El Salvador has been actively involved in promoting a safe cyberspace. The Latin American country, back in 2015, signed a
memorandum of understanding with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to support the fight against cybercrime, with training in capacity building, prevention and cooperation.
El Salvador has expressed views on the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes at the UNGA.
As part of their statement, it was noted the lack of regulation obliging network administrators of public, private, or non-profit institutions to establish, maintain, and safeguard the connection logs of their internal clients, which can be exploited for the commission of traditional crime and cybercrime.
As part of the OEWG discussions, El Salvador has identified the
norm regarding ICT product supply chains as the most important for states, in addition to proposing that the OEWG
highlights the efforts and progress that countries are making in cybersecurity, making the spirit of cooperation in this area clear.
Costa Rica has a long history of collaborating on cyber issues within the OAS Cyber Security Program, from training to capacity-building for both the public and private sectors. At
a 2019 intervention, Costa Rica recognised the leadership carried out by the aforementioned Working Group in coordinating the response to cyber incidents regionally and establishing a cooperative framework of action to cyber threats.
Costa Rican participation in the UN OEWG is guaranteed until 2025. As part of the second substantive session in 2022, Costa Rica
confirmed - along with several other countries - that international law is fully applicable to the use of ICT by states
[OH1], with a focus on how international humanitarian law and the principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and distinction apply in cyberspace.
An interesting approach was taken by Costa Rica during this session, as the Caribbean country
emphasised a multi-stakeholder approach to cybersecurity, involving the private sector, civil society, and researchers’ analysis, information, and capacity on threat.
India has assumed a stance of strategic ambiguity on the proliferation of norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, positioning itself as a
‘bridge builder’ between the two camps that have emerged during multilateral cyber norm negotiations.
Its insistence on an enhanced role for intergovernmental institutions (such as the ITU) and its oscillating allegiance to the two polarised factions largely reflect the country’s long-standing focus on Westphalian sovereignty and the consequent belief in the primacy of the state as an actor in international affairs. This brings India to a certain degree of alignment with sovereignty-focused countries like China and Russia in the context of norm-building debates.
At the second substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), India
argued that voluntary norms do not necessarily increase the predictability of state behaviour within the ICT environment, but was not openly against the adoption of new voluntary norms; for instance, the country
proposed the adoption of a new norm on refraining from weaponisation and offensive uses of ICTs along with countries like Iran, Cuba, and Nigeria.