Over the past decade, Australia has been a frontrunner in terms of digital transformation; the country ranked 11^th globally on the 2020 Global Connectivity Index and 2^nd in the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s better-than-expected economic performance in 2021 was largely owed to increased government efforts at promoting the digitalisation of businesses and government services, with significant investment being poured into the ICT sector under the Digital Economy Strategy and the Regional Connectivity Program. Meanwhile, however, self-reported losses from cybercrime amounted to more than $33 billion during the 2020-2021 financial year (E), while roughly a quarter of cyber incidents reported during the same period involved Australia’s critical infrastructure or essential services (E). In the cyber diplomacy realm, Australia has traditionally been a prominent member of the ‘like-minded’ group, promoting a vision of a free, open, and secure cyberspace that is very much in line with EU values and efforts.

In recent years, Bosnia and Herzegovina has seen a consistent increase in the rate of Internet absorption along with a continuous extension of broadband access across urban and rural areas. As a potential EU candidate country, Bosnia has recently developed a burgeoning drive to advance the country’s digital and cyber capabilities in line with those of the European Union; ‘smart growth’ is notably included as one of the national priorities under the 2015 Strategic Framework. That said, the institutional, regulatory, and operational framework that would enable the realisation of this ambition is still nascent and the progress in many policy areas is undermined by the complexity of the distribution of powers between the central government and two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. In 2017, Bosnia formally adopted the Policy of Electronic Communications of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2017-2021, which is largely aligned with the Digital Agenda of Europe [x]. This vision of a Bosnian digital society is a key milestone for the country’s emerging cyber diplomatic apparatus as it clearly identifies the foundational pillars of the country’s ICT ecosystem, which in turn will assist in bringing it into closer alignment with European cyber priorities.

As of 2020, 86 % of Uruguayans are active internet users, second in South America, only behind Chile. 9 out of 10 individuals in Uruguay are social media users. This provides a fabric for efficient digital policies and strategies that have transformed Uruguay since the 2010s. Uruguay is ranked first in Latin America and 35th place in the world on Digital Government Development, according to the UNDESA index, which measures dimensions related to technological infrastructure, availability of online services, and ability of citizens to take advantage of those resources. Uruguay also ranks first in Latin America and 42nd in the world on ICT Development, according to the 2017 IDI, published by the International Telecommunications Union. In all, this South American country has positioned itself at the forefront as a regional and world benchmark in Digital Government.

Australia believes that “the foundation for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace is our mutual commitment to existing international law” and that, as per the 2021 report of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), international law is “essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, […] stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.” In particular, Australia has affirmed that the UN Charter applies in its entirety to state actions in cyberspace, including the prohibition on the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the right to self-defence in response to an armed attack, the law of state responsibility during peacetime, and the doctrine of countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts. International legal obligations also include the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (especially the right to privacy and freedom of expression), as well as the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber operations in armed conflict. On the application of IHL, Australia echoes the position taken by the ICRC that “recognition of the application of IHL neither encourages militarisation, nor legitimises resort to conflict in any domain”.

At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, recalling its status as a potential candidate of the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina aligned itself with the EU’s statement that the existing corpus of international law, notably the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace in its entirety. In particular, this includes the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the provision of the use of force non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as principles of international law that are applicable to states use of ICTs in cyberspace. [x] Nevertheless, it has consistently refrained from aligning itself with the EU position in a number of key resolutions at the United Nations, including resolutions A/73/27 and A/74/29.

As a member state of the UNGA, Uruguay expressed their views at the OEWG in 2021, considering cybersecurity an essential element in the prevention of international conflicts. Uruguay provides a rather humanitarian approach to international law and its application on cyber issues. The country is a member of international organisations that promote the development and compliance with standards of transparency and access to information, such as the Open Government Partnership, the Electronic Government Network of Latin America and the Caribbean (GEALC) and Digital Nations.
Uruguay was the first Latin American country, in 2013, to sign the only existing binding, international document concerning the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (known as Convention 108). Its signature and membership have been ratified in 2021.
Uruguay’s Digital initiatives at the national level are also in compliance with the Digital Agenda for Latin America and the Caribbean (eLAC by CEPAL). In particular, Uruguay’s Cybersecurity goal is in line with CEPAL’s framework for confidence-building measures such as combating digital crime by formulating public policies and strategies for cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection.

Australia has been actively involved in both norm-building processes that have been occurring under the auspices of the UN, namely the UN Open-Ended Working Group (GGE) and the OEWG. The country’s 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy notes that the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms on responsible state behaviour agreed under the 2015 UN GGE consensus reports serve to “promote predictability, stability, and security” in cyberspace and should be seen as the “point of departure” for any constructive norm-building discussion. Australian diplomats have consistently reiterated the complementarity between international law and norms of responsible state behaviour, stating that “norms are not a panacea” and that they should not be understood as a standalone “normative framework”, since they do not replace existing state obligations under international law. For this reason, Australia stands against the establishment of binding norms or agreements. The country is not prima facie opposed to discussing other states’ proposals for the development of new norms, but Australia’s own “proactive priority” is reaching agreement of guidance on the implementation of the existing norms. In the current environment, Australia believes that “we will have the biggest impact on international peace and stability if we translate norms ‘on paper’ into norms ‘in practice’”. While not discounting the value of “norms agreed among friends”, it has also highlighted that the framework will only be effective when it is any proposals for new norms would first need to be negotiated, agreed upon, and endorsed by universal consensus.

At the first substantive session of the 2021-2025 UNGGE, Bosnia and Herzegovina aligned itself with the EU’s position that the previous UNGGE and OEWG reports, including corresponding UNGA resolutions adopted by consensus, form the unequivocal basis for “any further discussions on the position, role, and implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms, rules and principles of state behaviour in cyberspace (norms)” [x]. In 2018, however, it voted in favour of Russian-sponsored resolution A/73/27, which launched the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) format.

Uruguay is a represented member in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. The South American country has openly stated that the voluntary norms included in the Report of the Group of Experts (GGE) represent an inescapable guide for the responsible behaviour of States in cyberspace. In session 5 of the second substantive session of the OEWG 2021-2025, Uruguay along with seven other States pointed out the importance of the protection of critical infrastructure, according to norm 13(f).

In recent years, Australia has emerged as a regional leader in conversations surrounding cyber resilience in the Indo-Pacific as well as globally. The new 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Strategy constitutes one of the most comprehensive documents of its kind, with “secure, resilient, and trusted technology” representing a crucial objective. Key initiatives include enhanced protections for critical infrastructure
and systems of national significance, as well as greater support for businesses
and individuals to develop their cybersecurity resilience. In the past three years, Australian cyber diplomats have brokered a series of bilateral partnerships in the form of cyber Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs); currently there are agreements with India (2020), Indonesia (2018), Papua New Guinea (2018), Singapore (2020), and Thailand (2019), all of which include capacity-building and information-sharing elements. On a regional level, the country is chairing the Asia-Pacific CERT community and the Asia-Pacific cybersecurity operations network. Australians have also significantly extended their regional outreach through their flagship capacity-building initiative, the Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation Program. Meanwhile, Australia participates in several multipartite initiatives with a strong cyber component such as the Structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the eponymous Quad) along with India, Japan, and the US, and the tripartite AUKUS coalition along with the US and the UK. In international fora, Australia has been a vocal champion of increased international collaboration in cyber capacity building (CCB), welcoming references to further cooperation within the 2021 OEWG report but cautioning against limiting such cooperation to the protection of national, translational and supranational infrastructure. Australia has also argued that CCB should be mainstreamed into the larger development agenda of the UN, specifically the Sustainable Development Goals.

The country has no overarching cybersecurity strategy. Elements of strategic contemplation over cybersecurity can be found within the Criminal Code, which criminalises critical infrastructure damage (including that of information systems) as an act of terrorism. The 2015-2020 Strategy for Prevention and Combating Terrorism reiterates an objective laid out in earlier documents regarding the setup of a dedicated national CERT that will develop and implement monitoring and response mechanisms vis-a-vis the misuse of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been exploring potential avenues of cooperation with NATO, especially in relation to common solutions to security challenges in the area of cyber defence [x], while Bosnian scientists have also participated in the NATO SPS Programme. Finally, as a member state of the OSCE, Bosnia and Herzegovina is required to implement the OSCE’s 16 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) as adopted by the OSCE Permanent Council.

Objective 10 of Uruguay’s Digital Agenda for 2025 provides a clear guideline for resilience measures in cybersecurity and ICT. Uruguay is focused on enhancing cybersecurity to prevent and mitigate risks in cyberspace, advancing compliance with the national cyber-security framework, based on public-private cooperation and ensuring the availability of critical information assets. Uruguay intends to achieve this goal by improving efficiency in detecting and responding to cyber incidents by implementing new technologies that allow for predictive analytics and response automation, among others.

The 2021 International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy recognises that Australia, and the Indo-Pacific region more widely, faces a “worsening” cybercrime landscape characterized by “expanding threats, low barriers to entry, and increasingly resourceful actors”. Australia acceded to the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention in 2013 and has since been vocal about the Convention’s status as the “most comprehensive and effective basis upon which to pursue a common international approach”. The country voted against the Russia-sponsored UN resolution on the establishment of a new cybercrime treaty; however, upon the passage of the resolution and the subsequent creation of a dedicated Ad Hoc Committee, Australia has been active in advocating for a “transparent, inclusive, and consensus-based process with multi-stakeholder participation”. More specifically, it has stated that the new Convention should “draw heavily” from existing international instruments such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and especially the Budapest Convention, so as to avoid undermining these regimes and ensure the protection of human rights. Australia has additionally placed great emphasis on the need for international cooperation, with the 2021 Strategy noting that “information sharing, discussion and capacity building are vital to any meaningful response to the threat posed by cybercrime”. The country has launched numerous regional cooperation and capacity-building initiatives, partnering with Pacific Island countries (Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Niue, Tuvalu) to advance cybercrime law reform and ensure alignment with Budapest provisions.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, officially acceding in 2006. As of 2019, however, domestic legislation at the state level had only been partially harmonised with Budapest provisions [x]. The country voted against the Russian-sponsored UN resolution that launched the institutional procedure for a new legal instrument on international cybercrime cooperation. Bosnian law enforcement regularly cooperates with Europol and is due to open negotiations for a cooperation agreement with Eurojust [x].

Uruguay is not a signatory State of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, cooperating in international affairs outside of the framework established by the Council of Europe. However, it has a relatively low rate of cybercrime compared to other countries in the region, staking its position as one of the most advanced countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of cybersecurity. Much of its success relies on the Cybersecurity Framework published in 2021, which is allowing Uruguay to start using artificial intelligence to automate incident response and pattern detection, as well as incorporating data analytics to make projections and anticipate incidents.
Regarding Data Protection, Uruguay has adapted its national framework to the European GDPR, despite its latest Data Protection Law dating back to 2008.