora, the US has also welcomed the inclusion of confidence-building measures in the GGE reports and noted that, in order for CBMs to be useful, they need to be implemented at minimum on a bilateral basis and preferably on a multilateral and eventually an international basis. The Personal Data Protection Law N° 29733 (PDPL) was enacted in June 2011. In March 2013, the Supreme Decree N° 003-2013-JUS-Regulation of the PDLP (Regulation) was published in order to develop, clarify and expand on the requirements of the PDPL and set forth specific rules, terms and provisions regarding data protection.
Together, the PDLP and its Regulation are the primary data protection laws in Peru.
As of 2021, Peru approved the Bill that creates the National Authority for Transparency, Access to Public Information and Protection of Personal Data.
Peru possesses a Digital Trust Framework, as a means to establish certain obligations for public or private entities acting as digital service providers. These include reporting when a digital security incident involving personal data occurs, as well as implementing technical, organisational, and legal security measures to guarantee the confidentiality of information transmitted through its communications services.
Over the last decades, the Peruvian state has made efforts to promote digital transformation, both within its institutions and in the services it offers to citizens and has outlined a Digital Agenda in 2021 for Digital Transformation.
In the context of multilateral fora, India has many a time reiterated that the issue of supply chain protection enjoys particular significance for them, especially in relation to ‘trust and trusted sources’ when it comes to preferring suppliers of ICT products and systems. It has also noted that capacity building actually goes beyond what is being dealt with under international security and is inherently tied to discussions on international legal instruments on cyberspace, where all states are equal and have the capacity to discuss legitimate matters under the auspices of the UN. The March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance states that “[the US] will make cybersecurity a top priority, strengthening our capability, readiness, and resilience in cyberspace.” Following the recommendations of the 2020 Solarium Commission, the US government has adopted the concept of ‘layered resilience’ and is gradually rolling out a comprehensive arsenal of resilience measures across a variety of domains.
The US has been active in engaging in strategically-minded capacity building with partners; US capacity building in Africa with organisations such as the African Union and SADC, for instance, have been largely motivated by Washington’s wish to promote an open, secure, and democratic model for Internet governance across the African continent.
In relation to cyber defence, there have been several joint operations and military exercises, both bilaterally (e.g. between the US Cyber Command and the Montenegrin military) and under the auspices of NATO. Recent regional engagement efforts such as the dialogues in the context of the tripartite AUKUS coalition and the Structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the eponymous Quad) also heavily feature references to collaborative cyber-capacity building. In multilateral fora, the US has also welcomed the inclusion of confidence-building measures in the GGE reports and noted that, in order for CBMs to be useful, they need to be implemented at minimum on a bilateral basis and preferably on a multilateral and eventually an international basis. The Personal Data Protection Law N° 29733 (PDPL) was enacted in June 2011. In March 2013, the Supreme Decree N° 003-2013-JUS-Regulation of the PDLP (Regulation) was published in order to develop, clarify and expand on the requirements of the PDPL and set forth specific rules, terms and provisions regarding data protection.
Together, the PDLP and its Regulation are the primary data protection laws in Peru.
As of 2021, Peru approved the Bill that creates the National Authority for Transparency, Access to Public Information and Protection of Personal Data.
Peru possesses a Digital Trust Framework, as a means to establish certain obligations for public or private entities acting as digital service providers. These include reporting when a digital security incident involving personal data occurs, as well as implementing technical, organisational, and legal security measures to guarantee the confidentiality of information transmitted through its communications services.
Over the last decades, the Peruvian state has made efforts to promote digital transformation, both within its institutions and in the services it offers to citizens and has outlined a Digital Agenda in 2021 for Digital Transformation.
Under the auspices of the OEWG, India has highlighted the need for “real-time cooperation between government agencies” in combatting cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyber threats more widely. To date, however, India has not signed any international cybercrime agreement. It voted in favour of a Russia-sponsored UNGA Resolution calling for the establishment of a separate cybercrime treaty.
Despite having brought its legal framework largely in alignment with the Budapest Convention, India remains a non-party because the document was drafted without the country’s participation, thus rending the treaty discriminatory. Another big objection has been raised on the basis of section 32.b, which gives intelligence agencies trans-border access to data for the purposes of criminal investigations with lawful and voluntary consent - a concern shared by Russia.
It has also been argued that the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) regime under Budapest is not effective, as it does not commit states to a firm promise of cooperation; from the perspective of the Indians, it would be preferable to replace this regime with a UN-driven process. The US is a signatory and an early proponent of the Budapest Convention. A big part of American cyber diplomatic activity has, in fact, been focused on promoting the Budapest regime as the global model of cybercrime governance. In 2019, the US firmly opposed the Russian-sponsored resolution calling for an alternative legal instrument to the Convention; following the passing of the resolution, however, the US has agreed to participate in the Ad Hoc Committee established under UNGA resolution 74/247 despite the fact that the “surprise text” within the May 2021 resolution was seen as an effort to “circumvent dialogue” and undermine the “balanced, inclusive, consensus-based process” sought by the US.
On a multilateral level, the US is also a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and is a member of Interpol.
Bilaterally, the US has completed an agreement with the UK under the CLOUD Act that facilitates cross-border data sharing directly between US companies and the British government; the US is trying to expand this type of bilateral engagement, currently negotiating a similar agreement with Australia. Peru’s signature and ratification of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which is the only binding international instrument dealing with cybercrime, was a great step towards advancing a cyber agenda.
In 2019, Peru passed a Cyber Defence Act, with the objectives of defending and protecting sovereignty, national interests, critical national assets and key resources to maintain national capabilities against threats or attacks in and through cyberspace, when these affect national security.Peru has also passed a Cybersecurity Framework for the private sector, with the objective of identifying and protecting information assets, detecting security events, and providing for response and recovery from cybersecurity incidents.
In this context, there are more and more reports of cybercrime in the country. According to data from the Public Prosecutor's Office, in 2021 they received 18,596 reports of cybercrime cases, which represents a percentage increase of 92.9% compared to 2020, with phishing and ransomware being the most common attacks.
Despite having brought its legal framework largely in alignment with the Budapest Convention, India remains a non-party because the document was drafted without the country’s participation, thus rending the treaty discriminatory. Another big objection has been raised on the basis of section 32.b, which gives intelligence agencies trans-border access to data for the purposes of criminal investigations with lawful and voluntary consent - a concern shared by Russia.
It has also been argued that the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) regime under Budapest is not effective, as it does not commit states to a firm promise of cooperation; from the perspective of the Indians, it would be preferable to replace this regime with a UN-driven process. The US is a signatory and an early proponent of the Budapest Convention. A big part of American cyber diplomatic activity has, in fact, been focused on promoting the Budapest regime as the global model of cybercrime governance. In 2019, the US firmly opposed the Russian-sponsored resolution calling for an alternative legal instrument to the Convention; following the passing of the resolution, however, the US has agreed to participate in the Ad Hoc Committee established under UNGA resolution 74/247 despite the fact that the “surprise text” within the May 2021 resolution was seen as an effort to “circumvent dialogue” and undermine the “balanced, inclusive, consensus-based process” sought by the US.
On a multilateral level, the US is also a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and is a member of Interpol.
Bilaterally, the US has completed an agreement with the UK under the CLOUD Act that facilitates cross-border data sharing directly between US companies and the British government; the US is trying to expand this type of bilateral engagement, currently negotiating a similar agreement with Australia. Peru’s signature and ratification of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which is the only binding international instrument dealing with cybercrime, was a great step towards advancing a cyber agenda.
In 2019, Peru passed a Cyber Defence Act, with the objectives of defending and protecting sovereignty, national interests, critical national assets and key resources to maintain national capabilities against threats or attacks in and through cyberspace, when these affect national security.Peru has also passed a Cybersecurity Framework for the private sector, with the objective of identifying and protecting information assets, detecting security events, and providing for response and recovery from cybersecurity incidents.
In this context, there are more and more reports of cybercrime in the country. According to data from the Public Prosecutor's Office, in 2021 they received 18,596 reports of cybercrime cases, which represents a percentage increase of 92.9% compared to 2020, with phishing and ransomware being the most common attacks.
